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Personalizing the Impersonal:
Corporations and the Bill of Rightst
by
CARL J. MAYER*
Between 1989 and 1992 Americans will celebrate the bicentennial of
the ratification of the Bill of Rights. Even more than average citizens,
however, corporations and their managers are marking this anniversary
with approval1 because they successfully have used the Bill of Rights as a
shield against government regulation. Businesses now wield the Bill of
Rights in much the same way that the fourteenth amendment was used
during the Progressive era when corporations impeded state governmen-
tal regulation with constitutional roadblocks. In this sense, the suppos-
edly defunct doctrine of substantive due process2 -under which the
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1. An example of the importance corporations attach to the bicentennial of the Bill of
Rights is the willingness of one corporation-Philip Morris Companies, Inc.-to sponsor a
bicentennial advertising campaign built around the Bill of Rights.
The multinational tobacco conglomerate plans to spend $60 million on the campaign,
including $600,000 paid to the National Archives to allow Philip Morris to associate itself, on
television and in print, with the Archives-the federal government's keeper of the Bill of
Rights. See Bill of Rights for Rent, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1989, § 6 (Week in Review), at 21,
col. I (editorial).
The federal government-through the Bicentennial Commission-plans to spend approxi-
mately $17 million through the end of 1991 promoting the Bicentennial of the Bill of Rights.
Telephone interview with Jack McDade, Comptroller of the Commission on the Bicentennial
of the United States Constitution (Dec. 19, 1989).
That one corporation plans to spend three times more than the federal government to
promote the bicentennial of the Bill of Rights suggests the anniversary's importance to the
business community.
2. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), has come to embody the doctrine of sub-
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Court imposes its own economic views to strike down regulation-re-
tains surprising vitality. Indeed, the current era can be characterized as
one of corporate due process.
Consider, for example, the following recent Supreme Court deci-
sions: a textile corporation successfully invoked the fifth amendment
double jeopardy clause to avoid retrial in a criminal antitrust action;3 a
consortium of major corporations, including the First National Bank of
Boston, joined in a first amendment lawsuit that overturned state restric-
tions on corporate spending for political referendums; 4 an electrical and
plumbing concern invoked the fourth amendment to thwart federal in-
spections conducted under the Occupational Safety and Health Act;5
and, a California public utility relied on the first amendment to overturn
state regulations designed to lower utility rates.6
Twenty years ago, the corporation had not deployed any of these
Bill of Rights provisions successfully.
The corporation's invocation of the first ten amendments symbolizes
the transformation of our constitutional system from one of individual
freedoms to one of organizational prerogatives. Regarded as America's
most cherished palladium of personal liberties, the Bill of Rights was
appended to the Constitution at the behest of Jefferson and inherited,
ideologically, from political philosophers concerned with individual lib-
erties: Locke, Rousseau, and Montesquieu. The use of these amend-
ments by corporations raises extraordinary historical and political
questions.
This Article explores why, as an historical matter, the Supreme
Court only recently conferred Bill of Rights guarantees on corporations.
stantive due process. This Article does not enter the current debate about the precise meaning
of Lochner. See, e.g., Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987). For pur-
poses of this Article, Lochner represents what it came to mean to the corporate community:
the use of the Constitution to invalidate government regulation of the corporation. See infra
notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
Lochner itself did not involve a corporate plaintiff. But the Court read into the fourteenth
amendment the power to overturn government economic regulation.
Corporations were accorded fourteenth amendment protections under Santa Clara v.
Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1896). Prior to the New Deal, Santa Clara and Lochner
were the twin pillars of corporate opposition to government regulation.
This Article suggests that after 1960 corporations resurrected the spirit of Lochner by
challenging government regulation using the Bill of Rights, rather than the fourteenth amend-
ment. This ushered in an era of corporate substantive due process.
3. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1976).
4. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1977).
5. Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1977).
6. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 475 U.S.
1133 (1986).
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It also asks: what theory of the corporation 7 permits the Court to bestow
these protections? Part I argues that intangible Bill of Rights protections
are, in an unprecedented manner, important to the corporation in the
modem political economy. Whereas the fourteenth amendment was use-
ful in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to shield corporations
from rudimentary, sporadic attempts by states to regulate, the Bill of
Rights today helps corporations fight more sophisticated modem federal
regulation. Part II explains why, although the Court increasingly con-
fers Bill of Rights safeguards on corporations, it has abandoned earlier
efforts to theorize about the corporation's entitlement to constitutional
protections. This Part also suggests that the Court currently lacks a co-
herent or defensible theory of the corporation. Part III considers the
future of the Bill of Rights and corporate theory.
I. The Corporate Bill of Rights in the Modern
Political Economy
A. The Rise of Corporate Theory
To understand how the corporation-as opposed to individuals-
can claim any constitutional rights, a review of corporate personhood
theory is required.
The Constitution does not mention corporations.8 To claim legal
status, nineteenth century lawyers argued that corporations should be
considered "citizens" or "persons" for application of various constitu-
tional provisions. The Supreme Court has examined whether corpora-
tions are citizens under the following provisions: article III diversity
jurisdiction,9 article IV privileges and immunities clause,10 and the four-
7. For purposes of this Article, the term "corporation" includes both public and private
corporations. It does not include unions, universities, associations, partnerships, or any other
form of organization; these forms are not discussed here. The Article is concerned particularly
with the large, publicly held corporation of the kind that dominates the American economy.
The term "corporation" sometimes is used interchangeably with "firm," "company," or
"enterprise."
8. The Framers certainly were aware of corporations. In that era, most corporations
were chartered by state legislatures for specific purposes, including banks, canal companies,
railroads, toll bridge companies, and trading companies. See Henderson, The Position of For-
eign Corporations in American Constitutional Law, in 2 HARVARD STUDIES IN JURISPRU-
DENCE 1 (1918); J. HuST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 (1970).
9. See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 91 (1809) (jurisdic-
tion determined by the "real persons" (shareholders) coming to court under the corporate
name).
10. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839) (Corporations are not
citizens within the meaning of article IV privileges and immunities clause; therefore, a state
does not have to give extraterritorial effect to corporation charters granted by another state.);
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teenth amendment."l Most of these cases were decided early in the nine-
teenth century-before significant government economic regulation-
and involved the corporation's right to sue or be sued.
The Supreme Court's most renowned decisions, however, were in
the 1880s and 1890s, holding that corporations are persons for the pur-
pose of fourteenth amendment equal protection 12 and due process.' 3
These opinions paved the way for companies to receive the benefits of
Lochner era substantive due process and the Court's invalidation of state
economic regulation prior to the New Deal. 14
Two competing visions of corporate personality influenced the
Court's nineteenth century decisions, 15 and to some degree still underlie
modern opinions. The first and most traditional notion was the "artifi-
cial entity" theory viewing the corporation as nothing more than an arti-
ficial creature of the state, subject to government imposed limitations and
restrictions. 16 This theory had its origins in English corporation law, 17
and in antebellum legislatures' practice of considering incorporation a
special privilege, awarded by the state for the pursuit of public pur-
poses.'I Under this view, corporations cannot assert constitutional rights
against the state, their creator.19
The second vision was the "natural entity" or person theory. This
theory regards the corporation not as artificial, but as real, with a sepa-
rate existence and independent rights. It is associated with continental
theorists who, at the turn of the century, wrote about "group" or "corpo-
See also Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1868) ("[tlhe term citizens ... applies
only to natural persons ... not to artificial persons created by the legislature").
11. See Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181 (1888) (corporation is not a
citizen within the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment). Pembina did not decide, however, whether the corporation is a person for purposes of
the fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection clauses.
12. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
13. Minneapolis & Saint Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
14. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 582 (1897) (due process protects liberty
of contract); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 381 (1893) (due process
clause subjects state economic regulatory legislation to a reasonableness test).
15. See Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W.
VA. L. REV. 173, 178-87 (1985).
16. Sometimes called the creature, concession, fiction, or artificial entity theory, this view
can be traced to Friedrich Karl Von Savigny. See G. HEIMAN, OTTO GIERKE: ASSOCIATIONS
AND LAW 27-33 (1977); see also Schane, The Corporation is a Person: The Language of a Legal
Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REV. 563 (1987).
17. See J. HURST, supra note 8, at 4-5.
18. See Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corpo-
rate Privileges, XIV J. OF LEGAL STUD. 129 (1985).
19. In the era of Jackson, special charters were discredited as encouraging bribery, favor-
itism, and monopoly. See Horwitz, supra note 15, at 181.
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rate" personality in an effort to, challenge individualism and to come to
terms with institutions of modem society such as corporations, trade un-
ions, universities, and professional associations. 20 This understanding of
the corporation most favors corporate constitutional rights.21
These competing paradigms of the corporation were in tension in
the Court's nineteenth century opinions. The "artificial entity" theory
was invoked to deny corporations constitutional protection; the "natural
entity" theory was used to accord them safeguards. 22 Competing corpo-
rate theories advanced by the Court reflected the theoretical debates in
the treatise literature over the nature of corporate personality. 23
The personification of the corporation occurred in 1886; the popular
literature marks this as the year that the corporation "stole" the four-
teenth amendment. 24 In Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Rail-
road25 the Court simply decreed, without hearing argument, that a
corporation is a person for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. At
issue was whether the due process clause barred the State of California
from taxing the property of a railroad corporation differently from that
of individuals. By the early twentieth century, the natural entity theory
was established firmly, if not permanently. 26
20. See A.J. JACOBSON, THE PRIVATE USE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY: SOVEREIGNTY AND
ASSOCIATIONS IN THE COMMON LAW 599 (1980); Dewey, The Historical Background of Cor-
porate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926); Vinogradeff, Juridicial Persons, 24 COLUM.
L. REV. 594 (1924).
21. The principal continental theorist was Otto Gierke. See 0. GIERKE, POLITICAL
THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES (E.W. Maitland ed. 1900); see also, Horwitz, supra note 15,
at 179-91, 216-22 (the natural entity theory was not available in the United States until after
Santa Clara).
22. See, eg., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 587 (1839) (a corporation is
not a citizen for purposes of the privileges and immunities clause of article IV because a corpo-
ration is merely an "artificial being created by the charter"); see also appendix II; Horwitz,
supra note 15, at 203-07 (discussing the partnership theory that replaced the artificial entity
theory before the development of the natural entity theory).
23. See Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987) (authored by Gregory A. Mark).
24. Sherrill, Hogging the Constitution, GRAND STREET 106 (Autumn 1987).
25. 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) ("The court does not wish to hear argument on the question
whether the provision in the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State
to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these
corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does."). Later dissents by Justices Black and
Douglas suggested that Santa Clara was decided wrongly, and that the legislative history of
the fourteenth amendment did not support the proposition that corporations were meant to be
included under its protections. See Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 82
(1938) (Black, J., dissenting); Wheeling Steel v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, vacated, United States
Gypsum Co. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 951, rev'd, 337 U.S. 951 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
26. Although Santa Clara did not actually employ the natural entity theory to grant
corporations fourteenth amendment rights, the corporation was fully personalized in 1910 in a
series of "unconstitutional conditions" cases. See Southern R.R. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 401
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To understand why the corporation did not assert theories of corpo-
rate personality in the Bill of Rights context until the twentieth century,
and to understand the recent interest in the corporate Bill of Rights, one
must first survey the political economy of regulation as it developed in
the twentieth century.
Two questions must be answered. First, how did regulation change
in its form, content, and purpose over the century? Second, what legal
and constitutional implications did regulatory changes have for
corporations?
B. The Bill of Rights and an Evolving Political Economy
Despite earlier assertions of corporate personhood in the fourteenth
amendment context, corporations did not come to rely on Bill of Rights
protections until quite recently. As late as 1960 the corporation arguably
enjoyed only the protection of the fifth amendment's due process
clause.27 Today, the corporation boasts a panoply of Bill of Rights pro-
tections: first amendment guarantees of political speech, commercial
speech, and negative free speech rights; fourth amendment safeguards
against unreasonable regulatory searches; fifth amendment double jeop-
ardy and liberty rights; and sixth and seventh amendment entitlements to
trial by jury.28
The evolution of the modem political economy and the modem reg-
ulatory state in part account for this striking change. Changes in
America's political economy, over the course of the twentieth century,
gradually enticed corporations to assert Bill of Rights protections against
a changed regulatory state and increasingly to protect modem forms of
intangible commercial property (like speech or federal subsidies).29
(1910); Ludwig v. Western Union Tel. Co., 216 U.S. 146, 157 (1910); Pullman Co. v. Kansas,
216 U.S. 56, 64 (1910); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 36 (1910).
27. See appendix I. The Supreme Court first conferred Bill of Rights protections on cor-
porations in Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165 (1893) (fifth amendment due
process rights). Although the Court conferred fourth amendment protections on corporations
in Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), the Court limited these rights in United States v. Mor-
ton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
28. See appendix I.
29. See infra notes 145-216 and accompanying text. The Bill of Rights is now chiefly
useful to corporations as a means of challenging intrusive government regulation and protect-
ing intangible property such as speech.
Modern federal regulation can be highly intrusive; it is certainly more invasive than the
state regulation of earlier eras. For example, the federal government's regularized system of
health and safety inspections, often involving surprise inspections, has been challenged by cor-
porations on fourth amendment grounds. See Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1977).
Federal regulation can be so invasive as to involve spying by federal aircraft-a practice
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The corporation faced different kinds of regulation in three separate
political periods: the Progressive era, the New Deal era, and the Mod-
em, post-1960 era. Each of these eras was characterized by distinct polit-
ical economies and regulatory structures. Within each period there were
bitter struggles over how, and for what purpose, the regulatory state
would assert its power.30
During the course of the twentieth century the political and regula-
tory environment consistently changed in ways that dramatically altered
the legal and constitutional strategies of corporations. Over time, regula-
tion became more federal and intrusive in character, property became
more intangible and ephemeral, and regulation became explicitly
designed to serve environmental, consnmer, and social-rather than eco-
nomic-goals. Each development encouraged the corporation to assert
Bill of Rights privileges and to abandon the previous, increasingly inef-
fective, strategy of relying on fourteenth amendment protections.
(1) Progressive Era Regulation
a. The Political Economy
Before and during the Progressive era, the corporation frequently
asserted fourteenth amendment rights against state regulation.31 But
during this epoch, federal regulation remained rudimentary and only in-
frequefitly triggered Bill of Rights claims. 32
Progressive era regulation was irregular and primarily
microeconomic in nature.33 It included laws passed chiefly to regulate
railroads, to curb the power and size of monopolies, to tax income and
wealth, and, only later, to improve working conditions. Regulation was
challenged recently by one corporation. See Dow Chemical Corp. v. United States, 476 U.S.
227 (1986).
Corporations also use the Bill of Rights to protect modem forms of property such as
speech. Corporations have challenged restrictions on commercial free speech rights such as
the right to advertise corporate products. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm. of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 574 (1980). Corporations, particularly within the
tobacco industry, have been active in promoting the bicentennial of the Bill of Rights. Accord-
ing to congressional critics, this is an attempt to promote the corporations' own form of com-
mercial speech. See Rothenberg, Philip Morris Ads Anger Congressmen, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16,
1989, at D7, col. 1.
30. These distinct eras of government regulation are widely recognized. See H. FIRST,
BUSINESS CRIMES I (1990)(describing the environmentalist-consumerist era, 1968 to 1977);
Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1189 (1986).
. 31. See infra notes 59-68.
32. See infra notes 33-47.
33. M. SCHNrrZER, CONTEMPORARY GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS RELATIONS 23 (2d
ed. 1983).
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conducted primarily by state government. 34 Only gradually did the fed-
eral government become the focus of regulatory reformers. 35
Historically, the federal government played a diminished regulatory
function because states and localities assumed primary responsibility.36
Undoubtedly, a fear of centralized regulatory authority stemmed from
America's Revolutionary War experience. Regulation in America origi-
nally was conceived as a means of writing into state charters restrictions
on corporate activity.37 In Massachusetts, for example, the first state
railroad corporations, created in the 1830s and 1840s, had economic re-
strictions embedded in their charters. 38 Some statutes even went so far as
to define precisely acceptable rates of return. These controls, however,
rarely were enforced. 39
As the century progressed, the source of regulation shifted from
weak charter provisions to pronouncements from state regulatory com-
missions.4° These commissions--created first in Rhode Island, New
Hampshire, and Connecticut-were founded primarily to oversee the
railroads' rate-making process.41 The most famous of these was the Mas-
sachusetts Board of Railroad Commissioners, founded by Charles Fran-
cis Adams in 1865.42 The Commission was unlike modem regulatory
agencies. Rather, it was akin to a "sunshine" commission: dedicated to
information and education rather than direct action.43
34. Id. at 23 ("Those laws regulating the railroads were initiated by the state government
and only later by the federal government.") See generally THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT (R.
Hofstadter ed. 1963) (a collection of writings of great reformers).
35. The type of property regulated during this period was that traditionally recognized at
common law. This included monetary currency, rights over goods, or rights over the inputs of
the corporate economy: capital and labor. Compare Santa Clara with the type of property
discussed infra notes 135-40. Property is the creation of law; its definition is controversial, and
it changes over time. But what is meant by traditional property in this context is more tangible
property, rather than wealth in the form of information or government created wealth. See
generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (discussing "new property" cre-
ated by government largess). Santa Clara, for example, involved tangible property in the form
of corporate assets taxed by the state. Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 395
(1896) (involving an effort by the state of California to tax land and fences owned by a
railroad).
36. T. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 11 (1984).
37. Id.; J. HURST, supra note 8, at 13-52.
38. See T. MCCRAW, supra note 36, at 11; see also S. SALSBURY, THE STATE, THE IN-
VESTOR, AND THE RAILROAD: THE BOSTON & ALBANY, 1825-1867 (1967).
39. T. MCCRAW, supra note 36, at 11-12.
40. Id. at 11, 17.
41. Id. at 17; see also E. KIRKLAND, MEN, CITIES AND TRANSPORTATION: A STUDY IN
NEW ENGLAND HISTORY, 1820-1900 (1948).
42. C. ADAMS, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1916).
43. Its goals were not to regulate directly, but to require corporations to open their books
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This philosophy of voluntarism reflected the patrician origins of the
early regulatory commissioners. 44 Their weak version of regulation was
evident in the safety area, where commissions customarily would investi-
gate railroad accidents and then urge voluntary reform on industry.4 5
Only in the late 1880s and 1890s did state regulatory commissions take
stronger measures such as setting rates for gas and electric utility
monopolies.46
State regulation was even more aggressive in the early twentieth cen-
tury when the Progressive movement gained stature. The states became
"laboratories" of social reform, as wage and hour legislation and'child
labor laws, among others, were passed. 47
Progressives harbored a deep ambivalence to federal regulation, and
often preferred state controls.48 Louis Brandeis, the Progressive era's
most celebrated reformer, typified this attitude in the fight over the re-
form of industrial life insurance, one of his most important causes. Bran-
deis believed that the entire industry principally served to defraud
working people of their life savings. His solution, however, was to im-
pose strict state, rather than federal, regulation of the insurance industry.
Brandeis believed that federal regulation would lead to capture of the
national legislature by the industry, but that the insurance industry could
never capture every statehouse.49
The federal government did intercede in the economy during this
period, but almost always in a sporadic manner for economic (as opposed
to environmental or social) purposes. The establishment of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887 marked the beginning of this
and provide information to the public. Often the information was required to be offered in a
standardized form. See Rabin, supra note 30, at 1219.
44. See E. KIRKLAND, CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR. 1835-1915: THE PATRICIAN AT
BAY (1965).
45. Id. at 11-28.
46. T. MCCRAW, supra note 36, at 58; see E. WINSTON CLEMENS, ECONOMICS AND
PUBLIC UTILITIES (1950); M. GLAESER, PUBLIC UTILITIES IN AMERICAN CAPITALISM
(1957).
47. A. EKIRCH, JR., PROGRESSIVISM IN AMERICA 106-34 (1974). Federalism, noted
James Bryce in his book, American Commonwealth, enabled people "to try experiments in
legislation and administration which could not be safely made in a large centralized country."
Id. at 107 (quoting J. BRYCE, AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH); see also S. HABER, EFFICIENCY
AND UPLIFT: SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890-1920 (1964) (a
study of the "efficiency craze" of the Progressive era).
48. See G. MOWRY, THE ERA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT, 1900-1912 59-84 (1958); Ra-
bin, supra note 30, at 1218 n.74; Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REv. AM. HIST. 113
(1982).
49. P. STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 74-93 (1984); see also R.
WIEBE, BUSINESSMEN AND REFORM (1962) (discussing business involvement in Progressive
Era reforms).
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trend. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 189050 and the Federal Trade
Commission Act of 191451 followed. These regulatory efforts involved
microeconomic questions: the ICC dealt with anticompetitive practice in
the railroad industry; the Sherman Act targeted restraints of trade or
conspiracies; and the FTC's chief mandate was to prohibit unfair meth-
ods of competition or deceptive trade practices.5 2
The first federal regulatory agency, the ICC, was established to reg-
ulate railroads, America's only national industry. The ICC primarily
was concerned with setting rates and gathering information and, there-
fore, served as a weak federal agency.5 3
Although the Sherman Antitrust Act was passed in 1890, it relied
on the resources of the Justice Department for sanctions and was en-
forced only sporadically prior to the height of the Progressive era. From
1890 to 1905, The Justice Department brought only twenty-two suits-
on average 1.5 per year. The number increased to thirteen per year over
the next decade as Presidents Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson demonstrated
a stronger commitment to trust busting, as evidenced by the passing of
the Clayton Antitrust Act in 1911. 54
Not until Woodrow Wilson created the Federal Trade Commission
in 1914 was the trust question broadly addressed. The Commission was
intended to increase competition and solve the merger problem that
dominated the American political scene from 1890 to 1920. 55 The Com-
mission, however, was not particularly effective prior to the New Deal.
The recession of 1914 gave Wilson and the Democrats the stigma of hav-
ing regulated prosperity out of the economy. Also, the outbreak of
World War I shifted the public's interest from trust busting to interna-
tional politics. Indeed, the investigatory power of the Federal Trade
Commission was limited explicitly by Wilson, who stopped short of alter-
50. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
51. 7 U.S.C. § 610 (1982).
52. D. GUJARATI, GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS 6 (1984).
53. Other federal agencies similarly played only a weak investigatory role. Roosevelt's
Bureau of Corporations, for example, was designed to produce the same type of studies as
Adam's earlier sunshine-commission. The ICC has been portrayed as the classic regulatory
agency captured by business. See G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877-1916 in-
troduction, ch. 1 (1966). The Kolko thesis has been widely debated. See Rabin, supra note 30,
at 1206-08; Harbeson, Railroads and Regulation 1877-1916: Conspiracy or Public Interest, 27 J.
ECON. HIsT. 230 (1967); Purcell, Ideas and Interests, Businessmen and the ICC, 54 J. AMER.
HIsT. 568 (1967).
54. T. MCCRAW, supra note 36, at 144-45.
55. Id. at 124; see G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 1-48 (1924); THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF
BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF U.S. REGULATORY AGENCIES (B.
Schwartz ed. 1973).
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hig the relationship between business and government. The FfC had no
power over prices, wages, mergers, or stock offerings. It was limited in
scope to correcting unfair trade practices as defined by common-law in-
terpretation of the Sherman Act.56
Despite the intellectual fervor of the time, federal regulatory agen-
cies never posed ongoing regulatory challenges to business during the
Progressive era;5 7 certainly not in a way that invoked the ire of the busi-
ness community as have modern environmental and health and safety
legislation. More importantly, the government rarely acted in such a
way as to pose major Bill of Rights questions for corporations.5 8
56. Id. at 125; see also T. BLAISDELL, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: AN EXPERI-
MENT IN THE CONTROL OF BUSINESS (1932) (a study of the Commission's purposes and ac-
complishments); G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 ch. 1 (1963); A. STONE, ECONOMIC REGULATION AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE ch. 1-3
(1977).
57. Even by 1930, the tepid ICC and FTC existed as the only significant federal regula-
tory agencies. T. McCRAw, supra note 36, at 210 ("prior to 1930, only two important regula-
tory agencies existed: the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade
Commission").
58. The historical literature on Progressive era regulation does not ask the question posed
here: To what extent did government regulation trigger Bill of Rights claims by the corpora-
tion? But the historic debate is cast in broader terms that are nevertheless relevant to constitu-
tional inquiry.
Initially, the literature on the Progressive era emphasized the alignment of government
agencies with corporate interests. See G. KOLKO, supra note 53, at ch. 1 (1966). Carried to its
extreme, this argument suggests that corporations rarely pose constitutional challenges to gov-
ernment regulation because regulation was designed to advance the cause of business. There
were, however, such challenges.
Recent historical literature portrays a more complicated story of Progressive era regula-
tion. One historian suggests that rather than capturing the regulatory state, corporations ac-
commodated themselves to regulation and American liberalism in this era. The result was
what is now termed "corporate liberalism." See M. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUC-
TION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM (1988).
Corporate liberalism emerged from the triumph of progressivism over socialism and pop-
ulism. Socialists, during the Progressive era, envisioned an economy directed by the state,
while Populists wanted a return to a precorporate small-scale producer society. The Progres-
sive vision, and the one that triumphed, regarded the state as subordinate to society and the
private marketplace. A distinction was drawn between positive government and statism, that
called for direct state regulation of the economy. Positive government was accepted by Wilson
and his followers; statism was rejected. Positive government meant limited government inter-
vention that regarded corporations as autonomous entities.
According to this school of historical thought, the triumph of Wilson in the 1912 election
was a triumph of corporate liberalism that largely set the parameters of the business-govern-
ment relationship to the present day.
The central legal battle in the late nineteenth century and Progressive era was over anti-
trust policy and interpretations of the Sherman Act of 1890. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). While
Populists supported the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the law in 1897 as forbidding
any restraint of trade, including mergers and cartels, the Progressives opposed it. The Progres-
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b. The Corporate Legal Response
The response of corporations to the evolution of state regulatory
mechanisms was not surprising; constitutional challenges were posed,
under the fourteenth amendment, to state statutes. Within the context of
the political economy of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
intangible Bill of Rights protections had little relevance for corporate
actors.
Lochner illustrated how the fourteenth amendment and the doctrine
of substantive due process were used to invalidate state regulation. In
Lochner the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a New York State stat-
ute limiting the number of hours employees could work in a bakery. The
challenge was brought by a bakery owner who maintained that the stat-
ute interfered with his freedom to contract and was therefore invalid
under the fourteenth amendment. 59
Lochner did not involve a corporate plaintiff; but by reading a sub-
stantive economic doctrine into the fourteenth amendment-the doctrine
of laissez-faire and freedom of contract-the Court provided a powerful
wedge for corporations. Since corporations had fourteenth amendment
protections under Santa Clara, the addition of Lochner allowed corpora-
tions to challenge many state regulations.
For the next fifty years, under the banner of substantive due process,
and in the guise of "persons," corporations challenged Progressive era
sives sought to return to the prior "common-law" interpretation of the Sherman Act that
would only rule out unfair restraints of trade by corporations (the prevention of free entry into
a market, for example). The Court eventually adopted the common-law interpretation in
1911.
Woodrow Wilson's triumph in the 1912 elections solidified the Progressive position on
antitrust. Wilson preserved the relationship between state and society. He supplemented judi-
cial power through the Federal Trade Commission, which had investigatory power. But he
limited the power of the FTC to ameliorating unfair trade practices as defined under the com-
mon-law interpretation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The FTC had no power over prices,
wages, mergers, or stock offerings. While socialists wanted to treat all corporations as public
utilities-subject to public control-Wilson explicitly rejected this.
If one accepts the thesis that a political economy of corporate liberalism emerged from
this era, one then expects to find sporadic regulation that only occasionally poses constitu-
tional challenges to corporations. Indeed, this is precisely what is found.
Whatever view is taken of the historical controversy, from the perspective of the Bill of
Rights, Progressive era regulation did not trigger many Bill of Rights claims. The important
legal challenges were in the antitrust area, and the constitutional questions posed by New Deal
regulation loomed in the future.
See Frese, BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT: ESSAYS IN 20TH-CENTURY COOPERATION
AND CONFRONTATION (S.J. Judd & J. Judd eds. 1985) [hereinafter ESSAYS] for an excellent,
but obscure, summary of recent scholarship on Progressive era regulation.
59. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 45-46 (1905).
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regulation and maneuvered to protect more traditional forms of
property.6°
Once armed with the fourteenth amendment, corporations wielded
it with considerable force. By 1938 Justice Hugo Black observed with
dismay that, of the cases in which the Court applied the fourteenth
amendment during the first 50 years after Santa Clara, "less than one-
half of 1 percent invoked it in protection of the Negro race, and more
than 50 percent asked that its benefits be extended to corporations."'61
The use of the fourteenth amendment to strike down state interferences
with an increasingly corporate-dominated marketplace proceeded until
the 1930s when the Court abandoned substantive due process. 62
From the 1905 Lochner decision until the middle of the 1930s, the
Court invalidated approximately two hundred economic regulations,
usually under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; many
of the challenges were brought by corporate plaintiffs. Most decisions
centered on labor legislation, the regulation of prices, and restrictions on
entry into businesses.63 Cases involving corporations often concerned
state restrictions on entries into a new business. 64
Corporations continued to challenge state regulations using the
fourteenth amendment until the doctrine of substantive due process was
abandoned by the New Deal Supreme Court. In West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 65 for example, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
state legislation establishing a minimum wage for women. The Court
rejected the corporate plaintiff's assertion that its common-law right to
freedom of contract was violated.66
60. See B. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO
THE SUPREME COURT (1942) (on the history of substantive due process).
61. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 90 (1938) (Black, J., dissent-
ing) ("Neither the history nor the language of the fourteenth amendment justifies the belief
that corporations are included within its protection." Id. at 85-86); see also C. WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, 1836-1918 741 (1960) (For the period from
1889 to 1918 attacks upon state statutes were made in 422 cases involving state police power.
Fifty-three of these were held invalid, of which the greater number involved the regulation of
public service corporations. Only 14 involved legislation affecting the general rights and liber-
ties of individuals.).
62. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-94 (1937).
63. G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN, M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 739
(1986).
64. For example, in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 278 (1932), the Court
invalidated, under the due process clause, a law prohibiting any person from manufacturing ice
without first obtaining a certificate of need from the.state; see also Louis K. Liggett Co. v.
Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111 (1928) (invalidating a law limiting entry into the pharmacy busi-
ness to pharmacists).
65. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
66. See also Lincoln Federal Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536
March 1990] BILL OF RIGHTS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The business press recognized the fourteenth amendment's vital role
in protecting corporate interests. A 1936 Fortune magazine article
opined that
[T]he effect [of granting corporations fourteenth amendment rights]
was to impose between the state legislatures and the industries of the
country the judgment of the Supreme Court and to insure to individual
businessmen complete freedom from state regulation other than that
which the Supreme Court held to be a proper exercise of governmental
power. All this the words "due process of law" were held to imply.67
The article even suggested that the Court's defense of substantive due
process was arguably the corporation's most important weapon against
Progressive era reforms. 68
Although business defended against government regulation by using
fourteenth amendment property-oriented safeguards, Bill of Rights pro-
tections rarely were sought. When invoked, they were used to defend
tangible property against economic regulation and operated much like
due process property protections.
Corporations first received Bill of Rights guarantees in 1893. In No-
ble v. Union River Logging Railroad,69 a railroad corporation invoked the
fifth amendment due process clause to challenge the Secretary of the In-
terior's revocation of an approval for a right-of-way over federal public
(1949) (The Court explained that it had abandoned the Lochner constitutional doctrine and
returned "to the earlier constitutional principle that states have power to legislate against what
are found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and business affairs, so long as
their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition."); Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) (upholding law authorizing employees to take
four hours leave with full pay on election day).
67. The Constitution of the United States, FORTUNE, July 1936, 57, 60; see also MacLeish,
The Fourteenth Amendment, FORTUNE, June 1932, 52.
68. MacLeish, supra note 67, at 52 ("[T]he conflict between laissez faire and reform [be-
gun by Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson] was less important, from the standpoint of the Consti-
tution, than the fact that the Supreme Court had undertaken to judge whether state laws
regulating business, etc., were proper or improper exercises of governmental power.").
69. 147 U.S. 165 (1893). In 1889, a railroad corporation, organized under the Territorial
Code of Washington, sought to take advantage of an act of congress of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat.
482, granting railroads a right of way through the public lands of the United States. The
railroad filed the documents, including articles of incorporation, required by act, and the right
of way was approved by the Interior Secretary. Noble, 147 U.S. at 165-66.
The firm was incorporated to build and run railroads in 1883. In 1888 its charter was
revised to construct telegraph lines, haul logs, and carry freight. Id. at 165. The approval was
cancelled in 1890 by the subsequent Interior Secretary because of his view that the corporation
was not a public railroad company as contemplated by the 1875 statute, but was merely a
logging concern carrying logs for private use and benefit. Id. at 167.
The Supreme Court found, however, that the "[tihe railroad company became at once
vested with a right of property in these lands, of which they can only be deprived by a proceed-
ing taken directly for that purpose." Id. at 176. The court found that the right-of-way was a
property right. Id.
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lands. The Court invalidated this action, viewing it as an attempt to de-
prive the railroad corporation of its property without due process. 70
Although the Court in Noble did not explain why the fifth amendment
due process clause-as opposed to the fourteenth amendment clause-
should apply to corporations, no other interpretation is possible, because
the defendant was the federal government.71
Decided on the heels of opinions granting fourteenth amendment
guarantees to corporations, 72 Noble represented an extension of due pro-
cess property-oriented protections. In Noble the fifth amendment pro-
tected corporations' traditional property rights-such as a right-of-way
or an easement-that were recognized at common law. Similarly, Noble
thwarted Progressive era regulation. In this period the federal govern-
ment regulated public lands for economic purposes; only later, in the
1960s, did it oversee them with'an eye toward environmental, or social,
objectives.73
Not until the twentieth century did corporations receive more intan-
gible Bill of Rights protections. Most Bill of Rights protections, of
course, are intangible in the sense that they protect interests that one
cannot feel or touch. The right to speak or the right to privacy are exam-
ples. Sucht intangible interests-particularly commercial speech, the
right to privacy, and the right to government largess (for example, a gov-
70. The Court held: "A revocation of the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, how-
ever, by his successor in office was an attempt to deprive the plaintiff of its property without
due process of law, and was, therefore, void." Id.
71. A discussion of the fifth amendment takings clause is beyond the scope of this Article.
Corporate and individual exercise of taking clause protections has a long history. But because
the language of the clause does not limit it to "persons," there has never been a question that
corporations and other business organizations are entitled to its protection. Every other Bill of
Rights clause discussed in this Article has been discussed in the context of corporate per-
sonhood theory.
Although not immediately relevant to personhood theory, the takings clause is the focus
of those who would expand constitutional protections for business while diminishing the regu-
latory state. See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1986).
72. See Minneapolis & Saint Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 31-33 (1889) (due pro-
cess); Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 395 (1886) (tax violated four-
teenth amendment).
73. See C. MAYER & G. RILEY, PUBLIC DOMAIN, PRIVATE DOMINION (1985) (chroni-
cling the history of federal regulation of public mineral rights). The federal government's
control over the public domain is mandated by the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
This extensive state control over property is anomalous in the American political economy.
Whereas most of the property discussed in Reich, supra note 35, is created in the modern era-
like licenses and franchises-the use of public resources, has always been a form of property.
Strictly speaking, this is not "Modern Property" in that it has existed since the beginning of
the Republic; but the history of this type of property foreshadows questions raised by govern-
ment largess in later eras.
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emnment license or contract)-have become increasingly important to
corporations over the course of the twentieth century. 74
Corporations did assert intangible Bill of Rights in the Progressive
period, but only infrequently compared to the modern era. Only occa-
sionally were fourth amendment privacy rights asserted against the weak
and rudimentary federal agencies of the Progressive era: the Federal
Trade Commission or the Justice Department in antitrust cases. This
contrasts dramatically with the modem period when corporations fre-
quently invoke fourth amendment safeguards against a plethora of fed-
eral agencies involved in many regulatory inspection programs.
Usually, companies sought protection from overbroad government
subpoenas for corporate documents.75 In practice, only the FTC, and
occasionally the Justice Department (enforcing the Sherman Act), would
issue such requests. Circumstances such as these led the business press,
at least, to conclude that Bill of Rights protections were not important-
compared to the fourteenth amendment-in the political economy of the
first half of the twentieth century.
The first time a corporation claimed, and was granted, intangible
Bill of Rights protections was in 1906. In Hale v. Henkel,76 the Supreme
Court held that an overbroad subpoena for corporate documents could
constitute an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of a corpora-
tion's fourth amendment rights. Hale was an effort to forestall Progres-
sive era regulation. The case involved a criminal contempt charge arising
from an antitrust action under the Sherman Act against two tobacco cor-
porations. In refusing to comply with a government subpoena for poten-
tially incriminating documents, 77 the corporations advanced only one
constitutional argument: the fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination.78 The Court held this privilege inapplicable to corporations,
requiring the companies to produce the documents. 79 The Court raised
the question, on its own, whether a corporation is entitled to fourth
amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
answer was affirmative. 80 The Court further ruled that an overbroad
74. See infra text accompanying notes 177-189.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 76-83.
76. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
77. Id. at 44-47.
78. Id. at 46.
79. Id. at 74-75.
80. Id. at 76 ("In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immu-
nities appropriate to such body."); see also Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S.
150, 154 (1897), and cases cited therein.
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subpoena for corporate documents constitutes an "unreasonable"
search.81
Several cases, decided before 1930, restricted the ability of govern-
ment agencies to peruse corporate documents. The most famous was
Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co.,82 in which Justice
Holmes held that the fourth amendment did not authorize government
agencies "to direct fishing expeditions into private papers on the possibil-
ity that they may disclose evidence of crime."'83
While the fourth amendment provided some protection from gov-
ernment regulation, the use of the Bill of Rights as a corporate weapon
was infrequent when compared with the use of the fourteenth amend-
ment against state regulation.
(2) New Deal Regulation
a. The Political Economy
The regulatory state changed significantly during the New Deal.
Federal regulation overshadowed state regulation and New Dealers ad-
ded a concern for planning to the Progressive era antitrust impulse. But
regulation remained primarily economic as opposed to social, consumer,
81. Hale, 201 U.S. at 76. The search was found unreasonable because it required the
production of many corporate documents. In dicta, the Court noted that if Congress exercised
its powers over interstate commerce to examine a corporation's books, this would not consti-
tute an unreasonable search. Id. at 77.
82. 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
83. Id. at 306. In overturning an FTC order requesting the papers of a tobacco corpora-
tion, Justice Holmes wrote, "[a]nyone who respects the spirit as well as the letter of the fourth
amendment would be loath to believe that Congress intended to authorize one of its
subordinate agencies to sweep all our traditions into the fire... and to direct fishing expedi-
tions into private papers on the possibility that they may disclose evidence of crime." Id. at
305-06.
Hale and American Tobacco have been criticized as stretching the language of the fourth
amendment. "The words of the fourth amendment are quite compatible with a conclusion that
a subpoena for papers is neither a search nor a seizure. The fallback position is unnecessary
that even if it is a search or a seizure, it may be reasonable. The words 'in a criminal case' had
to be interpreted to include administrative and legislative investigations .. " K. DAVIs, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 227 (2d. ed. 1978).
Corporations were protected against invasive searches designed to secure corporate docu-
ments as well. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (gov-
ernment officers, "without a shadow of authority" went to the office of the company and made
a clean sweep of all books, papers and documents and brought them to the district attorney's
office for photographing. The Court found that the search violated the fourth amendment and
overturned the district court judgment finding the corporation guilty of violating a federal
statute); see also Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 346 (1931) (A corpora-
tion received an order enjoining the use of materials taken from a corporate headquarters, in
violation of the fourth and fifth amendments, to be used against two individual defendants and
for violating the National Prohibition Act of 1929.).
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or environmental. As a consequence, New Deal regulation, like Progres-
sive era regulation, posed few Bill of Rights challenges for the
corporation.
During the New Deal, macroeconomic management replaced
microeconomic tinkering as the federal government worked feverishly to
stimulate a moribund economy. The Federal Home Loan Bank Act, the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, the National Industrial Re-
covery Act, and the Agricultural Adjustment Act-all passed between
1932 and 1946-attempted to speed economic recovery. 84 Social goals
such as consumer protection and environmental regulation were deem-
phasized in this period of economic stagnation.85
By the end of the 1930s, a plethora of federal regulatory agencies
blossomed. Four new federal commissions were created, more than had
appeared in the years prior to 1933: the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, and the Civil Aeronautics Authority. 86 Existing
agencies were endowed with additional authority to regulate industry. 87
The New Deal elevated from the state to the federal level the Pro-
gressive era ideal of economic administration by technocratic experts. 88
Many New Deal reforms were designed to overcome the limitations of
Progressive era regulation. After the stock market crash of 1929, for
example, it became evident how little protection Progressive era meas-
ures, such as state "blue sky" laws, provided investors. "Blue sky" stat-
utes originally were designed to protect against securities of doubtful
value (pieces of the blue sky) and held great promise as antidotes to un-
scrupulous investment practices. 89 The New Deal solution to the failure
of Progressive era state structures was to implement federal securities
regulation. 90
84. D. GUJARATI, supra note 52, at 7; see also J.K. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS IN PER-
SPECTIVE 221-51 (1987); A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL (1958)
[hereinafter NEW DEAL]; A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL (1960) [herein-
after POLITICS].
85. See Rabin, supra note 30, at 1248 ("the principal objective of the New Deal was
economic recovery").
86. T. MCCRAW, supra note 36, at 210.
87. Id.
88. J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). Landis, the creator of the SEC,
and author of influential works on regulation, was the most prominent example of a govern-
ment expert who favored a regulated economy.
89. T. MCCRAw, supra note 36, at 211.
90. The federal securities law was an example of a New Deal reform that was supported
by a business community anxious to bolster public confidence in the nation's financial markets.
See Rabin, supra note 30, at 1254 n. 192. This is the very type of regulation that would not
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Historians have penned volumes attempting to explain the meaning
of the creation of these New Deal agencies and programs. 91 Forty years
later, there is still no consensus on their purpose, intentions, or effects.
Some of the most intriguing writing on the New Deal suggests that
Roosevelt's regulatory programs reflected a division among advisors to
the president. Divisions in regulatory programs and philosophies trig-
gered dissimilar constitutional responses by business.
The split recognized is between planners and antitrusters.92 The
planners-people like Jerome Frank and Rexford Tugwell-supported
direct government measures to regulate the economy. The National Re-
covery Administration (NRA) embodied this vision; to bolster prices the
NRA sponsored a system of industrial organization that called for out-
put restrictions to boost prices and for standardization of work practices
and product quality. This type of intense industrial supervision was tai-
lored to an economic system beset by a deflationary crisis. Advocacy of
planning also reflected the recognition of a new, powerful constituency in
favor of regulation, labor, that was less noticed in the Progressive era.93
NRA-type planning in such areas as the regulation of trucking and air-
lines remained a component of the New Deal even after 1935, when the
NRA was declared unconstitutional. 94
But after the first NRA phase of the New Deal, the antitrusters were
ascendent. 95 Like the advocates of Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom,
the antitrusters, or neo-Brandeisians, favored policies that would decen-
tralize business and enforce competitive behavior. People like Thomas
Corcoran, James Landis, Benjamin Cohen, and James Rowe-disciples
of Brandeis and Frankfurter-advocated programs of decentralization:
cheap power and rural electrification, and the social engineering of the
engender constitutional challenges of any sort-and did not during this period (although Bill
of Rights assaults on securities regulations began to gather momentum in the 1980s).
91. Historians are unable to agree on most aspects of the New Deal, not just the purposes
of New Deal regulatory programs. Why the economy plunged into a depression, whether
Roosevelt himself was chiefly responsible for the architecture of the New Deal, whether the
New Deal helped or hurt businesses are questions still debated in current historiography. See
Ferguson, Industrial Conflict and the Coming of the New Deal: The Triumph of Multinational
Liberalism in America, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEw DEAL ORDER 3-6 (1989).
92. See E. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966).
93. The increase in labor militancy and populist demands increased pressure for more
planning and direct government action. See R. MCELVAINE, THE GREAT DEPRESSION:
AMERICA 1929-1941 at 252-54 (1984).
94. See HAWLEY, supra note 92, at ch. 2-5.
95. Id.
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TVA and the rural rehabilitation program. 96 They also favored reforms
in areas of banking, securities, and holding companies. 97
Undoubtedly, both planners and antitrusters had an effect on the
New Deal regulatory state and the historic debate over which camp at-
tained the upper hand may never be resolved.9
For the purposes of constitutional history, however, it is sufficient to
suggest that neither reforms advocated by the planners or by antitrusters
prompted Bill of Rights challenges by corporations. The new regulatory
state erected during the New Deal did not create an intrusive system of
monitoring, inspecting, and regulation-for consumer, environmental, or
social purposes-that would later pose Bill of Rights threats to
corporations. 99
Instead, the constitutional challenges mounted by corporations dur-
ing this period were directed either at undermining the very legislative
authority of New Deal proposals (these tended to be planning proposals),
96. Id.
97. Id. at 283-383.
98. Another important historical debate over the New Deal is whether regulatory agen-
cies during that period were captured by the very businesses they were designed to regulate-a
controversy reminiscent of debates over Progressive Era regulation. See B. KARL, THE UN-
EASY STATE (1983); FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: His LIFE AND TIMES 289 (0. Graham & M
Wander eds. 1985).
There is certainly truth to the argument of scholars that many New Deal reformers were
"corporate liberals"-Washington lawyers and insiders who ultimately were captured by the
very interests they purported to regulate. See generally K. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR 284-
85 (1989); P. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 295-300 (1982) (discussing the impact of
government lawyers during the period); R. JEFFREY LUSTIG, CORPORATE LIBERALISM
(1982); T. MCCRAW, supra note 36, at 216-21 (1984) (examining the theoretical outlook in
American politics during the early part of the century); Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the
New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1986) (criticizing New Deal reforms for failing to extend
checks and balances to the regulatory state). But others, such as Adolph Berle, Gardiner
Means, and Rexford Tugwell were dedicated reformers. See also Ferguson, supra note 91, at 1-
32 (analyzing the historiographic debate and showing that the question of whether the state
was captive to private interests remains open).
Evidence exists on both sides. Aviation and trucking, for example, were areas in which
government regulation served protectionist functions. See BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSI-
NESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955); Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The
Commissions, the Railroads and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952); Jaffe, The Effec-
tive Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105-35 (1954).
But measures such as the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the Tennessee Valley
Authority, and the Bonneville Power Administration were anathema to the utility industry,
for example.
This broader historical debate has implications for corporations and the Bill of Rights.
To the extent that the state was captured by corporate interests, one would expect no constitu-
tional challenge to regulatory powers. Since constitutional challenges were undertaken, the
question remains: for what reasons? This is an example of historic and constitutional inquiry
intersecting in important ways.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 121-76.
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or in working within the administrative system to delay the existing regu-
latory process (these tended to be the antitrusters' programs).
b. The Corporate Legal Response
Corporate managers remained impassive about the Bill of Rights in
the Progressive and New Deal eras, in part because these rights were not
useful in fighting economic regulation, and in part because they had
other constitutional battles to wage. Until 1937, the main event was the
fight over substantive due process. With the end of the Lochner era and
the election of Roosevelt, business interests challenged New Deal plan-
ning reforms as overbroad exercises of constitutional powers.' °° Later,
due process challenges to the antitrusters' regulation increasingly were
fought in the administrative context. 01
While the business press heralded the Supreme Court's substantive
due process rulings, 0 2 it ignored the Court's Bill of Rights opinions re-
garding corporations.10 3
But business' self-confessed satisfaction with the substantive due
process shield was shortlived. As Fortune magazine put it, "after the
1929 crash and the advent of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal... the
Constitution again became a hot issue."' 4
Citations to the Constitution riddled the business literature in the
New Deal era. The Industrial Arts and the Business Periodicals Index-
the two principal indices of business literature-contained numerous ref-
erences to the constitutionality ,of Roosevelt's reform legislation. 0 5 No
longer concerned with personhood, state regulation, and the fourteenth
amendment, the focus shifted to restricting executive and congressional
power exercised in the name of reform. The principal New Deal enact-
100. See Rabin, supra note 30, at 1253-62.
101. See iL at 1263-72 (describing the pressures to bring some formality and due process
to agency proceedings. Business recognized that due process could be used as tactic of delay.).
102. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
103. Neither the Bill of Rights, nor any of its constituent amendments, was listed in the
main catalogue of business literature-the Business Periodicals Index and its predecessor, the
IndustrialArts Index-until the 1960s. The Bill of Rights was not indexed in a business publi-
cation until October 1961. Our American Bill of Rights,, MGMr. REc., October 1961, at 30.
See also Constitutionalizing the Corporation, Bus. WK., Oct. 26, 1974, at 109; How the Consti-
tution Supports Private Enterprise, NATION's Bus., July, 1976, at 62.
104. The Constitution of the United States, FORTUNE, July 1936, at 57.
105. See generally THE INDUSTRIAL ARTS INDEX, 1913 to 1957, and THE BUSINESS PE-
RIODICALS INDEX, 1957 to present. The Constitution was not mentioned in the index until
1922. See Constitution of the United States, COMM. & FIN. CHRONICLE, Dec. 23, 1922.
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ments rested on three constitutional powers: interstate commerce, taxa-
tion, and appropriation. Several of these were held unconstitutional. 0 6
The National Industrial Recovery Act, for example, which set in-
dustrial hours and wages, was held to be an unconstitutional delegation
of power.'0 7 The type of regulation and planning symbolized by the
NRA did not, however, provoke Bill of Rights challenges by corpora-
tions. Rather, because the NRA was a system of planning, it was chal-
lenged successfully as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
and an overbroad application of the commerce power.108 To the extent
planning was an integral component of New Deal regulation, it repre-
sented a departure from Progressive era reforms conducted on the state
level. But the goals of planning were primarily economic reform and
price administration-goals that raised constitutional questions other
than Bill of Rights concerns.
Constitutional limitations on federal regulatory power supplanted
debates over corporate personhood. I0 9 With the possible exception of
publishing corporations, which claimed the first amendment exempted
them from government antitrust prosecutions, Bill of Rights issues were
completely overshadowed by other constitutional questions during the
New Deal.iI0
106. See Rabin, supra note 30, at 1253-62; Clark, A Socialistic State Under the Constitu-
tion, FORTUNE, Feb. 1934, at 68; see also The Constitution of the United States, FORTUNE, July
1936, at 57, 60.
107. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). For a brief discussion of how
business viewed the constitution during this period see M. KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT
WOULD Go OF ITSELF 293 (1986) ("[T]he business class owes much to the Constitution. The
vast mercantile development of the last 150 years would not have been possible but for the
liberty of movement and action which the Constitution guarantees, for the interstate recogni-
tion of commercial obligations which it enforces, and for the freedom of trade throughout the
United States which it requires.").
108. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935); see also A.
SCHLESSINGER, JR., POLITICS, supra note 84.
109. The business press reflected concerns about overbroad uses of executive power. See
The Case Against Roosevelt, FORTUNE, Dec., 1936, at 102; Must We have Government by
Subterfuge? Why Not Amend the Constitution, PUBLIC UTILITIES, July 2, 1936; No Men Clear
Decks: Supreme Court and New Deal Legislation, Bus. WK., Nov. 23, 1935, at 11; Supreme
Court Looms Up, Bus. WK., Sept. 19, 1936, at 11; What AAA Decision Discloses About Our
Form of Government, MAGAZINE OF WALL STREET, Feb. 1, 1936.
See also W. ELLIOTT, THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM (1935) (discussing, in
1935, the need for fundamental reform following the New Deal); H. WALLACE, NEw FRON-
TIERS (1934) (discussing new social plans to address Depression Era changes); H. WALLACE,
WHOSE CONSTITUTION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE GENERAL WELFARE (1936) (surveying the
historical development of the Constitution).
110. See Blanchard, The Associated Press Antitrust Suit: A Philosophical Clash Over Own-
ership of First Amendment Rights, 61 Bus. HIST. REV. 43 (1987).
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During this period, corporations also began to manifest their opposi-
tion to government regulation in the administrative arena. As New Deal
reforms withstood constitutional challenges, and federal regulatory pow-
ers expanded, corporations fought regulation using tactics of delay in ad-
ministrative law. The procedural provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act, for example, served as a stalling device for regulatory
opponents.111 Corporations came to realize that by insisting on proce-
dural guidelines for agency decisions they could stall, if not forestall reg-
ulatory action.1 12
This is not to say there was no litigation implicating the Bill of
Rights in this era. Indeed, fourth amendment cases involving govern-
ment subpoena power over corporate documents continued through the
New Deal, building on the Progressive era Hale decision.113
During the New Deal, however, the Court narrowly circumscribed
the fourth amendment rights of corporations against overbroad govern-
ment subpoenas. 114 In one case,11 5 the Court permitted the Administra-
tor of the Department of Labor, under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
broad access to a corporation's documents and records.1 16 In United
111. See Verkuil, The Emerging Concept ofAdministrative Procedure, 78 CoLUM. L. REV.
258, 311-13 (1978).
112. See T. McCRAw, supra note 36 at 210-11; Rabin, supra note 30, at 1262-72.
113. See supra notes 76-83.
114. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 368 (1910), distinguishing Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (no constitutional violation in a broad subpoena that asked for all
letters and telegrams relating to an alleged fraud and conspiracy violation where there was no
"unreasonable" search and seizure). Wilson did not develop any reason for its narrow con-
struction of fourth amendment rights, and it was not until the 1940s that the Court granted
government broader powers to search for corporate documents and reconsidered a theory of
corporate personality. Cf Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151, 157 (1922) (request for
corporate documents not unreasonable when confined in scope). /
115. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (The Department of
Labor subpoenaed the records of two newspaper publishing corporations pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060. The Court permitted a broad subpoena for corporate
documents and seemed to suggest that any request for corporate documents is not a search and
seizure protected by the fourth amendment.).
116. I. at 204-06 (citations omitted).
Correspondingly, it has been settled that corporations are not entitled to all of the
constitutional protection which private individuals have in these and related mat-
ters.... And, although the fourth amendment has been held applicable to corpora-
tions notwithstanding their exclusion from the privilege against self-incrimination,
the same leading case of Wilson v. United States, distinguishing the earlier quite
different one of Boyd v. United States, held the process not invalid under the Fourth
amendment, although it broadly required the production of copies of letters and tele-
grams 'signed or purport[ed] to be signed by the President of said company.., in
regard to an alleged violation of the statutes of the United States....
See alSo Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F.2d 384, 390 (7th Cir.) (A corporation is
not protected by immunity against self-incrimination, but is protected against unreasonable
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States v. Morton Salt Co.,1 17 the Court upheld a broad request by the
Federal Trade Commission that the well-known company produce a
complete set of prices and terms for its products. The request was al-
lowed even if it "was caused by nothing more than official curiosity."118
The post-New Deal composition of the Court may have accounted for
this temporary denial of Bill of Rights protections to corporations.
Commentators criticize Morton Salt for its complete contradiction
of American Tobacco. 119 Indeed, by 1950, the Court seemingly snatched
away any fourth amendment rights conferred in Hale and extended in
American Tobacco. Arguably, except for the property-oriented fifth
amendment due process clause, corporations had no Bill of Rights pro-
tections in 1950.120 And, at least according to the business press, corpo-
rations and their managers were not particularly concerned. The
corporation's true Bill of Rights battle was yet to come.
searches and seizures.) cert. denied, 311 U.S. 690 (1940) ; Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins,
317 U.S. 501 (1943) (delegated power of Secretary of Labor to issue subpoenas within limits of
congressional authority).
117. 338 U.S. 632, 641 (1950).
118. Id. at 652 ("Even if one were to regard the request for information as caused by
nothing more than official curiosity nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right
to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with law and the public interest.").
119. K. DAVIS, supra note 83, at 232 ("What a flexible Constitution we have! The Fourth
Amendment, according to a unanimous Supreme Court in 1924 ... prohibits 'direct fishing
expeditions into private papers on the possibility that they may disclose evidence of crime.'
And the same Fourth Amendment, according to a unanimous Supreme Court in 1950, allows
an agency to go fishing in corporate papers, even if the reason is 'nothing more than official
curiosity.' "). Although Davis chooses to regard the question as the degree of reasonableness
of an inspection, the Court saw the question as one of the nature of corporate personality, and
whether that entitled the state to regulate the corporation. In United States v. Morton Salt,
338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950), the Court explicitly used a federal version of the artificial entity
theory. The Court held that "[Corporations] are endowed with public attributes. They have a
collective impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege to act as artificial entities."
Id.
120. Before 1960, corporations did not receive any other Bill of Rights protections. First
amendment safeguards were invoked by other organizations: newspaper corporations for ex-
ample, which have greater protections under the language of the first amendment, and trade
unions and associations. See, e.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936)
(a newspaper corporation has a first amendment liberty right to freedom of speech, incorpo-
rated through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496, 520 (1939) (neither a labor union nor the ACLU could invoke first amendment protec-
tions incorporated through the fourteenth amendment due process liberty clause); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963) (NAACP may invoke first amendment rights). Although
presenting different issues, the analysis used by the Supreme Court in these opinions is relevant
to the history of corporate theory. In the cases decided in the 1930s the Court used corporate
theory as a mode of analysis. In later years the Court retreated from corporate theory. See
infra notes 245-52 and accompanying text.
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(3) Modern Regulation
a. The Political Economy
In the modem political economy, the Bill of Rights assumed new
exigency for corporations. After 1960 what may be called Modem Regu-
lation and Modem Property came to define the political economy. Mod-
em Regulation targets social goals such as environmentalism. It is
intrusive, and involves regularized inspections conducted principally by
federal agencies (for example, EPA and OSHA) overseeing a wide array
of economic sectors. Modem Property includes not only government-
created wealth in the form of government contracts, but also the cur-
rency of post-industrial society-knowledge and information. In re-
sponse to these changes, corporations invoked the Bill of Rights to
protect novel forms of property and to challenge modem regulatory
structures. 121
Although regulation's role in the history of the American political
economy remains controversial, there is one area of increasing agreement
among business and government historians: regulation changed substan-
tially, in nature and kind, in the period after 1960.122 This transforma-
tion has important implications for the corporation and the Bill of
Rights.
Four characteristics distinguish Modem Regulation. First, it differs
in nature. In the Progressive and New Deal eras, most regulation was
economic. Modem Regulation, however, strives to attain social goals:
environmental protection, consumerism, minority employment, women's
rights, and health and safety. 12 3 The Clean Air Act of 1970,124 the Con-
sumer Product Safety Act of 1972,125 and the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration Act of 1970126 exemplify this type of
regulation.' 27
Second, Modem Regulation differs from earlier regulation in that it
is conducted primarily on the federal level. Before 1960, whatever lim-
ited social regulatory programs existed were administered almost exclu-
121. See infra text accompanying notes 145-215.
122. Historians and political scientists suggest that differentiating among types of indus-
trial sectors is important for social analysis. See, e.g., T. FERGUSON & J. ROGERS, RIGHT
TURN: THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATS AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS
(1986). This Article suggests that differentiating among different types of regulation is impor-
tint for legal and constitutional analysis.
123. M. SCHNITZER supra note 33, at 23-24.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (1972).
126. 5 U.S.C. § 7902 (1970).
127. See B. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION 21-78 (1980).
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sively by state and local government. 128 Before 1965, only one federal
regulatory agency whose principal responsibility was to protect consum-
ers, employees, or the public from corporate activities was created: the
Food and Drug Administration, founded in 1931. Between 1964 and
1977 ten federal agencies were created for this purpose. 129
Third, Modem Regulation is more intrusive, systematic, and routin-
ized than Progressive or New Deal regulation. As laws and agencies in-
creased in number and scope, the government encroached on what were
formerly private corporate decisions. Corporate departments were
''shadowed" by their alter egos in the regulatory bureaucracy; a plethora
of statutes and regulations created elaborate new systems of reporting,
monitoring, and whistle-blowing.1 30 Whereas traditional regulation uti-
lized irregular subpoenas of corporate documents, Modem Regulation
instituted regular inspection of corporate premises and more.
Fourth, Modem Regulation governs many industrial sectors, not
just one industry, and is broadly opposed by a wide coalition of corporate
groups. Whereas agencies engaged in Progressive era regulation, such as
the Interstate Commerce Commission, ordinarily supervised only specific
industries, the new federal regulatory agencies, such as the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission, regulate many
economic sectors at once: retail, trade, communication, services, utili-
ties, and railroads.1 31 This broad multisectoral regulation makes it diffi-
128. Vogel, The "New" Social Regulation in Historical and Comparative Perspective, in
REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE 155, 161 (T. McCraw, ed. 1981).
129. Id. Although modern social regulation is occasionally conducted by state govern-
ments, the trend is federal. And, moreover, the sheer quantity of federal regulation has been
greater in the post-1960 era than in any previous era of American history. Sanders, The Regu-
latory Surge of the 1970's in Historical Perspective, in PUBLIC REGULATION 117 (E. Bailey ed.
1987).
130. Vogel, supra note 128, at 162-63. Vogel calls this regulation the "New Social Regula-
tion." Some political theorists refer to Modern Regulation as the "New Wave" of government
regulation. See Weidenbaum, The New Wave of Governmental Regulation of Business, Bus. &
SoC'Y REV. 81-86 (1975).
Vogel makes the distinction between new social and old economic regulation. "Economic
regulatory agencies govern prices, output, terms of competition and entry/exit. Social regula-
tions are concerned with the externalities and social impact of economic activity. The ICC,
FPC, and CAB, the FCC and the SEC are examples of the former; the CPSC, EPA, EEOC,
and OSHA illustrate the latter." Vogel, supra note 128, at 155 n.l.
For purposes of analyzing the Bill of Rights, this Article focuses on the nature of Modern
regulation, not simply its purposes. Therefore, the definition of Modern Regulation is broad,
including the four factors listed, with regard to the intrusiveness of the regulation.
131. M. WEIDENBAUM, BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND THE PUBLIC 13-16 (1981). See
generally STUDIES IN PUBLIC REGULATION (G. Fromm ed. 1981) (a collection of essays ad-
dressing different aspects of regulation economics); B. MITNICK, supra note 127; M. HEPER,
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cult for one sector or industry to capture an agency in a manner that was
possible in the Progressive or New Deal eras. But opposition to Modem
Regulation has become a unifying point for corporate interests opposed
to reforms passed at the behest of labor, consumer, and public interest
groups.132 One manifestation of this is the aggressive assertion of Bill of
Rights protections for corporations.
This new type of regulation reflected the growth of consumerism
and of the public interest movement; as the power of these two move-
ments increased, they influenced government regulatory programs. 133
Undoubtedly, it also reflected some of the reform impulses of the 1960s,
and the twin realizations of limits to growth and of the environmental
consequences of such expansion. 134
New forms of property, as well as novel modes of regulation, are
characteristic of the modem political economy. Since the 1960s, courts
and commentators have come to recognize that wealth created by gov-
ernment is increasingly important in contemporary society.135 This
"state created property" takes many forms: government jobs, govern-
ment benefits, occupational licenses, franchises, contracts, subsidies, and
THE STATE AND PUBLIC BUREAUCRACIES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1987) (a collec-
tion of essays comparing the bureaucracies of various nations); J. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION (1980) (a collection of essays addressing political influences on regulation).
132. See, eg., Vogel supra note 128, at 164-65.
[W]hat is novel about the politics of business-government relations during the last
fifteen years is that conflicts over the scope of social regulation have affected directly
the power and wealth of the private sector vis-a-vis nonbusiness interest groups. In
essence, during the seventies, the controversy over the social regulation of business
became the focus of class conflict: it pitted the interests of business as a whole
against the public interest movement as well as much of organized labor. The nature
of the conflict over regulation became analogous to the struggle over the adoption of
the welfare state and the recognition of unions that defined class conflict during the
1930s....
Id. at 164. This differs from other eras when conflicts over regulation pitted one private sector
interest against another--conf licts over antitrust and tariff rates-all had this effect during the
New Deal and Progressive eras. Similar conflicts were played out in the 1970s over economic
deregulation, oil deregulation, trucking, utilities, etc.
133. See id. at 170-75.
134. See T. FERGUSON & J. ROGERS, supra note 122; C. NOBLE, LIBERALISM AT WORK:
THE RISE AND FALL OF OSHA (1986); M. PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION
(1982); D. VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL POWER OF BUSINESS IN
AMERICA 16-112 (1989).
135. Reich, supra note 35, at 733. See also Rabin, supra note 30, at 1286 n.328 (describing
the wide influence of Reich's article). The judicial acceptance of the New Property argument
came in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 257 n.3 (1970) (Requiring a "fair hearing" prior to
termination of AFDC benefits. In this respect the New Property was recognized as something
created by government.).
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the use of public resources. Corporations, perhaps even more than indi-
viduals, benefit from this largess.1 36
This government-created wealth is one component of Modern Prop-
erty. 13 7 But the term is employed in a broader sense than simply govern-
ment largess. 138 To take account of much sociological and political
writing of the last twenty years, it is suggested that Modern Property
includes the intangible currency of the Post-Industrial Society: knowl-
edge and information. 139 Information in all its forms-including its use
to influence public elections and referenda-is central to the modern
political economy. 140 The defense of this Modern Property is an increas-
ingly urgent corporate concern.
For courts and commentators in contemporary society, the rise of
this Modern Property, defined here as government largess, circumscribed
the individual's ability to exercise Bill of Rights protections. "When gov-
ernment-national, state, or local-hands out something of value,
whether a relief check or a television license, government's power grows
forthwith; it automatically gains such power as is necessary and proper
to supervise its largess," writes one commentator. "It obtains new rights
to investigate, to regulate, and to punish."' 4 1 The overwhelming concern
is that the government's new intrusive powers--derived, mostly, from
new forms of property-would intimidate the individual and impair her
ability to exercise Bill of Rights protections. A welfare recipient, for ex-
ample, fearing the loss of her subsistence, probably would not assert
fourth amendment rights against a government official knocking at the
door. 142
136. Reich, supra note 35, at 734-37.
137. This term is different from the term "New Property"; Reich calls for the creation of a
New Property that is not tied to government largess. Id. at 787. In this Article the term is not
prescriptive, but merely descriptive. It includes government-created wealth as well as property
in the form of information.
138. Reich also acknowledges that government largess is only one of several new forms of
wealth. Id. at 786.
139. See D. BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY XV (2d ed. 1976) (a post-
industrial society is characterized not by a labor theory, but by a knowledge theory of value);
see also D. BELL & I. KRISTOL, CAPITALISM TODAY (197 1) (a collection of essays of contem-
porary capitalist thought); R. DAHRENDORF, CLASS AND CLASS CONFLICT IN AN INDUS-
TRIAL SOCIETY (1959) (writing of a "post capitalist" society); C. LINDBLOOM, POLITICS AND
MARKETS (1977) (discussing the relationship between politics and economics); THE POLIT-
ICAL ECONOMY OF CORPORATISM (W. Grant ed. 1985) (a collection of essays addressing vari-
ous aspects of "Neo-capitalism").
140. See G. GILDER, MICROCOSM ch. 1 (1989) (describing the twentieth century as one in
which matter is overthrown so that only knowledge becomes important as a source of wealth).
141. Reich, supra note 35, at 746.
142. Id. at 762. Similarly, an applicant can be penalized by permanent exclusion from the
bar for exercising his first amendment rights and refusing to answer questions about political
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No one, however, addressed the question of whether new forms of
property put a similar pressure on corporate Bill of Rights protections as
on the Bill of Rights as applied to individuals.1 43 Modem Property does
not impose such a burden for two reasons. First, Modem Property, as
the term is used in this Article, includes possession of information and
knowledge that is not contingent on government largess; defense of this
property does not trigger a government counteraction. Second, corpora-
tions are better able to withstand the pressure of threats of withholding
government largess than are individuals; common concerns about a tyr-
anny of the majority are not present for the corporation. 144 If anything,
the corporation aggressively uses the Bill of Rights to protect its Modem
Property, and to stymie Modem Regulation, at the expense of individual
rights.
The Modem Property and Modem Regulation classifications are
not intended to be rigid and immutable. Rather, they indicate the direc-
tion in which property and regulation have headed over the course of the
twentieth century. This direction has triggered a greater willingness and
necessity on the part of corporations than earlier to assert Bill of Rights
safeguards.
b. The Corporate Legal Response
Corporations reacted to Modem Regulation and Modem Property
by invoking the Bill of Rights. This was not their only response. Indeed,
affiliations. Id at 763; see In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961). In this way a government-
created property-the right to practice law-is only granted if first amendment rights not to
answer questions are curtailed.
143. Reich did not discuss whether corporations feel the pressure to forego their Bill of
Rights guarantees. Reich, supra note 35, at 760-64. He does discuss the case of a foundation,
licensed to broadcast by the government. Id at 762. But the general problem of the corpora-
tion does not arise; indeed, Reich remains concerned with sheltering the "solitary human
spirit" and fostering "individual values" for rootless twentieth century man. Id. at 787.
144. Reich wrote before the New Regulation. For him, reforms of the Old Regulation led
to increased government power over the individual.
The reform took away some of the power of the corporations and transferred it to
government. In this transfer there was much good, for power was made responsive
to the majority rather than to the arbitrary and selfish few. But the reform did not
restore the individual to his domain. What the corporation had taken from him, the
reform simply handed on to government. And government carried further the pow-
ers formerly exercised by the corporation. Government as an employer, or as a dis-
penser of wealth, has used the theory that it was handing out gratuities to claim a
managerial power as great as that which the capitalists claimed. Moreover, the cor-
porations allied themselves with, or actually took over, part of government's system
of power. Today it is the combined power of government and the corporations that
presses against the individual.
Id at 773.
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opposition to Modem Regulation, expressed in the political and legisla-
tive arena, is now a unifying ideology of the corporate community.1 45
But assertion of intangible Bill of Rights safeguards to protect Modem
Property and to thwart Modem Regulation complements the ideological
battle. Denied the protections of Lochner and substantive due process,
corporate managers merely shifted the constitutional battle from the
fourteenth amendment to the first, fourth, and fifth amendments. This
has created a modem corporate substantive due process umbrella.
i. The Fourth Amendment
In the hands of the corporation, the fourth amendment has been an
effective shield against the regulatory state. Not until 1977 did the Court
consider the constitutional implications of routine health and safety in-
spections 146-the trademark of Modem Regulation. When it did, how-
ever, it insulated corporations from "surprise" inspections.1 47
The Supreme Court's first analysis of Modem Regulation did not
involve a corporation, but rather set the stage for later consideration of
corporate fourth amendment rights. In See v. City of Seattle1 48 the Court
held that the principal tool of Modem Regulation-the regulatory in-
spection-requires a warrant. 149 The Court analogized to the predomi-
nant investigative technique used under old regulation: administrative
subpoena of corporate books and records. 150 In See, a Seattle fire inspec-
tor attempted to inspect a commercial warehouse, without a warrant or
probable cause, as part of a routine canvass to obtain compliance with
Seattle's fire code. Appellant was arrested and contended that the in-
spection violated his fourth amendment rights. The Court framed the
question in terms of the rise of federal regulation of "business enter-
prises," corporate or otherwise. "As governmental regulation of business
enterprise has mushroomed in recent years, the need for effective investi-
145. See infra notes 184-89.
146. See infra notes 158-71.
147. Id.
148. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
149. Id. at 554. See overruled Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 366 (1959) (the "protec-
tion of the community's health" should prevail, wrote Frankfurter for a 5-4 Court, which held
the warrantless inspection of a private dwelling, by a health inspector looking for rats, did not
violate the fourth amendment).
150. See, 387 U.S. at 544-45, 545 n.5, ("[ilt is now settled that, when an administrative
agency subpoenas corporate books or records, the fourth amendment requires that the sub-
poena be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that
compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome") (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co.,
338 U.S. 632 (1950); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); United States
v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)).
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gative techniques to achieve the aims of such regulation has been the
subject of substantial comment and legislation," noted the Court.1 51
"Official entry upon commercial property is a technique commonly
adopted by administrative agencies at all levels of government to enforce
a variety of regulatory laws. .... ,,152
The Court deemed "untenable" the notion that a subpoena, which it
dubbed a "constructive search," is subject to fourth amendment limita-
tions that do not apply to actual inspections of commercial property.1 53
The result: an administrative warrant is necessary to enter and inspect
commercial premises. 154
Similarly, in the late sixties and early seventies a liquor corpora-
tion 55 and a firearms company 56 raised fourth amendment challenges to
151. 387 U.S. at 543-44.
152. Id.
153. Id at 544.
154. Id The Court's reasoning is criticized from a linguistic perspective. Davis, for exam-
ple, notes that the fourth amendment refers to "persons, houses, papers, and effects". The
opinion, however, "said nothing of the possibility that business 'papers' may be protected even
though commercial premises may be considered not to be 'houses.'" K. DAVIS, supra note 83,
at 247.
Added to this problem of language is a theoretical issue. The opinions relied on in See-
Morton Salt, Oklahoma Publishing, and Hale-all involved corporations, and were based on a
theory of the corporation that permitted broad government visitorial powers. See did not
involve a corporation. By relying on cases that did, it used these cases for the wrong proposi-
tion, and thus turned fourth amendment discussion in a new direction.
See is also criticized for changing the focus of the fourth amendment.
The main purpose of the fourth amendment-both the historic purpose and today's
practical purpose-is to protect "privacy." An individual has interests in privacy
that a corporation does not have, including the body, the home, the bedroom, the
personal diary. Privacy interests relate more to what is personal than to what is
impersonal. A corporation's principal privacy interest is in its papers ....
Id
Davis also notes that the strongest privacy interest is in the home, because it was writs of
assistance used to enter homes that the colonists found most abhorrent. See also Go-Bart
Importing Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 344, 346 (1931); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). According to Davis, "[e]ach of those cases had to do with the
corporation's books and papers, not with an inspection of its premises or equipment. K.
DAVIs, supra note 83, at § 49, 251.
155. In Colonnade Corp. v United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1969), a federal agent inspected a
liquor corporation, without a warrant, searching for tampered bottles. Upholding the search,
the Court created a narrow exception to See's warrant requirement based on the history of the
fourth amendment and Congress' broad power over the liquor industry. Id at 74-75. Follow-
ing the English parliament, Congress imposed excise taxes when the fourth amendment was
ratified, and had a history of regulating the liquor industry. Id at 75 nn.6-7. The Court did not
broach the question of corporate personality, and confined its analysis to what extent a "busi-
nessman" or "private commercial property" has a right to privacy.
156. The firearms industry was also exempted from See's warrant requirement. In United
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1971), the Court upheld a warrantless search for illegal guns in
a pawn shop. Although the firearms industry is not as pervasively regulated as the liquor
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warrantless government inspections of commercial premises. Both chal-
lenges failed, in part because the Court found that industries endowed
with state licenses, such as the liquor industry, 157 waived their fourth
amendment rights. It appeared that corporations reliant on government
largess, in this case for licensing, might have the same difficulty asserting
Bill of Rights protections as individuals.
But these defeats proved only temporary setbacks for industry. 158
In 1977 the Supreme Court ruled that the liquor and firearms industries
are narrow exceptions to the general rule that corporations are protected,
under the fourth amendment, against warrantless regulatory searches.
Marshall v. Barlow's Inc. 1 -9 upheld a challenge to a provision of the Oc-
cupation Safety and Health Act (OSHA) 160 authorizing warrantless
workplace inspections. At issue was whether an OSHA inspector needed
a warrant to enter the premises of an Idaho electrical and plumbing
corporation. 161
Marshall captures the political dynamic of corporate opposition to
Modern Regulation. OSHA is the quintessential enactment of Modern
Regulation; it was passed for social purposes and authorized an intrusive
federal system of routinized inspections. Those filing amici curiae briefs
on behalf of the federal government included the AFL-CIO and the Si-
erra Club, advocates of Modern Regulation. Those submitting amici cu-
industry, the Court surmised that anyone entering that business "does so with the knowledge
that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection." Id.
at 316. The exception to the general principle that warrantless searches violate the fourth
amendment was limited to searches of commercial premises in a closely regulated industry or
marked by a history of careful legislative supervision. Id. In those industries, the commercial
owner gave his implied consent to the search. Id.
157. In Colonnade the Court stated:
We deal here with the liquor industry long subject to close supervision and inspec-
tion. As respects that industry, and its various branches including retailers, Congress
has broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures.
Under the existing statutes, Congress selected a standard that does not include forci-
ble entries without a warrant. It resolved the issue, not by authorizing forcible, war-
rantless entries, but by making it an offense for a licensee to refuse admission to the
inspector.
Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 77.
The Court relied on See for the proposition that "[t]he businessman, like the occupant of a
residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official
entries upon his private commercial property." Id.
158. See also G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 338 (1976) (The warrant-
less invasion of corporate offices violates the fourth amendment. Unlike Biswell or Colonnade,
the intrusion was not based on the nature of the business, its license, or on a regulation of its
activities.).
159. 436 U.S. 307 (1977).
160. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678.
161. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 310.
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riae briefs in support of the corporation revealed the uniformity of
company opposition: the Mountain States Legal Foundation and the Pa-
cific Legal Foundation (both are law firms representing corporate inter-
ests), the National Federation of Independent Business, the American
Conservative Union, and the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States. 162
Marshall's far-reaching implications include rendering presump-
tively invalid many inspection provisions of federal statutes. 163 In dis-
sent, Justice Stevens argued that the majority severely hampered the
ability of government inspectors to conduct surprise inspections and to
uncover workplace safety violations. 164 Marshall was more than simply
a corporate triumph over Modern Regulation. It represented the protec-
tion of New Property-information about workplace operations that the
corporation sought to conceal from government-and it demonstrated
the importance of the intangible Bill of Rights in the modem political
economy.
The business press registered this urgency. "The Supreme Court de-
cision banning OSHA inspections without a search warrant is a great
victory for privacy and freedom in this country," wrote the Personnel
Director of Nikon corporation in a trade journal.165 "In the long run, it
may also be a blessing in disguise for OSHA if it results in diminishing
the reputation OSHA established as being an antagonist to American
business and emerges as its adjunct."' 166 This recognition of Marshall as
162. Id. at 308-09.
163. Md at 339 n.11; see, eg., 30 U.S.C § 813 (Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969); 30 U.S.C §§ 723, 724 (Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act); 21 U.S.C
§ 603 (Inspection of Meat and Food Products).
164. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 329-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. Hayes, What Can You Do when OSHA Calls? PERS. ADMIN., Nov. 1982, at 66.
166. Id The view of Nikon, a multinational camera corporation, may not be representa-
tive. As a sizeable multinational, Nikon may welcome regulation, if it is regularized, whereas
smaller corporations may be opposed to government regulation altogether. Recent scholarship
suggests that different corporate sectors, and corporations of different size, have different inter-
ests in regulation. See T. FERGUSON & J. ROGERS, supra note 122, at 44-46; T. FERGUSON &
J. ROGERS, THE HIDDEN ELECTION at ch.1 (1984).
Some historians also suggest that corporations, far from opposing regulation, seek to cap-
ture the agencies they attempt to regulate. See, eg., G. KOLKO, supra note 53, at ch. 1; G.
KOLKO, supra note 56, at ch. 1.
But the Modem social regulatory agencies ate less susceptible to capture because they
regulate many sectors, not just one industry. For instance, the EPA cannot be captured by the
many industries that it regulates, but the ICC could be captured by just the railroad industry.
And the alliances of large and small businesses in Marshall suggest that many corporate sec-
tors can unite against the intrusive aspects of Modem Regulation, particularly surprise inspec-
tions. 436 U.S. at 308-09.
It is not necessary here to enter the debate about capture, or to determine whether regula-
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a triumph over Modern Regulation typified the corporate community's
response, 167 and heralded an unprecedented recognition by the business
press of the importance of the Bill of Rights. 168
After Marshall corporations continued to challenge the tools of
Modem Regulation. In Donovan v. Dewey, 169 a mineral company dis-
puted, on fourth amendment grounds, the warrantless inspection provi-
sions of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977.170 Although
the Court rejected the challenge, it did not overrule Marshall, but sug-
gested that Congress' power over interstate commerce justified warrant-
less searches only in certain narrow cases such as liquor or firearms. 171
In 1986, in Dow Chemical Corp. v. United States, 172 corporations
posed their most far-flung constitutional challenge to the Modem Regu-
lation of Modem Property. Dow Chemical corporation argued that the
fourth amendment should prohibit the Environmental Protection
Agency from flying planes over Dow's manufacturing facilities to moni-
tor compliance with the Clean Air Act. 173 Although the Court permit-
tion is opposed altogether or welcomed by certain industries and sectors. It is sufficient for Bill
of Rights purposes to note corporations' uniform opposition to the intrusiveness of Modem
Regulation.
167. See Blow for Freedom?, CHEMICAL WK., June 7, 1978; Man From OSHA Must Have
Warrant, FLEET OWNER, July 1978; OSHA Needs Warrant for Inspections, PROFESSIONAL
BUILDER AND APARTMENT Bus., July 1978.
168. Neither the Bill of Rights nor any of its constituent amendments was listed in the
Business Periodicals Index until the 1960s. The Bill of Rights was not indexed in a business
publication until October 1961. See Our American Bill of Rights, MGMT. REC., Oct. 1961, at
30.
In the mid-1970s, the Business Periodicals Index exploded with references to the Bill of
Rights, and thereafter major articles on the first ten amendments, as they relate to corpora-
tions, have appeared in the business press. See generally Business Periodicals Index, 1975 to
present. See also How the Constitution Supports Private Enterprise, NATION'S Bus., July 1976
(National Chamber of Commerce publication).
Mobil Oil's advertising campaigns are recent evidence of the importance of the Bill of
Rights to corporations. Begun in the 1970s, the campaigns focus on the first ten amendments.
Mobil ran a series of "advertorials" in the New York Times trumpeting the Bill of Rights as
the "Second American Revolution." See An Inexhaustible Mine of National Wealth, N. Y.
Times, Oct. 15, 1987, § A, at 3 1; see also The Danger of the Levelling Spirit, N. Y. Times, Oct.
8, 1987, § A, at 39.
169. 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
170. 30 U.S.C. § 801 (1977).
171. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 606; see also New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 692 (1987)
(warrantless inspections permitted for the junkyard industry); Collins & Hurd, Warrantless
Administrative Searches: It's Time to Be Frank Again, 22 AMER. BUS. L.J. 189 (1984) (a
review of Supreme Court decisions concerning administrative searches); Comment, The Fourth
Amendment and Administrative Inspections, 16 Hous. L. REV. 399 (1979) (authored by
George T. Perry, Jr.).
172. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
173. Dow Chemical owned a 2000 acre facility in Midland, Michigan. The complex's
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ted the ffights, it appeared to endorse Dow's expansive view of the
Constitution. The Court opined that Dow plainly had a reasonable, le-
gitimate, and objective expectation of privacy,174 but found that Dow's
facility was similar to "open fields" that are subject to public view and
observation.' 75 The taking of photographs, therefore, did not constitute
a search. 176 Undoubtedly, the narrow grounds upon which the Court's
decision rests will encourage further corporate challenges to the more
sophisticated modes of Modem Regulation in defense of information, the
most intangible form of Modem Property.
ii. The First Amendment
Corporations invoked the first as well as the fourth amendment to
challenge Modem Regulation and safeguard Modem Property. In the
late 1970s the Supreme Court conferred constitutional protections on
two types of corporate speech: commercial and political. The impor-
tance of commercial speech in the modem political economy is evinced
by corporations' legal actions and by the business press' defense of this
form of communication. Political speech, as a means of influencing legis-
lative economic decisions, and thwarting novel forms of regulation, also
has assumed increased urgency for corporations.
The protection of "commercial speech" is a comparatively new con-
stitutional phenomenon. Until the 1970s advertising was viewed as com-
mercial speech, unprotected by the first amendment. 177 But in 1976, in
numerous buildings and interconnecting pipework were surrounded by an elaborate security
system that barred ground level public view of the plant. Id at 240. The EPA, rather than
secure an administrative warrant, hired a pilot to photograph the plant from altitudes of
12,000, 3,000, and 1,200 feet. Id at 243. The district court granted Dow's motion for sum-
mary judgment, reasoning that, because the configuration of building and pipes photographed
constituted "trade secrets" protected by state tort law, the government had violated the com-
pany's reasonable expectation of privacy. The Sixth Circuit reversed, id. at 243, and the
Supreme Court upheld the reversal.
174. Dow, 476 U.S. at 235 (citing See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); see also New
York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
175. Dow, 476 U.S. at 235 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 171 (1984)).
Justice Powell's partial dissent concluded that the Court did not explain how its decision
squared with Katz v United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Dow, 476 U.S. at 244. Katz held that
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection .... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
389 U.S. at 351.
176. See Federal Prying from the Sky, 73 NATION'S Bus., Oct. 1985, at 34.
177. The issue was not considered until 1942 when, in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S.
52 (1942), overruled, Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980),
the Court considered the case in which a man passed out handbills advertising a tour in viola-
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Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.,178 the Court held unconstitutional a Virginia statute prohibiting
price advertising of prescription drugs. A consumer group brought suit,
contending that it had a right to receive price information. The Court
found that commercial speech is not so far removed from the "exposition
of ideas" that it should be denied first amendment protection, though of
a lesser degree than "core" political speech. Because the consumer's in-
terest in this information was held to outweigh the government's interest
in protecting the pharmacists' expertise, the statute was struck down.
Soon after, corporations pressed for protection of commercial
speech. They did so both to thwart government regulation and to defend
a form of Modem Property: advertising. In 1980, in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 179 the
Court overturned a state regulation, adopted during the mid-1970s en-
ergy crises, banning all utility corporations from promoting the use of
electricity in advertisements. The Court applied a balancing test-used
for lesser-protected commercial speech-and found that because the
overbroad ban covered advertising that promoted the purchase of more
energy efficient appliances, it was broader than necessary to serve the
state interest in energy conservation.180
The Central Hudson Court acknowledged that communication, in
the modern political economy, is a form of property. Commercial speech
was defined as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience."181 In dissent, Justice Rehnquist protested that
striking down state economic regulation was nothing more than a con-
temporary version of Lochner. 182 Indeed, Central Hudson was a Loch-
ner-like invalidation of Modern Regulation: social regulation-albeit
tion of a city ordinance. The Court upheld the ordinance, holding that "purely commercial
advertising" has no first amendment protection.
178. 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
179. 447 U.S. 557, 574 (1980).
180. Advertising bans on legal services, contraceptives, abortion clinics, and real estate
were all struck down because the consumer had a right to hear the information. See, e.g.,
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (lawyer's services); Carey v. Population Serv.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (contraceptives); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willinoro, 431 U.S. 85
(1977) (housing); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (abortions).
The Court has allowed regulations of commercial speech when such speech is false, decep-
tive, or misleading. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 658 (1985);
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
473 (1978). It also has allowed regulation when the speech proposes illegal transactions. Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 387-88, reh'g denied, 414 U.S.
881 (1973).
181. 447 U.S. at 557.
182. Id. at 589 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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conducted by state, not federal, government-designed to achieve a na-
tional goal of energy independence.18 3
If Rehnquist criticized Central Hudson as a modem version of sub-
stantive due process, the business community welcomed protection of
commercial speech as a guarantor of property rights. The inviolability of
this form of speech, like the opposition to government regulation, has
become a unifying ideology of the corporate community. "We maintain
that voices in a democratic society-individual and corporate alike-
shouldn't be stifled or filtered through Big Nanny," opined a corpora-
tion-sponsored editorial defending unfettered commercial speech.
"Whether the topic is cigarettes, or energy policy, or the latest in de-
signer jeans, the first amendment shield must never be lowered, or selec-
tively applied."' 84
Undoubtedly commercial speech rights are more important to cer-
tain corporations and sectors of the economy: those industries-such as
consumer goods and retailing-that count advertising and marketing as
part of their product. But corporations from diverse sectors publicly ad-
vocate commercial free speech rights and view them as property
rights. 185
The corporate legal literature now promotes commercial speech as a
component of the bottom line, to be carefully monitored with an eye to-
wards encroaching government regulation. Corporate managers are ad-
monished to "run advertisements that are expected to raise profits (but
should avoid false and misleading advertising because the FTC will fine
them)." 16 The exercise of first amendment rights, in a commercial
speech setting, becomes a property right, subject to cost-benefit
calculations.
183. Although the Court has permitted regulation of corporate commercial speech in re-
cent years, it has always been in the context of the Hudson balancing test. See Posadas de
Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 329 (1986) (upholding a
regulation restricting the advertising of gambling casinos on the basis of the Hudson balancing
test).
184. With Liberty and Justice (and free speech) For A-t Some, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1987,
§ A, at 31. Mobil Oil Corporation, whose "advertorials" are often an accurate barometer of
Fortune Five Hundred opinions, has launched a campaign opposed to a cigarette advertising
ban.
.See also Commercial Free Speech, The Argument for Our Side, DIRECT MARKETING, Feb.
1983; Crossen, Proliferation of 'Advertorials' Blurs Distinction Between News and Ads, Wall St.
J., Apr. 21, 1988, § 2, at 33.
185. See, eg., PUB. REL. J., Dec. 1979, at 20.
186. Hatano, Should Corporations Exercise Their Freedom of Speech Rights?, 22 A. Bus.
L.J. 165 (1984); see also Barrett, The Unchartered Area-Commercial Speech and the First
Amendment, 13 U.C. DAvis L. Rnv. 175, 185 (1980) (discussing the regulation of false
advertising).
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The importance of commercial speech rights to corporations is re-
flected in their aggressive assertion of those rights, often with adverse
consequences for individuals. In 1987, Americans witnessed a fierce, and
public, debate over corporate commercial speech rights when a bill was
introduced in Congress to ban all forms of cigarette advertising. 8 7 To-
bacco companies' subsequent efforts to oppose this legislation provoked a
minor political furor. In late 1987, Phillip Morris Companies, Inc.
mailed a press kit to a select group of newspaper and television editors.
In it was a glossy black brochure. In deep red, on the cover, was a repro-
duction of the Order of Lenin, the highest honor conferred by the Soviet
Union, and the words: "One world-famous newspaper without cigarette
advertising." 188 Inside was a copy of Pravda. Kansas Representative
Mike Synar, a sponsor of the antismoking legislation, later accused Philip
Morris of "using the basest, grossest form of redbaiting to protect their
multibillion-dollar investment, which costs young people their health and
older Americans their lives." 189
That a tobacco corporation would engage in such aggressive tactics
to support its commercial free speech rights is indicative of the impor-
tance of these rights have in the modem political economy. But the invo-
cation of corporate commercial free speech rights presents two problems
for individuals. First, as the Philip Morris example illustrates, the asser-
tion of corporate rights can sometimes involve what Representative
Synar calls "redbaiting," or a certain measure of intimidation directed at
individuals who favor restricting corporate commercial speech. Second,
the assertion of corporate commercial speech rights deprives the individ-
ual of a certain kind of freedom-the freedom to be protected from to-
bacco and tobacco advertising. 190
187. See Health Protection Act of 1987, H.R. 1272, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); see also
H.R. 1532, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
See also T. B. CARTER, FREE SPEECH AND ADVERTISING-WHO DRAWS THE LINE?
(1987); R. REIMER, THE PROPOSED PROHIBITION ON ADVERTISING TOBACCO PRODUCTS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, Jan. 16, 1986 (prepared for the Congressional Research Ser-
vice); G. Will, The Civil Libertarians Are Blowing Smoke, Washington Post, Jul. 24, 1986, § A,
at 23; J. Tye, Cigarette Ads Reveal a History of Deceit, Wall St. J., Aug. 5, 1986, at 30; M.
Mintz, Judge Says Tobacco Industry Hid Risks, Washington Post, April 22, 1988, at 1.
188. Washington Post, Dec. 20, 1987, § K, at 2. Also enclosed in the packet was a book of
essays from a Phillip Morris Magazine Essay competition, soliciting essays that specifically
contained the words "Smoking and the First Amendment." See AMERICAN VOICES: PRIZE
WINNING ESSAYS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, CENSORSHIP & ADVERTISING BANS (1987)
($81,000 in prize money awarded to authors for these essays).
189. Washington Post, Dec. 20, 1987, § K, at 3.
190. Tobacco use is one of the leading causes of death in the United States, responsible for
346,000 lives lost every year. (By comparison, approximately 50,000 Americans died in the
Vietnam war; 4,000 die annually from heroin and 2,000 die annually from cocaine). Figures
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In this way, the corporation's invocation of the Bill of Rights to
protect Modem Property (the ability to advertise) and to thwart Modem
Regulation (federal measures to protect health and the environment) im-
pinges on individual liberties.
Corporations wield first amendment protections of political, as well
as commercial speech, to derail government regulation. The Court ini-
tially conferred first amendment political speech safeguards on corpora-
tions in 1978 in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.191 In that case,
a consortium of Boston corporations192 raised a first amendment chal-
lenge to a Massachusetts statute prohibiting corporate expenditures on a
graduated income tax referendum. 193 The Massachusetts Legislature
and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the tax
question did not materially affect the property, business, or assets of the
corporations. 194 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court struck down the stat-
ute, holding that corporate political speech is protected. 95
Bellotti's corporate plaintiffs maintained that a graduated personal
income tax would have a direct economic effect on them (by promoting a
tax climate unfavorable to business or discouraging managers from mov-
ing to Massachusetts). 196 The corporate community applauded the
"landmark"' 197 decision as much for its economic as for its political con-
taken from "Learning and Unlearning Drug Abuse in the Real World" at 105 (1988) (research
monograph of the National Institute on Drug Abuse) cited in THE UTNE READER 144 Jan./
Feb. 1990).
191. First Natl Bank v. Attorney Gen., 371 Mass. 773, 359 N.E.2d 1262 (1977), rev'd sub
nom. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); see also Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (utilities enjoy the full panoply of first amendment
protections for their direct comments on public issues), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1114 (1985).
192. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, New England Merchants National Bank, Gillette Co.,
Digital Equipment Corp., and the Wyman-Gordon Corporation were plaintiffs in the action.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 768 n.1.
193. The referendum, or ballot, involved in Bellotti, was a proposed amendment to the
Massachusetts constitution allowing a progressive state income tax. See First Nat'l Bank v.
Attorney Gen., 371 Mass. at 774-75, 359 N.E.2d at 1265. At the time, Massachusetts had a
flat income tax; the proposed amendment authorized no new taxes, it only made the existing
system progressive.
After corporations overturned the Massachusetts statute proscribing corporate spending
on the tax ballot, the ballot was defeated. Massachusetts still does not have a progressive
income tax. Telephone interview with Dan Sullivan, Massachusetts Department of Campaign
Financing (April 6, 1988). This was the second time corporations and their allies defeated a
progressive income tax. First Nat'l, 371 Mass. at 778, 359 N.E.2d at 1266-67.
194. First Nat'l, 371 Mass. at 785-87, 359 N.E.2d at 1270-71.
195. Bellotti. 435 U.S. at 802.
196. Id at 770 n.4.
197. H. SCHMERTZ, CORPORATIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 16 (1978) ("The
Supreme Court decision is also important in that it diminishes the distinction that existed
between individuals and corporations. The decision erases any doubt that first amendment
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tent. "[P]rudence dictates a careful eye on gross revenues and net earn-
ings," wrote a leading corporate spokesman, analyzing Bellotti for
managers.
In addition, common sense dictates some correlation between money
spent and the importance of the particular issue to the company's im-
mediate business goals. It goes without saying that management is
likely to spend far more to defeat legislation that would hinder its in-
dustry than it would to advocate a law with relatively minor business
repercussions. 198
In the modern political economy, the ability to spend money to influence
referenda is a form of Modern Property. As the advice for corporate
managers suggests, it is frequently in the corporation's interest to spend
money for political purposes. The right to spend this money is therefore
an important property right to be guarded.
Bellotti was as much a frustration of Modem Regulation as a de-
fense of Modern Property. The regulation was modern in the sense that
state regulation of corporate spending in referenda is a comparatively
new phenomenon 99 compared to prohibitions against corporate expendi-
tures on election of candidates, which date back to the Progressive era.2°°
rights inure to corporations, which have, in the eyes of the law, certain of the characteristics of
,natural persons.' ").
198. Id. ("At the same time, when there are not bottom line considerations, it may make
sense for a corporation to spend heavily on behalf of what it deems to be the national good.").
199. See Mastro, Costlow & Sanchez, Taking the Initiative: Corporate Control of the Refer-
endum Process Through Media Spending and What to Do About It, 32 FED. COMM. L.J. 315
(1980); see also Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition For Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley,
454 U.S. 290, 290-91 (1981) (White, J., dissenting) (city ordinances that placed $250 cap on
contributions to committees formed to support ballot measures contravened the first amend-
ment); E. BARNOUW, THE SPONSOR (1981) (discussing the use of the media to influence
referenda).
200. President Theodore Roosevelt, in his 1905 State of the Union address, recommended
a total ban on corporate political activity, urging that "both the national and the several state
legislatures forbid any officer of a corporation from using the money of the corporation in or
about any election [or] in connection with any legislation." Quoted in J. Brebbia, First Amend-
ment Rights and the Corporation, PUB. REL. J. 17 (Dec. 1979); see also 40 CONG. REc. 96
(1905) (Roosevelt message to Congress to the same effect). Reflecting this sentiment, the Till-
man Act, ch. 420 Stat. 864, repealed by Act approved Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1153,
1159, provided that no corporation could make direct contributions to campaigns involving
Federal office. Since then Congress and the state legislatures have repeatedly limited or pro-
hibited corporate contributions or expenditures. See Act approved Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34
Stat. 864.; Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 81-82 (1975); Note, Corporate Democracy and the Corpo-
rate Political Contribution, 61 IOWA L. REV. 545 (1975) (authored by Michael D. Holt).
See, e.g., Michigan State Chamber of Commerce v. Austin, 643 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. Mich.
1986) (denying a Michigan State Chamber of Commerce first amendment challenge to a state
statute that makes it a felony for corporations to spend money on political candidates), rev'd on
other grounds, 856 F.2d 783 (6th Cir. 1986).
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The degree to which intangible, highly abstract first amendment
rights become central in corporate economic calculations became appar-
ent in 1986. In Pacific Gas & Electric v. Public Utilities Commission,20 1 a
public utility monopoly disputed a state regulation allowing a ratepayer
advocacy group to enclose inserts in the utility's billing envelopes; the
regulation's stated purpose was to allow for the dissemination of compet-
ing viewpoints and thus to lower utility rates. The Court ruled that the
regulation violated the first amendment, as incorporated through the
fourteenth, because it infringed the corporation's right not to associate
with speech it opposed.202
This freedom of association right is a form of Modem Property. In
his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall indicated that a corporation has
a property interest in the extra space in its billing envelope.20 3 Indeed,
the Commission shared this view, suggesting that this property belonged
to ratepayers.2°4 The development of extra space in an envelope as animportant property right is symbolic of the evolution of property in post-
industrial society;20 5 the corporate assertion of first amendment rights to
protect this Modem Property suggests the stakes involved.
Pacific Gas & Electric represented a victory for corporations over a
novel form of regulation. The ratepayer advocacy group seeking access
to the utility billing envelopes was an elected citizens group whose mis-
sion was to challenge electric rates on behalf of consumers. Established
in several states, these groups attempted to create a decentralized, par-
ticipatory form of regulation operating independently of government and
deriving monetary support directly from the citizenry. In theory, this
form of participatory or populist regulation should be less susceptible to
capture than a state or federal regulatory apparatus. But Pacific Gas &
Electric eliminated the groups' funding and communications capabilities,
perhaps permanently ending this regulatory experiment.
Corporations, encouraged by the legal community, plan further first
amendment assaults on a multiplicity of government regulations. At a
1987 judicial conference in Hershey, Pennsylvania, corporate lawyers
counseled corporations to use the first amendment to invalidate a range
of federal regulations, including Securities and Exchange Commission
201. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
202. Id
203. Id at 22-25.
204. Id at 5 n.3.
205. It is symbolic in the sense that property has become more like air in an envelope:
intangible, ephemeral, and based on ideas.
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disclosure requirements governing corporate takeovers and rules affect-
ing stock offerings. 206
iii. The Fifth Amendment
The use of the fifth amendment is the most striking example of how
corporations invoke Bill of Rights protections to protect Modern Prop-
erty in the form of government largess. After Hale, 207 the Court did not
consider whether corporations enjoyed fifth amendment protections until
the 1960s.208 At that time, it reviewed the applicability of the double
jeopardy clause to a corporation.20 9
In Fong Foo, a corporation and two of its employees were tried on
charges of concealing material facts in connection with a million dollar
contract to furnish radiosondes (weather gathering devices) to the gov-
ernment. The district court judge directed a verdict of acquittal, citing
improper conduct by the prosecuting attorney. The Supreme Court held
that the double jeopardy clause barred retrial of the defendants, includ-
ing the corporation. 210 The company successfully invoked its right to
safeguard its government largess, a government contract.
In 1980, a federal court ruled that corporations have liberty interests
protected by the fifth amendment due process clause. In Old Dominion
Dairy Products, Inc. v. Secretary of Defense,21 1 a corporation challenged
the Defense Department's determination that it was barred from supply-
ing dairy products to the Armed Services because an audit revealed that
Old Dominion was an "irresponsible" contractor lacking "business integ-
206. Labaton, Speech Rights of Companies, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19 1987, at D2, col.I.
207. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
208. The court granted the protection of the fifth amendment takings clause to corpora-
tions in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
209. Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962). The business press also follows fifth
amendment evolution to some degree. See Corporate Officer Can't Use Fifth Amendment to
Withhold Corporate Records, PRACTICAL AccT., Aug. 1986, at 12; Supreme Court Interpreta-
tion of Fifth Amendment Protection Against the Compelled Production of Business Documents,
ARMA REC. MNGT. Q., Oct. 1986, at 3.
210. 369 U.S. at 143; see United States v. Security Nat'l Bank, 546 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.
1976); see also United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co, 430 U.S. 564 (1977) (the fifth amend-
ment bars retrial of a textile corporation that was acquitted under Rule 29(c) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure of violating an antitrust consent decree); United States v. Armco
Steel Co. 252 F. Supp. 364, 368 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (Ruling "beyond doubt.., that the constitu-
tional jeopardy extended to 'persons' includes corporations." The court relied on the defini-
tion of persons used by federal statutes, such as the antitrust laws, and included corporations
as persons.); Comment, The Applicability of the Double Jeopardy Right to Corporations, 1977
DUKE L.J. 726 (1977) (authored by David L. Kane) (denial of double jeopardy protection to
corporations does not advance public interest).
211. 631 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980), reversing sub. nom. Old Dominion Dairy Prods., Inc.
v. Brown 471 F. Supp. 300 (D.D.C. 1979).
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rity.' 212 The D.C. Court of Appeals ruled that the Department violated
the corporation's liberty interest in its reputation.213 The court relied on
earlier cases that held corporations have fourteenth and first amendment
liberty rights. 2 14
Old Dominion is further indication that the Bill of Rights can be
used by corporations to protect Modem Property. The award of military
contracts is largess-considered a form of Modem Property because it is
created by the federal government. 215
212. Id at 957-58.
213. Id at 962-64.
214. Id at 962-63. In the fight against Modem Regulation corporations have also received
some sixth and seventh amendment protections. Although never specifically extending the
right, the Court heard the claim of a corporate defendant that it was denied sixth amendment
safeguards. In 1907, in Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 76-77 (1907), a
company, convicted for failure to pay specific rates of shipment for goods as required by fed-
eral law, was assumed to be an "accused" for sixth amendment purposes.
Recently lower courts have specifically extended sixth amendment rights to corporations.
One court noted "the fundamental principle that corporations enjoy the same rights as individ-
uals to trial by jury." United States v. R. L. Polk & Co., 438 F.2d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 1971).
In United States v. Rad-O-Lite, 612 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1979), the Third Circuit heard a
corporation's appeal, along with its principal officer, of conviction for conspiracy to engage in
racketeering activities. The corporation claimed it was denied its sixth amendment right to
counsel, because the same attorney represented both the corporation and its principal officer.
The court, following the mode of analysis used in Bellotti, noted that
[t]he Supreme Court generally has considered issues of the application of constitu-
tional rights in negative terms: asking whether corporate status should defeat an
otherwise valid claim of right. The sixth amendment describes the class of persons
protected by its terms with the word 'accused.' This language does not suggest that
the protection of sixth amendment rights is restricted to individual defendants.
Furthermore, an accused has no less of a need for effective assistance due to the
fact that it is a corporation. The purpose of the guarantee is to ensure that the ac-
cused will not suffer an adverse judgment or lose the benefit of procedural protections
because of ignorance of the law... A corporation would face the same dangers
unless the agent representing it in Court is a competent lawyer.
Id at 743; see also United Sates v. Crosby, 24 F.R.D. 15 (1959) (corporation may only appear
in a court through an attorney in a criminal case); In re Las Colina Dev. Corp., 585 F.2d 7 (1st
Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 937 (1979); see also United States v. Winnie Mae Mfg. Co.,
451 F. Supp. 642 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (corporations entitled to sixth amendment right to present a
defense, and to fifth amendment due process right, when charged with harboring illegal aliens).
The Supreme Court has not directly granted seventh amendment rights to corporations,
although it has intimated that a corporation's right to sue implies the right to trial by jury. In
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 532 (1970), the Court held that plaintiffs in a stockholders
derivative suit are entitled to trial by jury when the corporation, suing in its own right, would
be permitted a jury trial.
At least one court has suggested that corporations have a general right of privacy, derived
from the penumbra of Bill of Rights protections accorded them. Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
147 Cal. App. 3d 770, 795-97, 195 Cal. Rptr. 393, 410-12 (1983).
215. In the 1960s courts and commentators worried that government could intimidate
individuals, and impinge on their liberty, by threatening to withhold government largess (like
welfare checks). Old Dominion is an example of how this concern applies with less force to
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The willingness of corporations to assert first, fourth, and fifth
amendment claims derives from the increased importance of the Bill of
Rights in the modern political economy. Because much of Modem Reg-
ulation is conducted by federal government, the Bill of Rights is impli-
cated rather than the fourteenth amendment, as in the era of substantive
due process. Modem federal regulation--conducted for environmental,
social, or consumer purposes-often involves intrusive inspections that
trigger fourth amendment concerns.
Modem Property often takes the form of government largess, and
corporations invoke the fifth amendment to protect it. The ability to ad-
vertise commercially, or to participate in political referenda that affect
the corporate environment, are increasingly important forms of Modem
Property; corporations assert the first amendment to protect it.
Taken together, these Bill of Rights assertions represent a bold new
challenge to government regulation. Denied the power of the fourteenth
amendment when the era of substantive due process ended, corporations
have taken refuge in the Bill of Rights.
In the process, substantive due process may have been revived.
When the Supreme Court pronounces on the nature of the corporation
(for constitutional purposes) it imposes its own economic views, as it did
during the substantive due process era. The question: What is the nature
of the corporation? is similar to the economic questions that the
Supreme Court was criticized for asking in the Lochner era. In fact, the-
orizing about the nature of the corporation ends up as an inquiry into the
propriety of regulation.
To determine the extent to which substantive due process has been
revived for the corporation, one must consider the history of corporate
theory and the Bill of Rights.
II. The Demise of Corporate Theory
In the era of Modem Regulation, the rise of the application of the
Bill of Rights to corporations has coincided with the demise of corporate
theory. Before 1960, the Court only considered corporations' constitu-
tional guarantees within the strictures of corporate personhood theory: a
corporation was either an "artificial" entity subject to expansive state
regulation or a "natural" entity entitled to constitutional protections
against the state. After 1960, the Court abandoned theorizing about cor-
porate personhood.
corporations-the more size and resources a corporation has, the more it is willing to fight to
retain government largess. See supra notes 135-43.
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In some respects, this drastic doctrinal reversal is extraordinary, es-
pecially considering the frequency with which corporate constitutional
rights are now asserted. Without some theory of corporate personhood,
it is unclear how corporations can claim the succor of Bill of Rights
amendments written only for "persons." 216
In other respects, the Court's modern, pragmatic, antitheoretical ap-
proach is the prosaic legitimation of the corporation's constitutional sta-
tus. This pragmatic approach is a less controversial guarantor of
corporate rights than a theoretical methodology that raises fundamental
questions about the nature of a corporation and its role in society. The
Court retreated to pragmatism in response to criticisms of corporate per-
sonhood theory-by Legal Realists and economists-and out of a con-
cern for its own legitimacy to decide economic questions (including the
ultimate question: What is a corporation?) in the post-Lochner era.
A. The Progressive and New Deal Periods: Personhood Theory
The Supreme Court only occasionally considered corporate protec-
tions under the Bill of Rights prior to 1960. When it did, it invoked a
theory of corporate personhood. Fifth amendment privileges against
self-incrimination were denied the corporation, because artificial entities
subject to state regulation (defined to include federal superintendence)
cannot invoke constitutional rights. Although the Court initially em-
ployed the natural entity theory to confer fourth amendment privileges
on corporations, it later used the artificial entity theory to narrow those
rights. This pattern was repeated in the first amendment area.
(1) The Fifth Amendment: Artificial Entities
Corporations were first "personalized" in Santa Clara, and by 1910
the Court accepted the natural entity theory for fourteenth amendment
purposes.217 While in Noble the Court never explained its reasons for
conferring fifth amendment due process property rights on corporations,
the logic of the natural entity theory appeared to govern.
Intangible Bill of Rights protections were another matter. Their ap-
plicability to corporations was first considered in 1906 in Hale,218 which
marked the beginning of the Court's schizophrenic view of corporate pei-
sonality.219 The Court utilized the artificial entity theory to deny corpo-
216. The language of the document never mentions corporations. See supra note 8.
217. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
218. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
219. Unlike with the fourth amendment, the Court never deviated from its conclusion that
corporations may not invoke the fifth amendment privilege. In Wilson v. United States, 221
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rations fifth amendment privileges against self-incrimination, 220 while
embracing the natural entity theory to grant corporations fourth amend-
ment safeguards. 221
The reasons for Hale's two-faced view of the corporation remain
mysterious. The opinion may have reflected the growing debate in the
legal literature over corporate personality. It may be that although the
Court viewed the fourth amendment protection of papers to be akin to
the protection of property, the very personal, intangible privilege against
self-incrimination is more difficult to grant a corporate entity. One com-
mentator suggests the opinion represents a savvy accommodation to old
style regulation because if both fourth and fifth amendment protections
were granted corporations, prosecution under the Sherman Act wguld
be impossible. 222
Whatever the reasons, Hale marked the beginning of a period in
which the Court viewed corporate Bill of Rights guarantees exclusively
in terms of personhood theory; Morton Salt,223 decided in 1950, marks
the end of that period.
Hale involved a criminal antitrust action, brought under the Sher-
man Act, against two tobacco corporations: the American Tobacco
Company and the MacAndrews & Forbes Company. A subpoena duces
tecum was issued to Hale, the secretary and treasurer of MacAndrews &
Forbes, requesting that he appear and produce a battery of letters and
contracts executed between his corporation and several other tobacco
U.S. 361 (1911), the Court held that corporate officers in possession of corporate records must
produce them in response to a subpoena, even if the records might incriminate them person-
ally.
A companion case to Wilson, Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394, 399-400 (1911), indi-
cated that the result would be the same whether the subpoena was directed to the corporation
or to an officer of the corporation, as long as it sought corporate records. See also Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1948) (no privilege as to records required by law); Grant v.
United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913) (no privilege as to corporate records in possession of attor-
ney of former sole shareholder).
220. There may be little practical significance to Hale's fifth amendment holding. First, a
corporation can never take the stand to use the privilege orally-its chief value is to individu-
als. Second, when the individual uses the privilege for documents, it is usually circumvented
and the documents are obtained by other means. See generally Comment, Fifth Amendment
Protection and the Production of Corporate Documents, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 747 (1987) (au-
thored by Shauna J. Sullivan).
221. Hale, 201 U.S. at 75.
222. Saltzburg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its Lessons for the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 36-38 (1986).
223. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
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firms. 2 2 4 Hale refused to comply, invoking the fifth amendment's privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 225
Rejecting this argument, the Court held that the words "no person"
in the privileges portion of the fifth amendment do not suggest that cor-
porations should be included within the amendment's protections.226
The majority then rendered its most expansive rendition of the artificial
entity theory,227 drawing a sharp distinction between the individual and
the corporation. 228 The individual exists antecedent to the state and
therefore owes no duty to the state and cannot be deprived of any consti-
tutional rights. The corporation, however, is a mere "creature of the
State." Its powers are limited by law, and the legislature reserves a right
to investigate the corporation.229 An individual may refuse to answer
incriminating questions, but a corporation may not if it is charged with
an abuse of its state-conferred privileges.230
Hale, for the first time, modified the artificial entity theory to in-
clude the federal government. Since the defendant tobacco corporation
was incorporated in New Jersey, the artificial entity theory, strictly ap-
plied, would only permit a state government to exercise its visitorial pow-
ers over the corporation. The Hale Court ruled, however, that because
the defendant corporation is subordinate to Congressional power over
interstate commerce, it is subject to dual sovereignty, and the federal
224. 201 U.S. at 44-45.
225. Id at 46.
226. Id at 70-72.
227. Id at 78-79.
228. Id. at 74.
229. Id. at 74-75.
230. Id
The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to
carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He
owes no duty to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his
doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to criminate him. He owes no such
duty to the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his
life and property. His rights are such as existed by the laws of the land long antece-
dent to the organization of the State, and can only be taken from him by due process
of law, and in accordance with the Constitution .... He owes nothing to the public
so long as he does not trespass upon their rights .... Upon the other hand, the
corporation is a creature of the State. It is presumed to be incorporated for the
benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds
them subject to the laws of the State and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are
limited by law .... It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a State, having
chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not, in the exercise
of its sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had been employed, and whether they
had been abused, and demand the production of the corporate books and papers for
that purpose.
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government has the same right to inspect corporate documents as the
State of New Jersey. 231
Since Hale, the privilege against self-incrimination remains the only
Bill of Rights safeguard unavailable to corporations; its reasoning sur-
vives as a relic of a bygone era of corporate theory. 232 Paradoxically, in
modem times, corporations receive other fifth amendment protections:
due process liberty rights and double jeopardy safeguards.
(2) The Fourth Amendment: Artificial v. Natural
Although Hale settled the personhood debate for the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination, it merely began it for the fourth
amendment. In Hale, the Court raised the question, on its own, whether
a corporation is entitled to fourth amendment protections. The Court
held that corporations are entitled to such protection.
[W]e do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not
entitled to immunity, under the fourth amendment, against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an association
of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity.
In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional im-
munities appropriate to such a body.233
By suggesting that a corporation is a distinct legal entity, the Court for
the first time explicitly adopted the "natural entity" theory of the corpo-
ration. There was no doubt about the utilitarian reasons for doing so:
231. Id. at 75.
It is true that the corporation in this case was chartered under the laws of New
Jersey, and that it receives its franchise from the legislature of that State; but such
franchises, so far as they involve questions of interstate commerce, must also be exer-
cised in subordination to the power of Congress to regulate such commerce, and in
respect to this the General Government may also assert a sovereign authority to
ascertain whether such franchises have been exercised in a lawful manner, with a due
regard to its own laws. Being subject to this dual sovereignty, the General Govern-
ment possesses the same right to see that its own laws are respected as the State
would have with respect to the special franchises vested in it by the laws of the State.
The powers of the General Government in this particular in the vindication of its
own laws, are the same as if the corporation had been created by an act of Congress.
It is not intended to intimate, however, that it has a general visitatorial power over
state corporations.
Id.
232. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 408 (1976); Fifth Amendment Limitations on Compelled Production of Evidence, 22
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 559, 559-60 (1984). But see Comment, Fifth Amendment Privilege and
Compelled Production of Corporate Papers After Fisher and Doe, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 935
(1986) (authored by Arthur Y.D. Ong) (arguing that Fisher can be construed to create a fifth
amendment privilege for custodians of corporate papers).
233. Hale, 201 U.S. at 76; see Gulf Colorado & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150,
154 (1897).
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"corporations are a necessary feature of modem business activity, and
their aggregated capital has become the source of nearly all great enter-
prises. '234 The Court went on to hold that an overbroad subpoena for
corporate documents constitutes an "unreasonable" search.235
In a separate concurrence in Hale, Justice Harlan advanced the arti-
ficial entity theory to suggest that corporations should not be accorded
fourth amendment protections.
In my opinion a corporation-"an artificial being, invisible, intan-
gible, and existing only in contemplation of law"-cannot claim the
immunity given by the fourth amendment, for it is not a part of the
"People," within the meaning of that amendment. Nor is it embraced
by the word "persons" in the amendment.236
After the New Deal, the artificial entity theory worked its way back
into fourth amendment jurisprudence as a way of narrowly circumscrib-
ing the corporation's fourth amendment rights. 237 This was first done in
234. Hale, 201 U.S. at 76.
235. r at 76-77. The search was found unreasonable because it required the production
of so many corporate documents. In dicta, the Court noted that if Congress exercised its
powers over interstate commerce to examine a corporation's books, this would not constitute
an unreasonable search. Id. at 77.
236. Id at 78-79 (Harlan, J., concurring). Harlan warned of the grave restrictions that the
majority's ruling would have on the government's regulatory powers.
[The power of the Government by its representatives to look into the books, records
and papers of a corporation of its own creation, to ascertain whether that corporation
has obeyed or is defying the law, will be greatly curtailed, if not destroyed. If a
corporation, when its affairs are under examination by a grand jury proceeding in its
work under the orders of the court, can plead the immunity given by the fourth
amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures, may it not equally rely upon
that amendment to protect it even against a statute authorizing or directing the ex-
amination by the agents of the Government creating it, its papers, documents and
records, unless they specify the particular papers, documents, and records to be
examined?
At
Justice McKenna argued in his concurrence that Congress, by virtue of the Commerce
clause, has dominion over corporations engaged in that commerce and is not subject to the
limits of the fourth amendment. Id. at 82 (McKenna, J., concurring).
237. Shades of Harlan and artificial entity theory emerged in later years as the government
acquired increased power over corporate documents. In Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361,
368 (1910), the Court held constitutional a broad subpoena that asked for all letters and tele-
grams relating to an alleged fraud and conspiracy violation. The subpoena required the pro-
duction of letters and telegrams "signed or purporting to be signed by the President of said
company during the month [sic] of May and June 1909 in regard to an alleged violation of the
statutes of the United States by C.C. Wilson." Id. at 375. The Wilson Court did not develop
any reasons for its narrow construction of fourth amendment rights, and it was not until the
1940s that the Court granted the government broader powers to search for corporate docu-
ments and reconsidered a theory of corporate personality. See infra notes 239-42 and accompa-
nying text.
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Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,2 38 in which the Court permit-
ted the Department of Labor broad access to a newspaper corporations
documents.
Historically private corporations have been subject to broad visitorial
power, both in England and in this country. And it long has been
established that Congress may exercise wide investigative power over
them, analogous to the visitorial power of the incorporating state,
when their activities take place within or affect interstate commerce.2 39
Furthermore, the Court found that corporations are not entitled to all of
the constitutional protections individuals have "in these and related
matters." 24o
In United States v. Morton Salt Co.,2 4 1 the Court relied on a federal
version of the artificial entity theory to permit the FTC broad authority
to inspect a corporation's price lists. "[Corporations can claim no
equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy ....
They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective impact
upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial
entities," held the Court. "The Federal Government allows them the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government
often carry with them an enhanced measure of regulation. '2 42
The Court championed, and then abandoned, corporate theory.
From Hale to Morton Salt, the Court framed the question of whether a
search for corporate documents is reasonable in terms of corporate per-
sonality: to the extent the corporation was an artificial entity, sub-
servient to the state, the federal government could make broad requests
for the production of corporate documents.2 43 The Court moved from
the natural entity theory in Hale, which placed limitations on the federal
governments' investigatory powers, to a federal version of the artificial
238. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
239. Id. at 204.
240. Id. at 204-05. The Court relied on Wilson, where a government request for docu-
ments had been held valid despite its broad scope, as support for its narrow interpretation of
corporate fourth amendment rights; see also Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501
(1943) (subpoena for business records including payroll records, held invalid); Fleming v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F.2d 384, 388-89 (7th Cir. 1940) (held that a corporation is not
protected by immunity against self-incrimination, which is guaranteed by the fifth amendment,
but is entitled to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures under the fourth
amendment), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 690 (1940).
241. 338 U.S. 632, 641 (1950).
242. Id. at 652.
243. See also California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65, 67 (1974), citing Morton
Salt for the proposition that "corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoy-
ment of a right to privacy." Id. at 67. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the reporting
requirement of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1730d, 1829b, and 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1062, 1081-1083, 1101-1105, 1121-1122. Id. at 67.
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entity theory in Morton Salt that allowed the government seemingly un-
limited powers to inspect corporate documents for no other reason than
"official curiosity." This shift may have reflected the increased legiti-
macy of federal regulation in the New Deal era. Whatever the reasons,
during this period the Court always decided the question of a corpora-
tion's constitutional guarantees based on a corporate personhood theory.
(3) The First Amendment: Artificial v. Natural
Although corporations first received first amendment safeguards in
1978,244 by that time the Court had considered the first amendment pro-
tections of unincorporated associations, newspaper corporations, labor
unions, and other organizations. Although these cases have little prece-
dential value for profit-making corporations, corporate theory worked its
way into these decisions before and immediately after the New Deal.
First amendment rights were initially extended to a newspaper cor-
poration in 1936. In Grosean v. American Press Co.,245 the Court ruled
that a newspaper corporation has a first amendment liberty right to free-
dom of speech that would be applied to the states through the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Grosean, incorporated
Louisiana publishers sued to enjoin enforcement of a state tax imposed
on businesses selling advertising space in their publications. The corpo-
rations claimed that the tax infringed upon their right to freedom of the
press under the first amendment.
The Court relied on precedents holding that corporations are "per-
sons" for fourteenth amendment purposes, under the natural entity the-
ory, and suggested that "the word 'liberty'... embraces not only the
right of a person to be free from physical restraint, but the right to be free
in the enjoyment of all his faculties as well. '' 246 On this reasoning a cor-
poration should be free to sell advertisements without interference by the
state. The holding may have little precedential value for private corpora-
tions, however, because the press-which is specifically mentioned in the
first amendment-has a greater claim to constitutional protections than
do other corporations.
Grosean, however, ignored a 1906 opinion employing the artificial
entity theory to specifically deny corporations fourteenth amendment lib-
erty rights. In Northwestern National Life Insurance Co. v. Riggs,2 47 an
estate sued an insurance corporation that refused to honor certain poli-
244. See supra notes 191-95.
245. 297 U.S. 233, 242-43 (1936).
246. IdL at 244.
247. 203 U.S. 243 (1906).
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cies due to alleged misrepresentation. A Missouri statute prohibited the
use of the misrepresentation defense. The corporation charged that the
statute deprived it of liberty and property rights without due process.
Although the Court conceded that liberty included the right to pursue
lawful claims and enter contracts, it ruled that corporations cannot enjoy
this liberty right because "[t]he liberty referred to in ... [the fourteenth]
amendment is the liberty of natural, not artificial persons. ' 248 The ten-
sion between the artificial entity theory employed in Riggs and the natu-
ral entity theory of Grosjean was similar to fourth amendment tensions
over the corporate soul. 249
During this period the Court used the same mode of analysis to de-
cide first and fourth amendment cases: to the extent a corporation was
considered an artificial entity, it could be denied constitutional protec-
tions; to the extent it was considered a natural entity, it was granted
safeguards.
Three years after Grosjean, the Court adopted the Riggs artificial
entity analysis to deny an incorporated labor union first amendment
rights. In Hague v. CIO, 250 Justice Stone noted in his concurring opinion
that "[a corporation] cannot be said to be deprived of the civil rights of
freedom of speech and of assembly, for the liberty guaranteed by the due
process clause is the liberty of natural, not artificial persons."' 25I Hague
invalidated a Jersey City ordinance prohibiting individuals, labor associa-
tions, and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) from distributing
248. Id. at 255. The Court employed a strong version of the artificial entity theory that
accords states sweeping power to regulate corporate conduct.
Such a restriction as that founded in the Missouri statute, if embodied in the original
charter of a life insurance corporation, would, of course, be binding upon it in the
State granting such charter .... If, however, no such restriction was imposed by its
charter, it could yet be imposed by subsequent legislation.... The business of life
insurance is of such a peculiar character, affects so many people, and is so intimately
connected with the common good that the State creating the insurance corporations
... may, without transcending the limits of legislative power, regulate their affairs, so
far, at least, as to prevent them from committing wrong or injustice in the exercise of
their corporate functions.... If a life insurance corporation does not approve such a
restriction upon the conduct of its affairs it is its privilege to cease doing business.
Id. at 254-55.
249. Compare Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenburg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907) (concurring with
Riggs that the fourteenth amendment due process clause protects only the property, and not
the liberty, interests of corporations) with First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778-79
(1978) (disapproving the lower court's argument, as an "artificial mode of analysis," that cor-
porations cannot claim fourteenth amendment protection of liberty).
250. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
251. Id. at 527 (citing Northwestern Nat'l Life Insurance Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255
(1906); Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907)).
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literature. Only the individual plaintiffs, not the labor union or the
ACLU, could invoke first amendment protections.
Just as Morton Salt largely deprived corporations of fourth amend-
ment privacy rights in 1950, so Hague deprived at least one form of cor-
porate entity free speech rights in 1939. And as Morton Salt had marked
the end of Supreme Court theorizing about corporate personality in the
fourth amendment context, so Hague was the final attempt to formulate
a theory in the first amendment context. 252
B. The Modern Period: The Demise of Corporate Theory
As the Bill of Rights became important to the corporation in the
period of Modem Regulation and Modem Property, the Court jettisoned
theories of corporate personhood. Frequently the Court looked to the
history of the amendment in question to justify corporate rights, as in the
case of the fourth amendment; occasionally the Court examined the un-
derlying purposes of an amendment, as in its handling of the first amend-
ment; and sometimes the Court conferred Bill of Rights protections on
corporations with no explanation, as with the fifth, sixth, and seventh
amendments.
(1) The Fourth Amendment: Commercial Property
In the period of Modem Regulation and Modem Property the
Court discarded theories of corporate personality for a mode of analysis
concerned with the historical purposes of the fourth amendment. The
old categories of artificial entity versus natural entity theories of the cor-
poration were not applied in the context of intangible rights exercised
against the modem regulatory state. Instead the Court focused on pri-
vacy interests in "commercial property": theories of property, implied
consent, and the history of the fourth amendment "warrant" clause came
into play.
The See v. City of Seattle253 decision, which held unconstitutional
the Seattle fire inspection system, inaugurated the move away from per-
252. Almost thirty years later the Court reversed itself again and permitted a corporation
to assert a due process liberty right. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the Court
invalidated a Virginia statute that forbid the solicitation of legal business by any organization,
when the organization is not itself a party in the case. The NAACP had violated the statute by
representing schoolchildren's parents in desegregation suits. The Court relied, not on corpo-
rate theory, but on the purpose of the Statute. "We think petitioner may assert this right on its
own behalf because, though a corporation, it is directly engaged in those activities claimed to
be constitutionally protected which the statute would curtail." Id at 428. Although it cited
Grosean, the Court did not discuss Riggs or Hague.
253. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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sonhood theory. 254 In that case, instead, the Court focused on the fourth
amendment protections to which "commercial premises" and "business
enterprises"- corporate or otherwise-are entitled. Although See relied
on the line of cases from Hale to Morton Salt, 2 55 the Court ignored the
competing theories of the corporation developed therein. Rather, it anal-
ogized official entries upon commercial property to administrative sub-
poenas and held that it is untenable for subpoenas to be subject to fourth
amendment limitations that are inapplicable to actual searches and in-
spections of "commercial premises. '256
In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 257 the Court created a
narrow exception to See's warrant requirement based on the history of
the fourth amendment and Congress' historic power over the liquor in-
dustry.25 8 The Court never broached the question of corporate personal-
ity, and confined its analysis to what extent "private commercial
property" has a right to privacy. 259 In United States v. Biswell,260 the
Court held that the firearms industry was exempt from a warrant re-
254. See overruled Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
In the See dissent, Justices Clark, Harlan, and Stewart relied on Frank: "the power to
inspect dwelling places ... is of indispensable importance to the maintenance of community
health; a power that would be greatly hobbled by the blanket requirement of the safeguards
necessary for a search of evidence of criminal acts." See, 387 U.S. at 546 (Clark, J., dissenting)
(quoting Frank, 359 U.S. at 372).
255. See, 387 U.S. at 544 n.5.
The See Court failed to note the actual holding of these cases: that the "reasonableness"
of a search, and whether a corporation has any fourth amendment rights at all, depends upon a
theory of corporate personality. Indeed, if an almost blanket request for corporate documents
can be considered "reasonable," as it was in Morton Salt, the corporation comes very close to
having no fourth amendment rights.
256. Id. at 545 ("Given the analogous investigative functions performed by administrative
subpoena and the demand for entry, we find untenable the proposition that the subpoena,
which has been termed a 'constructive search,' Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S.
186, 202, is subject to fourth amendment limitations which do not apply to actual searches and
inspections of commercial premises.").
257. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
258. Id. at 75. (Congress, following the English parliament, imposed excise taxes when the
fourth amendment was ratified, and had a history of regulating the liquor industry.).
259. Id. at 77.
The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go
about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial
property.... We deal here with the liquor industry long subject to close supervision
and inspection. As respects that industry, and its various branches including retail-
ers, Congress has broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches
and seizures. Under the existing statutes, Congress selected a standard that does not
include forcible entries without a warrant. It resolved the issue, not by authorizing
forcible, warrantless entries, but by making it an offense for a licensee to refuse ad-
mission to the inspector.
Id. at 74.
260. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
[Vol. 41THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
quirement on a theory of implied consent. The Court reasoned that any-
one entering that kind of business "does so with the knowledge that his
business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective
inspection." 261
In Marshall v. Barlow,262 the Court's most consequential fourth
amendment decision, it struck down OSHA surprise inspection systems,
using yet another mode of analysis. No longer did it employ a theory of
implied consent, or pervasive regulation; instead, it employed the war-
rant clause of the fourth amendment,263 suggesting that the clause ap-'
plied to "commercial buildings" as well as private homes.264 The history
of this clause suggests that it protected merchants in the colonies imme-
diately preceding the Revolution. In Marshall, the Court rejected the
Secretary of Labor's artificial entity argument that the federal govern-
ment can regulate any corporation involved in interstate commerce with-
out regard to fourth amendment protections. 265 The Court easily could
have adopted the artificial entity analysis of Morton Salt to circumscribe
narrowly corporate rights, but chose not to do so.
The Court subsequently created narrow exceptions 266 to the See and
Marshall warrant requirements using arguments about privacy rights
261. Idk at 316.
262. 436 U.S. 307 (1977).
263. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
264. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 311-12.
The Warrant Clause of the fourth amendment protects commercial buildings as well
as private homes. To hold otherwise would belie the origin of that amendment, and
the American colonial experience.... The general warrant was a recurring point of
contention in the Colonies immediately preceding the Revolution. The particular
offensiveness it engendered was acutely felt by the merchants and businessmen whose
premises and products were inspected for compliance with the several parliamentary
revenue measures that most irritated the colonists.... Against this background, it is
untenable that the ban on warrantless searches was not intended to shield places of
business as well as of residence.
Id at 311.
265. Id at 313-14. In his dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehn-
quist, contended that the warrant clause was not the proper clause for the Court's decision.
Instead, they believed the ultimate question was whether the category of warrantless searches
authorized by the OSHA statute is "unreasonable" within the meaning of the first clause. Id.
at 327.
The dissenters also disputed the majority's interpretation of history, arguing that
"[flidelity to the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment, therefore, leads to the
conclusion that the Warrant Clause has no application to routine, regulatory inspections of
commercial premises." Id
266. In Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981), the Court confronted another statute-
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that attach to commercial property; 267 theories of corporate personality
from the Morton Salt and Hale era never re-emerged, even in dissent.
The Court's extraordinary shift in analytic paradigms may partly
reflect the novel problems presented by Modem Regulation. The privacy
issues arising from this form of government supervision were not raised
by earlier requests for corporate "papers" that could be considered
purely a request for property.
Another possible reason for the Court's shift in analytic paradigms
may be that the Court's concept of the fourth amendment had changed.
In the 1960s, the fourth amendment was construed to protect privacy
rights, not property rights.268 The theory of the corporation, however,
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (MSHA)--that required warrantless inspec-
tions. In Donovan, a federal mine inspector was denied access to the premises of the Waukesha
Lime and Stone Company. The corporation charged that the warrantless inspection provi-
sions of MSHA violated the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court disagreed. Although the
Court did not use a theory of corporate personality to reach this result, it distinguished be-
tween the privacy accorded commercial property and the sanctity of an individual's home. Id.
at 598-99.
Marshall made clear that most warrantless searches were unreasonable, except in the nar-
rowly defined exceptions of Colonnade and Biswell involving pervasively regulated industries
with a long tradition of regulation. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 313-14. These exceptions were based
on the historical purposes of the fourth amendment, and on a theory of implied consent.
But in Donovan, the Court focused on the fact that commercial property enjoys a lesser
privacy interest, and is only free from unreasonable intrusions by government agents. Dono-
van, 452 U.S. at 598-99. The Court found the intrusion in Donovan to be a reasonable inspec-
tion program carefully designed to fit a pervasively regulated industry like mining. Id. at 603.
The Court seemed to ignore the Colonnade and Biswell requirement that only pervasively regu-
lated industries, with a long tradition of regulation, are subject to warrantless searches. Id. at
611-13 (Stewart, J., dissenting). It was enough that an industry be pervasively regulated, even
if the regulation was enacted ex poste as was the case with the MSHA.
The Court would not, however, overrule Marshall and suggested that Congress' power
over interstate commerce justified warrantless searches only in certain narrow cases like Bis-
well, Colonnade, and the careful regulation of mining. In Donovan, the Court downplayed the
history of government regulation as a factor, because this would exempt dangerous modern
industries from warrantless searches. The Court specifically noted:
[I]f the length of regulation were the only criterion, absurd results would occur...
new or emerging industries, including ones such as the nuclear power industry that
pose enormous potential safety and health problems, could never be subject to war-
rantless searches even under the most carefully structured inspection program simply
because of the recent vintage of regulation.
Id. at 606; see also Collins & Hurd, supra note 171; Comment, The Fourth Amendment and
Administrative Inspections, 16 Hous. L. REv. 399 (1979) (authored by George T. Perry Jr.)
(examination of Barlow's in light of prior administrative inspection decisions).
The Court did not explain how the logic of implied consent-relied on in Colonnade and
Marshall-could apply if a regulatory scheme or warrantless searches were applied after a
business was operating.
267. See supra notes 161-76 and accompanying text.
268. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Dow Chemical, Justice Powell's par-
tial dissent concluded that the majority had not reconciled Katz's pronouncement that "the
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could not readily accommodate itself to this analysis. Instead, the Court
developed concepts of implied consent and commercial property as im-
perfect mechanisms for granting corporations privacy rights against reg-
ulatory searches.
But the rejection of corporate theory in the context of other Bill of
Rights amendments suggests that deeper forces were at work than simply
an accommodation to fourth amendment privacy theory.
(2) The First Amendment: Serving the Free Market
While the Court abandoned corporate theory for a collection of
fourth amendment paradigms, in the first amendment context it sup-
planted personhood theory with a single notion: the free market of ideas.
In both the political speech and the-commercial speech context the ques-
tion became not whether the party asserting the right (a corporation) was
entitled to free speech protections, but whether assertion of the right fur-
thered free and open debate.
In Bellotti, 269 the Court wasted no time disapproving corporate the-
ory. Relying in part on Riggs and Hague, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court had employed the artificial entity theory to hold that individuals
enjoy broader first amendment protections than corporations, which can
claim only fourteenth amendment property protections. 270 The majority
of the Supreme Court dismissed this reasoning as "an artificial mode of
analysis" 271 and radically changed the terms of the debate:
The Court below framed the principal question in this case as
whether and to what extent corporations have first amendment rights.
We believe that the Court posed the wrong question. The Constitution
often protects interests broader than those of the party seeking their
vindication. The first amendment, in particular, serves significant soci-
etal interests. The proper question therefore is not whether corpora-
tions "have" first amendment rights, and if so, whether they are
coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead, the question must
be whether [the statute] abridges expression that the first amendment
was meant to protect. We hold that it does . ... 272
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the
public even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection....
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be.
constitutionally protected." Id at 351-52, quoted in Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 239.
269. First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney Gen., 371 Mass. 773, 359 N.E.2d 1262 (1977), rev'd sub
nom. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
270. Id
271. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 779. If this is an artificial mode of analysis, any opinion, includ-
ing Santa Clara, employing corporate personhood theory suffers from the same defect, and
should be overruled.
272. Id at 775-76.
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The Court applied the same logic in according corporations their
most expansive first amendment guarantees: the right not to speak or be
associated with speech of others. Pacific Gas & Electric 273 overturned a
state regulation allowing a ratepayer advocacy group to enclose inserts in
a public utility monopoly billing envelope. The plurality's reasoning fol-
lowed Bellotti, noting that corporations are no less able than other speak-
ers to contribute to the "discussion, debate, and dissemination of ideas
that the first amendment seeks to foster. ' 274 For the state to force a
corporation to carry a particular message would alter what listeners hear,
in effect distorting the free market of ideas. 275
The free market concept that originated in the political speech arena
also governs commercial speech decisions. Central Hudson Gas & Elec-
tric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York 2 7 6 for the first time
extended commercial speech protections to corporations by holding that
a state regulation banning all promotional advertising by electric utilities
violated the first amendment. Relying on Bellotti, the majority found
that the paramount right of the consumer to hear overshadowed any
question about the right of the speaker to speak.277 In so pronouncing,
the Court abandoned corporate theory in the commercial speech context
as it had in the political speech context.
The Court's forceful rejection of corporate theory in the modern era
is matched by its equally ardent assertion that corporations' constitu-
tional guarantees depend on the nature and purpose of the particular
constitutional provision.278 If the purpose of the first amendment is to
promote a free market of ideas, all other considerations are
subordinate. 279 Although this view legitimates the invocation of corpo-
rate Bill of Rights protections, it begs the question of how corporations
can assert any rights to begin with.
(3) The Fifth Amendment: In Search of a Theory
If the corporation's constitutional rights depend on the underlying
purpose of an amendment, the Court has yet to explain how the goals of
273. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, reh'g den., 475 U.S.
1133 (1986).
274. Id. at 7-8 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783).
275. Id. at 16-18.
276. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
277. Id. at 557.
278. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 779 n.14 ("Whether or not a particular guarantee.., is unavaila-
ble to corporations... depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitu-
tional provision.").
279. Id.
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the fifth amendment are served by application to corporations. In the
modem era the Court extended double jeopardy protections to corpora-
tions without a trace of an explanation. Lower courts have bestowed
fifth amendment guarantees without any reasoning.280
In Fong Foo v. United States,28 1 the Supreme Court held, without
explanation, that the double jeopardy clause barred retrial of the defend-
ants, including the corporation, on charges of concealing material facts
from the government. 282 Similarly, in United States v. Martin Linen Sup-
ply Co., 283 the Court held that the fifth amendment bars retrial of a tex-
tile corporation acquitted, under the federal rules of criminal procedure,
of violating an antitrust consent decree. While citing Fong Foo, the
Court did not indicate why corporations, in particular, can avail them-
selves of fifth amendment protections. Instead, the case was decided by
taking "a closer look at the policies underlying the [double jeopardy]
Clause. '284 Though the clause's purpose is to mitigate individual suffer-
ing, the Court had no problem applying it to a corporate defendant. The
clause bars repeated attempts to convict the accused, "thereby subjecting
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in
a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. ' 285
Although the ascription of intensely human feelings-guilt, embar-
rassment, anxiety, and insecurity-seems forced when applied to the cor-
poration, the holding stands. The failure of the Court to broach issues of
corporate personality when analyzing the double jeopardy clause in the
280. The Court granted the protection of the takings clause to corporations in Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
281. 369 U.S. 141 (1962).
282. See United States v. Security Nat'l Bank, 546 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1976) (the corpora-
tion is entitled to protections of the double jeopardy clause; Fong Foo so held, despite the
absence of any reasoning to the contrary); see also Comment, supra note 210, at 217.
283. 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
284. Id. at 568 (citing United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339 (1975)).
285. Id at 569.
At the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to
subject the citizen to a second trial for the same offense would arm the Government
with a potent instrument of oppression.... [S]ociety's awareness of the heavy per-
sonal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is mani-
fested in the willingness to limit the Government to a single criminal proceeding to
vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws.
See also Comment, supra note 210, at 745-50 (the clause protects corporate interests such as
reputation and the expense of undergoing a second trial).
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1970S,286 contrasts with its theorizing about the self-incrimination clause
at the turn of the century.2 87
286. Neither have lower Courts applied a theory of corporate personality in according fifth
amendment liberty interests in reputation. See Old Dominion Dairy Products, Inc. v. Secre-
tary of Defense, 631 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980), reversing sub. nom. Old Dominion Dairy
Products, Inc. v. Brown, 471 F. Supp. 300 (D.D.C. 1979). The D.C. Court of Appeals ruled
that the Department infringed the corporation's liberty interest in reputation but did not em-
ploy a theory of corporate personality to reach its conclusion.
See also Comment, Corporate Liberty Rights in Reputation: Old Dominion Dairy Products,
Inc. v. Secretary of Defense, 61 B.U. L. REv. 1271 (1981) (authored by Catherine A. Olsen)
(the interest extended in Old Dominion was in accord with Bellotti and merely extended the
reasoning of Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972)).
But see Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 527 (1939) (Stone, J., concurring) (corporation can-
not assert free speech and assembly rights because it cannot claim liberty rights); Connecticut
Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 88-90 (1938) (corporations do not have a four-
teenth amendment liberty right). These cases, decided in an earlier era, employed a theory of
the firm.
287. Neither have the courts employed a theory of corporate personality in granting sixth
or seventh amendment rights to corporations.
In United States v. Rad-O-Lite, the Third Circuit granted corporations the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel based on the underlying purpose of the amendment. In following Bel-
lotti's mode of analysis, the Court noted:
The Supreme Court generally has considered issues of the application of constitu-
tional rights in negative terms: asking whether corporate status should defeat an
otherwise valid claim of right. The sixth amendment describes the class of persons
protected by its terms with the word 'accused.' This language does not suggest that
the protection of sixth amendment rights is restricted to individual defendants.
612 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court has not directly granted seventh amendment rights to corporations,
although it has intimated that a corporation's right to sue implies the right to trial by jury. In
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), the Court appeared to grant corporations seventh
amendment guarantees of trial by jury and found the history of the seventh amendment
dispositive:
[A] corporation, although an artificial being, was commonly entitled to sue and be
sued in the usual forms of action, at least in its own State.... Whether the corpora-
tion was viewed as an entity separate from its stockholders or as a device permitting
its stockholders to carry on their business and sue and be sued, a corporation's suit to
enforce a legal right was an action at common law carrying the right to jury trial at
the time the Seventh amendment was adopted. [W]e think the Seventh amendment
preserves to the parties in a stockholder's suit the same right to a jury trial that
historically belonged to the corporation and to those against whom the corporation
pressed its legal claims.
Id. at 542.
Lower courts have placed limits on the right to trial by jury in complex civil cases. This
limit will likely have the greatest effect on corporate litigants. See In re Japanese Elec. Prod-
ucts Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1079-80 (3d Cir. 1980) (in complex lawsuits, the fifth
amendment's requirement of due process requires greater weight than the seventh amend-
ment's jury trial guarantee). But see In re United States Financial Securities Litigation, 609
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979) (no complexity exception to the seventh amendment right to trial by
jury).
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(4) Corporate Theory: Critical of Corporate Rights
But corporate theory has not completely died as a constitutional
mode of analysis. Abandoned by the Court's majority,288 corporate the-
ory survives in powerful dissents by Justice Rehnquist and in a recent
lower court opinion. The reemergence of the artificial entity theory
serves as a haunting critique of the Court's disaggregated approach to
corporate rights.
Corporate theory made its modem debut in Justice Rehnquist's Bel-
lotti dissent. Carrying the banner of the artificial entity theory, Rehn-
quist argued that Grosean and NAACP, relied on by the majority, were
limited exceptions to the Riggs2 9 artificial entity theory. Rehnquist
characterized the corporation as nothing more than an artificial creature
of the state, guaranteed property rights implicitly by its charter. The
political activities of corporations, however, are not so protected, and in
fact pose great dangers. Therefore, the corporation has no liberty right
to engage in political activity.290 Rehnquist also dis'ented from the ma-
288. Although the Court has never employed corporate theory in the modem era, it re-
cently suggested in dicta that there are important differences, for constitutional purposes, in
corporate form.
In Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986),
a majority suggested that it might uphold election regulations limiting corporate speech. In
that case, the Court held that a provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 90 Stat. 490
(1976) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. 441b (1989)), which requires corporations to establish
a segregated fund for political spending, violated the first amendment as applied to a non-
profit, nonstock corporation. Federal Election Comm'n, 479 U.S. at 240.
The Court suggested that a for-profit, corporate speaker would trigger a different out-
come. Id at 259. Bellotti indicated in dicta that corporate spending in candidate elections-as
opposed to referenda-may pose a greater threat of corruption and therefore justify regulation
of corporate speech. The Court acknowledged "the legitimacy of Congress' concern that orga-
nizations that amass great wealth in the economic marketplace not gain unfair advantage in
the political marketplace,... and that [s]ome corporations have features more akin to volun-
tary political associations than business firms, and therefore should not have to bear burdens
on independent spending solely because of their incorporated status." Id. at 263.
Matters are different for profit-making corporations:
Relative availability of funds is after all a rough barometer of public support. The
resources in the treasury of a business corporation, however, are not an indication of
popular support for the corporations's political ideas. They reflect instead the eco-
nomically motivated decisions of investors and customers. The availability of these
resources may make a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the
power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas.
Id at 258.
This difference in corporate personality, between the non-profit and the for-profit corpora-
tion, determined whether state election regulations violated the first amendment.
289. 435 U.S. at 822 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The fact that the Congress, and the legis-
latures of thirty states place restrictions on the political activities of business, according to
Rehnquist, deserves great deference. Id
290. Id at 824-26.
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jority's opinion in Central Hudson that corporations enjoy commercial
speech protections. 291 In his dissent he noted that corporations-espe-
cially utility monopolies-are chartered by the state, and subject to en-
hanced supervision. 292
At least one district court has chosen to recognize corporate theory
in the modem period. In Michigan State Chamber of Commerce v. Aus-
tin,293 a district court rejected a chamber of commerce first amendment
challenge to a state criminal statute proscribing corporate spending on
political candidates. Relying, in part, on Morton Salt and the artificial
entity theory, the court held that corporations enjoy lesser first amend-
ment protections than individuals. 294 The court argued that "favors
from government often carry with them an enhanced measure of
regulation." 295
The Michigan legislature has granted corporations the advantages of
perpetual life, limited liability, and wide-ranging powers to encourage
economic expansion and prosperity [and] such advantages allow cor-
porations to amass great aggregations of capital and influence. In the
economic sphere such power is proper and often highly beneficial to
the general welfare of our society. In the political sphere, however,
such power coupled with the faceless nature of corporations may very
well create an atmosphere of distrust or the appearance of corruption
in the electoral process.296
The district court's invocation of corporate theory and fourth
amendment cases in the first amendment context is instructive. First, it
291. Although the Court has, in recent years, permitted regulation of corporate commer-
cial speech, it has always been in the context of the Central Hudson balancing test, not on the
basis of corporate theory. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328
(1986) (upholding a regulation restricting the advertising of gambling casinos).
292. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Sery. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 583-85
(1980). Rehnquist argued that state-created monopolies-like utilities-make an especially
compelling case for adopting the artificial entity theory: "The consequences of this natural
monopoly in my view justify much more wide-ranging supervision and control of a utility
under the first amendment than this Court held in Bellotti to be permissible with regard to
ordinary corporations." Id. at 587.
293. 643 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
294. Id. at 403. The Court noted that any statute restricting individual contributions to
elections is unconstitutional under Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-51 (1976). In Buckley, the
Supreme Court found no tendency on the part of individual spenders to corrupt the electoral
process.
295. Austin, 643 F. Supp. at 403 (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632,
652 (1950)).
296. Austin, 643 F. Supp. at 403 (citation omitted). Unlike in referenda on issues of gen-
eral public interest, this atmosphere of distrust in the electorate may arise in political elections
when corporate power through either independent expenditures or direct contributions be-
comes closely allied with the candidates. The Michigan legislature, as well as the United
States Congress, long ago arrived at that conclusion and, accordingly, limited the role of cor-
porations in the electoral process. Id. (footnote omitted).
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indicates that cases valid for one amendment are meaningful precedents
for other amendments. Second, it suggests the necessity of creating a
uniform theory of the corporation for all the Bill of Rights amendments,
as distinct from the current disaggregated approach.297 To do this re-
quires an understanding of the demise of corporate theory.
C. ' From Theory to Pragmatism
Why has the Court abandoned corporate theory in the period of
Modem Regulation, precisely when the Bill of Rights became so impor-
tant to the corporation? Important challenges to traditional corporate
theory, posed by Legal Realists and economists, undoubtedly influenced
the Court. Simultaneously, the invocation by corporations of more in-
tangible rights-of association, privacy, and speech-in response to
Modem Regulation, and in defense of Modem Property, severely
strained the argument that corporations 'are "persons." Moreover, the
need to legitimize the judicial creation of new constitutional persons un-
derlies the Court's pragmatic, antitheoretical approach.
(1) The Realist and Institutionalist Legacy
The powerful, corrosive critiques of the Legal Realists expedited the
demise of corporate theory. As part of their attack on "conceptualism"
and abstract legal reasoning,298 the Realists forcefully challenged the va-
lidity of corporate theory. John Dewey powerfully undermined corpo-
rate theory in a 1926 Yale Law Journal article concluding that "each
theory" of group personality "has been used to serve .. .opposing
297. Ironically, in an opinion authored by Justice Powell, the Court recently adopted the
artificial entity theory of the corporation in the private corporate law context. The theory was
invoked to uphold an Indiana anti-takeover statute. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America, 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (The Court noted that "state regulation of corporate govern-
ance is regulation of entities whose very existence and attributes are a product of state law....
'[A] corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation
of law ..... " (quoting Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 U.S. (Wheat.) 518, 636,
(1819); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 822-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)); see also Comment, The
Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers. A Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynam-
ics Corp. of America, 101 HARV. L. REv. 96 (1987) (authored by Donald C. Langevoort).
The use of the artificial entity theory in the private law context insulates current manage-
ment from takeovers; its rejection in the Bill of Rights context permits managers to use the
corporate form to promote their own views and political agenda.
The interesting question is why corporate theory has survived in the private corporate law
context, but not in the constitutional law context. Writers who argue that corporate theory is
available have not addressed this question. See Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the
Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1472 (1989). Corporate theory is
not used overtly in the constitutional law context because it raises problems of legitimacy.
298. See Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REv. 809 (1935); Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. Rnv. 429 (1934).
March 1990]
ends. '2 99 The Realists's critiques wound down the voluminous, pointed
intellectual debate over corporate personality that arose on the continent
and in America at the turn of the century. 3° °
But the Realists' forceful attack on corporate theory as an infinitely
manipulable doctrine cannot explain fully its demise. After all, the
Supreme Court relied on corporate theory at least until the Morton Salt
decision in 1950, long after Dewey's critique. Moreover, the Court's very
use of corporate personhood theory to decide Bill of Rights cases, as in
Hale and Morton Salt, belies Dewey's claims: there is a perfect correla-
tion between the invocation of the artificial entity theory and the denial
of corporate rights. Similarly, there is a perfect correlation between the
invocation of the natural entity theory, as in Hale and Grosjean, and the
conferral of corporate rights. In the particular context of the corpora-
tion's Bill of Rights, the choice of a corporate theory had important
consequences.
Economists, as well as lawyers, challenged theories of corporate per-
sonality in the New Deal era. In the 1930s a group of thinkers-called
Institutionalists-began to conceive of corporations as social institutions
rather than as a unified group of shareholders. Led by Adolph Berle,
Gardiner Means, and Rexford Tugwell, the Institutionalists advanced
the idea of corporations as competing interests rather than as artificial
creatures or bodies endowed with a collective will.301 The institutionalist
thesis that under shareholder capitalism the separation of ownership and
control places the interests of a managerial class above that of sharehold-
ers or workers, undoubtedly subverted corporate theory. The concept of
a power struggle within a corporate body undermines the notion of a
collective will implicit in the natural entity theory while raising the ques-
tion of for whom, and for what interests, a corporation is chartered.
299. Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 669
(1926); see also Smith, Legal Personality, 37 YALE L.J. 283 (1928) (discussion of the purpose of
legal personality as facilitating regulation of human conduct and how it relates to the
corporation).
300. See Horwitz, supra note 15, at 14-18; see also Kitagawa, Some Reflections on the
Corporate Theory-Including a Japanese Perspective, 1960 DUKE L.J. 535 (development of
corporate theories as reflections of state theory and state governmental structures).
301. See A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY (1959); J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW
INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967); A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY (1932); R. TUGWELL, THE INDUSTRIAL DISCIPLINE AND THE GOVERN-
MENTAL ARTS (1933); Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049
(1931). But see Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145
(1932).
The power of this theory has resonated at least until the 1980s. See E. HERMMAN, COR-
PORATE CONTROL: CORPORATE POWER (1981) (confirming the empirical validity of Berle's
managerial power thesis).
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(2) Current Crises in Corporate Theory
Recent work in economics and organizational studies also subverts
traditional corporate theory. This work reflects profound changes in the
internal structure of the firm and in the American and world economies.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries few challenged
the corporation as the essential engine of economic growth; the corpora-
tion was the organic building block of free market capitalism. Not so
today. A changing world economy and the rise of the modern regulatory
state provoked a profound debate about the nature of the corporation
and its role in society. After a period of quiescence-from roughly the
end of World War II to the 1960s-the central institution of contempo-
rary society was challenged in multidimensional ways.
As late as 1959 the corporate form stood unquestioned. "In review-
ing the literature about the current development of [the large, publicly-
held] corporations, and about possible programs for their reform, one is
struck by the atmosphere of relative peace," wrote political scientist Eu-
gene Rostow. "There seems to be no general conviction abroad that re-
form is needed. The vehement feelings of the early thirties, expressing a
sense of betrayal and frustration at a depression blamed on twelve years
of business leadership, are almost entirely absent. ' 30 2 In the years of
post-war prosperity, led by the export of American managerial expertise,
the corporation, like the concept of free trade, enjoyed renewed
legitimacy. 30 3
In the 1960s and 1970s the rise of the environmental, consumer, and
public interest movements challenged unfettered growth and questioned
accepted notions of the corporate form. A "social responsibility" school
of thought argued that a corporation serves many constituencies: work-
ers, consumers, and community members.30 4
The takeover economy of the 1980s put further pressure on corpo-
rate theory. Corporate managers, responding to merger threats, appeal
to states to pass antitakeover statutes. In so doing, ironically, they make
a social responsibility-like argument that corporations are comprised of
stakeholders: workers, consumers, and family members. 30 5
302. Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends is Corporate Management Responsible, in THE
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 59 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
303. See generally J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS: A CRITICAL HISTORY (1987) (arguing
that the "Is" is often justified as the "Ought" in economic thought).
304. See N. JACOBY, CORPORATE POWER AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (1973); J. Mc-
KIE, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS PREDICAMENT (1974); M. MEAD, THE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF BUSINESS (1970); C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS (1975).
305. On the Stakeholder Model, see Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1988, col. 1, 47 (NCR corpora-
tion's essay contest for stakeholders); see also Veasey, A Statute Was Needed to Stop Abuses, N.
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But America has become an economy of triadic elites: traditional
elites (managers) are joined by takeover elites (investment bankers, law-
yers, and raiders) and shareholder elites (pension fund managers). Each
has a different view of the corporation. The traditional manager, to jus-
tify state protection, suggests the corporation serves stakeholders; the
pension fund manager argues that companies serve shareholders only,
but is sometimes willing to take a long-term view of shareholder inter-
ests; takeover elites suggest the corporation should only serve the short-
term interests of shareholders, even if this means breaking up the
corporation.
A changing world economy-in which the American firm is no
longer predominant-also threatens corporate theory. The very ability
of American corporations to prevail against international competition
has provoked calls for protectionism, industrial policy, and suggestions
that the corporation serve some national good.30 6 Within this new econ-
omy, corporate theorists believe the corporation is already undergoing a
radical transformation. 30 7 Other societies are also reconsidering the
goals and purposes of the corporate form.308
Economic changes are reflected in the organizational and economic
literature of the firm. Building on the work of Berle and Means, modem
organizational management theory regards the corporation as a coalition
of competing interests and claims, all bargaining with one another. 30 9
The structure of this organization then becomes depersonalized, in the
sense that it has no clear authority and does not act as one individual. 310
The modem study of institutions resonates in economics. Contem-
porary economists challenge the traditional notion of a corporation as
simply a profit maximizing enterprise. The corporation, rather, is torn
Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1988, at F2, col. 1; Silk, The Merger Rise: How Beneficial?, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 10, 1988, D2, col. 1; Lipton, Why Takeovers are Taking OffAgain, N.Y. Times, April 1,
1988, at 30, col. 1.
306. See, e.g., W. ADAMS & J. BROCK, DANGEROUS PURSUITS 153-61 (1989) (analyzing
critically various calls for national direction of corporate affairs).
307. Drucker, The Coming of the New Organization, 88 HARV. Bus. REV. 45 (1988) (argu-
ing that corporations will become "information based" with fewer levels of management).
308. See R. TRICKER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1984) (reforms in the British corporate
system); A. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, LA SOCIETE ANONYME Au XIXE SIECLE (1985) (a reap-
praisal of French corporation law based on nineteenth century legal history).
309. R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963); F. KAST & J.
ROSENZWEIG, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT: SYSTEM APPROACH (1974).
310. See A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND (1977) (describing the rationality of the old
hierarchy); M. CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON (1964); J. GALBRAITH, THE
NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 71 (1967) (discussing a technostructure that runs corporations); H.
SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1976); 0. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL
AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR (1970).
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by contradictory motivations and- interests, including the self-serving
programs of corporate officers. Instead of pursuing the optimal, textbook
goal, of increasing share value, the modem firm often sets different goals,
including increased sales volumes, management returns, market share,
stability, or growth.311
An irony of the modem political economy is that the notions of ma-
terial prosperity and the free market remain unchallenged while the cen-
tral institution of that prosperity is undergoing a crises of legitimacy.312
Traditional notions of corporate personhood have little relevance in this
climate; the natural entity theory-or the view of the corporation as a
person-contains little residual meaning.
To the extent the corporation is perceived as having different goals,
and competing constituencies, the corporation does not act like a "per-
son" with a singular purpose.
(3) Intangible Rights: The Strain on Personhood
Fact as well as theory has strained traditional notions of corporate
personhood. The facts of the constitutional challenges brought by corpo-
rations in the period of Modem Regulation have made it increasingly
difficult for the Court to maintain that corporations are "persons."
These challenges required the Court to rule that corporations are akin to
persons in increasingly improbable respects: that corporations enjoy
some "privacy" that can be invaded by regulatory searches, or suffer the
indignities of a second criminal trial, or the forced association with an-
other's speech. As the metaphor of corporations as persons became in-
creasingly strained, the Court abandoned corporate theory in favor of
311. See generally G. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION 72-76 (1971); I. HOROwrrz, DECI-
SION-MAKING AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM (1970); R. MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY
OF MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM (1964); 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES:
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR,
VALUE AND GROWTH (1969) (describing the various goals of the corporation); D. MEIR-
COHN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 13-25 (1986); 0. WILLIAMSON, THE EcO-
NOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR: MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES IN A THEORY OF THE
FIRM (1964); Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. EcON.
LIT. 1537 (1981).
312. See Post, Perfecting Capitalism: A Systems Perspective on Institutional Responsibility,
in CORPORATIONS AND THE COMMON GOOD (R. Dickie & L. Rouner eds. 1987) (discussing
institutional responsibility to society and five models of corporate-society relationships, includ-
ing legal model; market-contract-model; exploitation model; technostructure model; interpene-
trating systems model; and stakeholder model).
This reconception of the corporation occurs at a time that social theorists are rethinking
the boundaries between public and private realms in America. See AMERICAN SOCIETY: PUB-
LIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES (W. Knowlton & R. Zeckhauser eds. 1986); see also D.
BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY (1960) (discussing social change in America during the 1950s).
March 1990]
notions about commercial property, the free market of ideas, and the
historical purposes of each amendment.
The problem posed for the personhood theory by intangible rights
asserted in the modem political economy is most strikingly evident in
Pacific Gas & Electric. The Court's conferral of negative free speech
rights on corporations hastened Justice Rehnquist to scorn the plurality
for refusing to face up to the constitutional status of the corporate
person.
Extension of the individual's freedom of conscience decisions to busi-
ness corporations strains the rationale of those cases beyond the break-
ing point. To ascribe to such artificial entities an 'intellect' or 'mind'
for freedom of conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with real-
ity .... The insistence on treating identically for constitutional pur-
poses entities that are demonstrably different is as great ajurisprudential sin as treating differently those entities which are the
same.
3 13
In the nineteenth century, however, the metaphor of corporations as
"persons"-capable of holding property under the fourteenth amend-
ment-was not entirely improbable. The concept of an organization
holding tangible property and asserting tangible rights did not strain the
imagination. It is entirely plausible that a group of people could band
together to hold property jointly. It is less plausible that the same group
can speak with one voice or have a singular privacy interest.
And even when corporations first began asserting intangible
rights-in 1906 in Hale-the dissonance between fact and theory was
not as significant. In Hale, for example, the Court granted fourth
amendment rights to corporations to protect what is arguably a form of
property: corporate papers.
But the more intangible the right, the more striking the difference
between a corporation and a person, and the more difficult it becomes for
the Court to treat corporations as persons. Consider, for example, the
fourth amendment. For corporations to assert fourth amendment rights
against warrantless regulatory inspections requires according corporate
persons the very intangible right of privacy. In return, this requires a
double constitutional leap. First, the Court must decide that corpora-
tions are persons. Second, the Court must decide that a privacy right of
a corporate person has been violated. Even assuming that the Court em-
ploys the natural entity theory to hold that corporations are persons, the
second prong of this analysis presents difficulties; how a corporation en-
joys a privacy interest in its premises remains unclear.
313. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 33, reh'g den., 475
U.S. 1133 (1986).
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Even the natural entity theory has difficulty explaining corporations
as persons for purposes of these rights. To circumvent the obvious differ-
ences between people and corporations in awarding intangible rights, the
Court attempts to reformulate the right to privacy, free from regulatory
inspections, as a property right attaching to commercial premises.
The problem is no less acute in the first amendment context, where
a corporate person is granted a freedom not to associate, or in the fifth
amendment arena, where corporate bodies are accorded "liberty" inter-
ests or suffer indignities or embarrassment from retrial. The response of
the Court to the metaphorical problems posed by the corporate invoca-
tion of intangible rights was to either accord constitutional rights to cor-
porations sub silentio, and without theoretical basis, (fifth amendment)
or justify the conferral of corporate rights based on an appeal to the free
market of ideas (first amendment).
(4) Judicial Legitimacy: The Specter of Lochner
More than the problems of personhood metaphors, concerns about
judicial legitimacy explain the demise of corporate theory. The bestowal
of constitutional rights on corporations, via the natural entity theory,
raises the specter of Lochner.
The Court admits its concern with avoiding the errors of the Loch-
ner era. "[The Court] is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegiti-
macy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no
cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution," wrote the
majority in a recent opinion. "[T]his ... was painfully demonstrated by
the face-off between the Executive and the Court in the 1930s, which
resulted in the repudiation of much of the substantive gloss that the
Court placed on the Due Process Clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments .... ",314
As Rehnquist's dissents in Pacific Gas & Electric and Central Hud-
son suggest, the Court is pushing the bounds of its legitimacy by granting
rights, often novel, to entities that are not mentioned in the Constitution.
A string of dissents by Justices Black, Douglas, and Rehnquist sug-
gesting that corporations were never intended to be persons for four-
teenth amendment purposes persuasively highlight this legitimacy
problem. 315 These dissents, like Rehnquist's in Pacific Gas & Electric,
publicly call into question the legitimacy of the Court to create a new
class of constitutionally protected actors.
314. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986).
315. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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By granting these rights, the Court invalidates state imposed eco-
nomic regulation. The invalidation of state restrictions on advertising to
promote utility consumption in Central Hudson caused Justice Rehn-
quist to question the Court's legitimacy:
The Court's decision today fails to give due deference to this
subordinate position of commercial speech. The Court in so doing re-
turns to the bygone era of Lochner v. New York in which it was com-
mon practice for this Court to strike down economic regulations
adopted by a State based on the Court's own notions of the most ap-
propriate means for the State to implement its considered policies. 316
Rehnquist went on to suggest in a discussion of the artificial entity
theory that no matter how much the Court attempted to deny that theo-
ries of the corporation are irrelevant, the Court implicitly had adopted
the natural entity view of the corporation, which inevitably leads to
Lochner-like results.
The search for legitimacy in the post-Lochner era may well explain
the retreat from theories of corporate personality. The Court is on much
safer ground looking to the purpose of the first, fourth, or fifth amend-
ments than attempting to define the relationship of corporations to the
state.
But by holding that corporations can speak, not associate with
speech, or enjoy a right to privacy, the Court molds a political commu-
nity. In so doing, the Court imposes its own view of what a corporation
is or should be. In the modem political economy, the question, what is a
corporation, is every bit as important as the questions about freedom of
contract and common-law entitlements considered during the Lochner
period. For the Court to appear to be imposing its view of the corpora-
tion-and therefore shaping a state and imposing an economic view-
creates problems of legitimacy reminiscent of Lochner.
It is perfectly legitimate for the Court to define the boundaries of the
first, fourth, and fifth amendments. It is more troublesome to have the
Court impose its own economic views of the nature of the corporation.
Because that question ultimately becomes a question of how much eco-
nomic regulation is proper in society (if regulation is proper, corpora-
tions should be considered artificial entities; if regulation is to be
discouraged, corporations are considered natural entities), when the
Court answers that question it revives substantive due process.
316. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'ns 447 U.S. 557, 589 (1980).
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(5) Corporate Legitimacy: The National Debate
But something deeper is at work than the Court's concern over its
own legitimacy. Its apprehensions mirror the business community's ap-
prehensions over the continued legitimacy of the business corporation.
The tremendous stakes involved in having the Supreme Court, through
the Bill of Rights, insulate corporations from economic regulation, while
actually defining acceptable corporate conduct, is suggested in the busi-
ness press.
The reaction of the business community to Bellotti, for example, is
most revealing. Trepidation was mixed with elation. In an article pub-
lished shortly after the decision, Business Week summarized this collec-
tive corporate concern:
Though a clear victory for corporate freedom, the decision is less im-
portant for what is says than for what it portends. It will almost cer-
tainly trigger an increase in corporate spending on issue-oriented
advertising, and it may pave the way for corporate political campaign
contributions. But the 5 to 4 decision will also spark more precise
legislative attempts at control, trigger lawsuits, and further fuel the
growing national debate on the legitimacy of the corporation in Ameri-
can society.3
17
Many advocates of corporate first amendment rights caution that
these rights should be used with restraint. Consider the reaction of Herb
Schmertz, public affairs director of Mobil Oil corporation and perhaps
the nation's most aggressive promoter of a public advocacy role for cor-
porations, to Bellotti:
The Bellotti decision does, indeed, open new vistas for the corporate
manager looking to assert his company's rights under the first amend-
ment. At the same time, this affirmation by the nations highest court
does not imply that these rights have been turned into a license. The
freedom remains fragile. It should be exercised by corporations in an
atmosphere of conscience and responsibility. 318
Other business spokespersons regard the freedom, at least in the
commercial speech area, as transitory, reflecting little more than the cur-
rent generation's acceptance of free market theory.319 While some cor-
porate managers call for the aggressive assertion of corporate first
317. Bus. WK., May 15, 1978, at 27.
318. H. SCHMERTZ, CORPORATIONS AND THE FiRST AMENDMENT 40 (1978) "Manage-
ment should take seriously the Supreme Court's admonition regarding the imminent danger to
democratic electoral processes that might be perceived in a future case. The Court's dicta on
this point should act as a restraint on management." Id at 32.
319. Brebbia, First Amendment Rights and the Corporation, PUB. REL. J., Dec. 1979, at 20
("One might ask why, after all these years, has there been a change of heart? Perhaps the
answer is that the law is a living thing and the Justices are again reading the election returns.
The Chrestensen decision was rendered during the Roosevelt age when the concept of eco-
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amendment rights, others urge extreme caution: "I do not see the first
amendment as the appropriate lever for general views about Government
regulation; if we do use it as that lever, we may discover that it snaps. '320
This position reflects more general reservations shared by corporate
managers about invoking first amendment rights. Reliance on such
rights risks raising fundamental questions, not just about the relationship
of business to government, but about the nature and purpose of the mod-
em corporation.
Much political science writing in the past two decades raises serious
questions about the corrupting influence of large corporations in Ameri-
can society. Since Charles Lindbloom argued in Politics and Markets321
that corporations subvert the pluralist process, political theorists-such
as John Kenneth Galbraith, Arthur Miller, and Robert Dahl-have fo-
cused on the corporation as a powerful private state that often skews
government decisionmaking in its favor. 322 Much of this writing is con-
cerned with how to cabin the private corporate state and mitigate the
corruption of politics.
Therefore, managers have begun to ask whether corporations should
exercise their first amendment rights at all.323 The answer depends on
how the corporation is viewed as an entity.324 This corporate self-exami-
nation reflects the concerns of managers and the corporate community
nomic regulation was in full bloom, and the Virginia State Board and Bates cases were decided
in the age of deregulation.").
320. Id.
321. C. LINDBLOOM, supra note 139, at 26, 34-35.
322. See D. BARBER, THE AMERICAN CORPORATION (1970); C. LINDBLOOM, supra note
139; A. MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE (1976); MINTZ & COHEN, AMERICA,
INC. (1971); Miller & Solomon, Constitutional Chains for the Corporate Beast, 27 Bus. & SOC'Y
REV. 15 (1978); Vogel, The New Political Science of Corporate Power, 87 PUB. INTEREST 63
(1987).
The view of the corporation as a separate government receives legal expression in the idea
of the corporation and corporate activity as "State Action." See Moskowitz, Constitutionaliz-
ing the Corporation, Bus. WK., Oct. 26, 1974, at 109; see also R. TUGWELL, A MODEL CON-
STITUTION FOR A UNITED REPUBLICS OF AMERICA (1970) (discussing the corporation as a
private state).
323. See supra notes 317-20.
324. See, e.g, Hatano, Should Corporations Exercise Their Freedom of Speech Rights?, 22
A. Bus. L.J. 165 (1984).
Lawyers now counsel managers either to exercise or forego their company's first amend-
ment rights based on the nature and purpose of a corporation. This collective corporate soul
searching also suggests the reverse: how Bill of Rights protections are exercised fundamentally
may determine the character of a company.
The first model presented to managers is the Law and Economics paradigm. In this view
the firm's only obligation is to shareholders and "managers should only speak out whenever
the speech increases the firm's profit." Id. at 175. This position relies on Justice White's
dissent in Bellotti to the effect that shareholders "do not share a common set of political or
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that the extension of intangible rights, especially first amendment rights,
will raise fundamental questions about the legitimacy of the corporation.
Questions about whose interests the corporation serves, and for what
purposes it operates.
Undoubtedly, the very conferral of Bill of Rights protections has
and will cause controversy. But for the Court to express a unified theory
of the corporation would further add to the problem of legitimation.325
social causes.. . ." Id. (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789). Management must avoid personal
statements; advocacy advertising is not efficient.
The second model is the Social Responsibility model. "On the one hand... these manag-
ers feel it appropriate to avoid exercising their free speech rights to avoid perverting the polit-
ical process. On the other hand, to fulfill their societal obligations these managers would feel
the duty to speak whenever their viewpoints increased the flow of information to society." Id
at 180-81 (footnote omitted). Managers, under this view, should determine whether the polit-
ical issue the corporation might address by exercising its first amendment rights is represented
adequately on both sides. If yes, there is no need to speak. If no, the firm should present both
sides of an issue "so the corporation's relevant information is presented without undermining
the legitimacy of the laws controlling the corporation. In the commercial speech area, socially
responsible managers strive to fulfill Virginia Pharmacy's goal of increasing information to
consumers. Id at 181. "A corporation devoted only to maximizing shareholder wealth would
eschew comparative advertisements and only advertise to maintain market share. A socially
responsible manager would encourage comparative advertising to increase the information
available to consumers and permit them to make informed purchasing decisions." Id at 182.
But see Farber, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 400
(1979). See also ALBION & FARRIS, THE ADVERTISING CONTROVERSY, EVIDENCE ON THE
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING (1981).
In considering whether to invoke corporate free speech rights, corporate managers occa-
sionally consider models of the corporation that are a hybrid of the two just discussed: the
social responsibility model and the shareholder maximizing model. One hybrid suggests that
although corporations should advance society's interests, managers should not make social
decisions because they are unaccountable and lack expertise. To the extent corporate speech
perverts the political process, managers should not exercise their speech rights. See Bellotti,
435 U.S. at 802 (White, J., dissenting); see also Patton & Bartlett, Corporate "Persons" and
Freedom of Speech: The Political Impact of Legal Mythology, 3 Wis. L. REV. 494 (1981) (anal-
ysis of Bellotti and purportedly neutral principles underlying the doctrines of corporate free
speech).
Another hybrid approach found in the business literature agrees that corporations should
only maximize shareholder wealth, but argues that it is in the shareholders enlightened self-
interest to diffuse hostile forces by anticipating social concerns. See also P. DRUCKER, MAN-
AGING IN TURBULENT TIMES 216-21 (1980) (corporate management functioning in a political
environment must learn to operate in interest of society as a whole). In commercial speech
this school would suggest that corporations become aware of social trends, and incorporate
them into advertising. The management literature now speaks of the "issue attention cycle"
and managers could use early advertising to discuss concerns about caffeine and salt, for exam-
ple. Gottschalk, Firms Hiring New Type of Manager to Study Issues, Emerging Trouble, Wall
St. J., June 10, 1982, § 2, at 33, col. 4.
325. The more overt the Court is about imposing its economic view of what is a corpora-
tion, the more the Court engages in reading its own substantive content into the Bill of Rights,
as in the Lochner era.
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(6) Constitutional Operationalism
The Court's pragmatic, antitheoretical approach to corporate rights
is a form of positivism that this Article will call Constitutional Opera-
tionalism. Operationalism was a scientific method, borrowed by the so-
cial sciences in the 1920s, and related to the quantum and relativity
revolutions in physics. It held that scientific objectivity depended on the
use of an operational definition of meaning. For a concept to be valid, it
had to be defined in terms of particular physical operations: for example,
the concept of length was defined in terms of an operation performed
with a yardstick.32 6 Every operation and every concept was a distinct
and particular phenomenon; operationalism, therefore, is a form of philo-
sophical nominalism.
The Court engages in Constitutional Operationalism by suggesting
that a corporation is only entitled to the guarantees of a certain amend-
ment if, by so awarding the protection, the amendment's purposes are
furthered. Therefore, the corporation is defined by the operation it per-
forms. This pragmatic methodology obscures the antecedent, and theo-
retical, question of what is the nature and purpose of a corporation.
Behind doctrines of commercial property and the free market of
ideas is hidden the tacit acceptance of the corporation as a person, enti-
tled to all the rights of real humans. Under this methodology of constitu-
tional operationalism, the rationale for equating corporations and
persons is not stated specifically, however, so it cannot be rebutted.
There is no opportunity for denial; sub silentio the corporation is legiti-
mated as a constitutional actor.
Why, and for what purpose, the Court has decided consistently to
treat corporations as persons, and legitimize their constitutional claims,
is beyond the scope of this Article. One possible answer may be that as
the Court moved to expand Bill of Rights protections for individuals dur-
ing the post-war period, an extension of corporate rights was required to
gain a working majority. A second possible explanation is that rights,
during this period, increasingly came to be seen as organizational rights,
rather than simply individual in scope. In this sense, the Bill of Rights
was gradually tailored to fit an organizational age. In the absence of any
explicit explanation by the Justices, the motives for extending corporate
rights may not be uncovered.
But it is certain that the conferral of corporate Bill of Rights protec-
tions, without any theory, has served an important legitimizing function.
Extending these rights has legitimized corporations as constitutional ac-
326. See E. PURCELL, JR., CRISES IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY 31-46 (1973).
[Vol. 41
tors and placed them on a level with humans in terms of Bill of Rights
safeguards.
I. Corporations and the Bill of Rights: The Future
History shows intensified efforts by corporations and their managers
to thwart government regulation using Bill of Rights safeguards. This
effort will invite opposition. Some commentators already criticize the
extension of first amendment protections to corporations3 27 and broader
critiques of corporations and the Bill of Rights may follow.
Continued extension of these safeguards promises to raise more fun-
damental questions about the nature and purpose of corporations. This
will challenge the legitimacy of the Court to confer, sub silentio, rights
on entities not mentioned in the constitution. Ultimately, the corpora-
tion's status may have to be decided by constitutional amendment.
A. The Onslaught of Corporate Rights
If, as historians and political scientists predict, the current era of
government deregulation ushers in an age of renewed regulation,32 the
corporate push for constitutional rights will become ever more urgent.
In a period of increased legislative re-regulation, the courts will become
the avenue of redress for corporate institutions.
Corporate lawyers already advocate using the first amendment to
broadside government regulation. The assertion of these rights may
someday become an integral part of the takeover economy. 329 "Elections
of company leaders, like political elections, involve some of the most im-
portant choices that are made in society," argues noted first amendment
lawyer, Floyd Abrams. "I think it's not too far off to foresee a case in
which there is a corporate takeover and one side will claim that the other
is providing less than full information, and the other side will step up to
the plate and say that the SEC has no authority to demand all this infor-
mation." In the fight against regulation, Bill of Rights arguments are
already becoming integral to the practice of corporate law.330
Corporations may yet seek to extend their Bill of Rights protections
beyond the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh amendments already
327. See infra notes 334-41.
328. See, eg., A. SCHLESINGER, THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1987).
329. See M. PORTER, COMPETrrIvE STRATEGY 13 (1980) (competitive strategy for busi-
ness includes monitoring and reacting to government regulation).
330. See also N. WOLFSON, THE MODERN CORPORATION (1984); Wolfson, Use First
Amendment To Call Off the SEC Censors, Wall St. J., Aug. 9, 1988, at 26, col. 3.
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granted. 331 As businesses increasingly employ private security guards
and firms, a corporation's right to bear arms, under the second amend-
ment, might be challenged by dissident shareholders. Wartime could
witness a government request to house troops on corporate property,
thereby creating third amendment problems. The increasing variety, and
escalating severity, of criminal sanctions imposed on corporate institu-
tions may one day induce a corporation to invoke the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 332
For now, discussion of these rights is speculative. History indicates,
however, that intangible rights are ever more important to the modern
corporation. 333
B. Challenges to a Corporate Bill of Rights
Vigorous assertion of corporate rights will undoubtedly be coun-
tered by more sophisticated theoretical and practical objections to the
corporate appropriation of the Bill of Rights: a wide variety of commen-
tators already criticize Bellotti; more generalized arguments for denying
corporations a variety of Bill of Rights protections have emerged.
(1) Particularized Critiques: The First Amendment
There has been little, if any, systematic thinking about the problem
of corporations and the Bill of Rights as a whole. Instead, commentators
have focused primarily on problems relating to corporations and the first
amendment. This is probably because first amendment cases are the
most visible and comprehensible to the public. Most of the commentary
centers on Bellotti in particular, perhaps because the participation of cor-
porations in campaigns traditionally has been a controversial issue in
American history (even in our own era). Although some commentators
support the Court's reasoning in Bellotti, most demur. Three principal
objections have been raised.
331. Corporate lawyers are adept at crafting unusual constitutional arguments. For ex-
ample, when the Oakland Raiders were barred by the National Football League from travel-
ling to Los Angeles, the corporation invoked a constitutional right to travel. See appendix II.
332. See E. HOCHSTEDLER, CORPORATIONS: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CRIMINAL
(1982); Anderson, Corporate Homicide: The Stark Realities of Artificial Beings and Legal Fic-
tions, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 367 (1981).
333. History is neither entirely predictive nor entirely irrelevant to the future of political
economy or to future legal developments. See, e.g., J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS IN PERSPEC-
TIVE 282 (1987) ("History does not end with the present; it extends on, changing without
limit, into eternity. The difference is only that the historian does not accompany it there; his
journey, however tempting the prospect, must end with the present. But not entirely. For as
there is much of the past that is in the present, so also there is much of the present that will be
in the future, including not a little that is yet to be evident.").
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The first criticism of Bellotti is that "corporate speech" is an illu-
sion. Only individuals can speak, and corporate speech obscures the fact
that managers use corporate assets to convey their own views;334 the na-
ture of corporate governance is such that communication becomes mana-
gerial speech, unratified by shareholders. 335 The argument is that even if
it is not permissible to censor the speech of wealthy individuals, it is per-
missible to limit the power of individuals to use their ownership or man-
agement of corporations to influence politics. 336
A corollary to this first objection is simply that the decision ignores
the political power of corporations to wield undue influence on referen-
dums. The Court's reasoning that more speech is better downplays the
fact that corporate contributions might lower the usefulness, while rais-
ing the volume, of the debate.337
The second criticism of Bellotti is that the protection of corporate
speech violates the dissenting shareholder's first amendment rights by
forcing these shareholders to contribute to the expression of views with
which they disagree. At the least, the shareholder is forced to chose be-
tween contributing to political expression with which they disagree or
foregoing a profitable investment opportunity. Further, the argument is
made that the first amendment does not preclude a requirement of stock-
holder consent that effectively may prohibit either some or all non-com-
mercial speech.338
334. Brudney, Business Corporations-and Stockholders' Rights Under the First Amend-
ment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 248 (1981); see also, O'Kelly, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Corpo-
rations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation after First National
Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEo. L.. 1347, 1373 (1979) (distinguishing between corporate communi-
cation and individual expression).
335. See Schneider, Free Speech and Corporate Freedom: A Comment on First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1227, 1234 (1986).
336. Id. at 1271-72. See also Hart & Shore, Corporate Spending on State and Local Refer-
endues: First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 29 CAsE W. RES. 808 (1979) (suggesting
that political advertising by large corporations may threaten the electoral process); Note, Polit-
ical Contributions-First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti-AnotherHurdlefor Shareholder
Protection, 4 J. CORP. L. 460 (1979) (authored by Daniel D. Dykstra) (suggesting that Bellotti
was a setback); Chevigny, Philosophy of Language and Free Expression, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv.
157, 189-90 (1980) (criticizing the Bellotti majority); Fox, Corporate Political Speech: The Ef-
fect of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti Upon Statutory Limitations on Corporate Ref-
erendum Spending, 67 Ky. L.J. 75 (1978-1979) (arguing that Bellotti will preclude statutory
restrictions posing substantial burdens upon corporate'expression).
337. See Schneider, supra note 335, at 1288.
338. Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under the First Amend-
ment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 294 (1981); see also Note, The Corporation and the Constitution:
Economic Due Process and Corporate Speech, 90 YALE L.J. 1833 (1981) (authored by David B.
Keto); Patton & Bartlett, Corporate 'Persons' and Freedom of Speech. The Political Impact of
Legal Mythology, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 494; Note, Integrating the Right of Association with the
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The third objection to Bellotti is that it creates an unfair advantage
for corporations over labor, because corporations can speak out on polit-
ical issues-despite shareholder dissent-while unions cannot. Unions,
when speaking on political matters, must refund, upon request, to dis-
senting members the prorated cost of such activity. To this critics attri-
bute the declining membership in unions and the failure of labor to pass
effective private sector bargaining laws. 339
Other commentators broadly criticize the "market theory" of the
first amendment. This does not necessarily have implications for the cor-
poration's ability to assert first amendment rights but it suggests that the
"marketplace of ideas," like the economic marketplace in Lochner, is not
inviolate. A better understanding of the first amendment is that it is
meant to encourage a broad deliberation among the citizenry. Since this
is not possible if some people have more resources than others, the gov-
ernment should intervene in the marketplace of ideas to encourage genu-
ine deliberation.340 In this school of thought, whether the corporation's
first amendment rights would be curbed depends on whether corpora-
tions taint the deliberative process. 341
Bellotti Right to Hear-Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 159 (1986) (authored by C. Eberhardt).
339. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 202 (1985); see also Pope, The Three-Systems
Ladder of First Amendment Values: Two Rungs and a Black Hole, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
2 (1984) (analysis of constitutional protection of free speech according to its position on three
tier model). Tribe also argues that the Court's reasoning in Central Hudson and Consolidated
Edison was reminiscent of debates over economic efficiency in the Lochner era. TRIBE, supra,
at 211-15.
Not all commentators oppose Bellotti. Some suggest the opinion is justified because a
corporation, which is simply a personless organization, derives its right to speak from the
rights of the individuals that comprise it. M. DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANI-
ZATIONS 102-113 (1986); see also Stewart, Organizational Jurisprudence (Book Review), 101
HARV. L. REV. 371, 384 n.41 (1987) (discussion of Dan Cohen's explanation and justification
of Bellotti). On this view, "[s]peech, no less than cars or widgets, can be a corporate product."
Corporate speech is viewed as a global organizational phenomenon, and information that
sometimes can only be processed by computers should not be withheld from the public. Be-
cause organizational speech is collective, it is not simply reducible to the utterances of manag-
ers in their individual capacities. Nor does it violate the rights of dissenting shareholders who
are separate from the organization. M. DAN-COHEN, supra, at 107.
340. Sunstein, Redistributing Speech, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 10 (1987).
341. This view, sometimes called Madisonian Republicanism, attempts to make political
discourse more representative by ensuring that deliberation is not thwarted by interest group
deals or somehow undermined by powerful private actors. See also Sunstein, Naked Prefer-
ences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984) (tracing the history of courts'
prohibition on the distribution of opportunities to one group over another on the grounds of
greater political power); Sunstein, Legal Interference With Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1129 (1986) (arguing in favor of government intervention to fix the problem of private
preferences). This differs from an approach that would curb corporate first amendment rights
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(2) Generalized Critiques
Corporate use of the Bill of Rights is subject to more general objec-
tions. The treatment of corporations as persons under the Bill of Rights
is intuitively problematic. The personification of the corporation also
broadly enhances the power of corporate management in a manner in-
consistent with most modem schools of thought on constitutional law.
Finally, granting corporations Bill of Rights protections is a zero-sum
game that pits the rights of corporations against those of "real" persons.
a. The Intuitive Approach
The concept of the corporation as person has done much to legiti-
mize the corporation in American law.342 But this idea also is intuitive
in'certain contexts: for example, when a statute clearly intended to cover
corporations includes them as "persons." In that case, corporations as
persons cum economic actors is metaphorically plausible.
Nowhere in the law, however, is the dissonance between a corpora-
tion and a person as great as in the Bill of Rights context.343 From a
layperson's or intuitive perspective, it must seem improbable that corpo-
rations can speak, assert privacy rights, or invoke the double jeopardy
clause. Even in a legal world filled with fictions, the corporate claim to
personal Bill of Rights guarantees must appear fantastic to the non-
lawyer.
A second intuitive problem is inconsistency. To the layperson, the
following remains a troubling question: Why do corporations enjoy cer-
tain Bill of Rights protections and not others? Either the corporation is
entitled to constitutional protections or it is not, and it is illogical to ac-
cord corporate entities some rights and not others, or even some fifth
amendment rights and not other fifth amendment rights. Either a corpo-
ration is a person or it is not. This inconsistency bears the imprint of
history rather than the stamp of logic: the denial of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination remains a relic from the era of corpo-
rate theory.344
as a way of ensuring, ex ante, not only that a temporary political process is not tainted, but
that power relations become more equal.
The Madisonian Republicanism view stems from a criticism of Lochner as enacting a
certain economic vision. This differs from the conception of Lochner offered in this paper:
that it represented an attack on government regulation, an attack made available to corpora-
tions through Santa Clara. See supra note 2.
342. See T. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 185-206 (1937); W. HuRST, THE
LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 (1970).
343. See supra text accompanying notes 269-79.
344. Related to the intuitive argument is the originalist argumeni. This Article merely
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b. Tyranny of the Minority: Managerial Power
Another broad objection to granting corporations Bill of Rights pro-
tections is that to do so unfairly promotes the power of corporate manag-
ers while diminishing that of shareholders, workers, and communities.
Business literature suggests that the prerogative to challenge government
regulation, wage political campaigns, or thwart government investiga-
tions by invoking constitutional rights is management's privilege.
Corporate managers regard the first amendment as a vehicle to ex-
press their own views on political questions. A leading spokesperson for
corporate management stated, "[I]n the economic climate rife with pub-
lic distrust of big business, corporate managements often find themselves
impelled to speak out on issues that affect them .... Sometimes they
wish to speak out to express corporate concern with the national wel-
fare."' 345 In this perspective, Bellotti is interpreted as a solicitation of
managerial speech;346 the expenditure of corporate funds on political
speech is "purely a management decision. '347
The assertion of other Bill of Rights protections may also serve
managerial power. When fourth and fifth amendment safeguards are em-
ployed to challenge government health and safety regulation, for exam-
ple, this may reflect a managerial political program rather than a desire
to advance shareholder interests. Complying with government regula-
tions may be in the long-term interests of shareholders, even if not profit-
able in the short term (for example, defective products that do not
comply with government specifications). The expense of invoking these
rights may constitute impermissible waste as much as asserting first
amendment rights.
raises, without presuming to answer, whether it is possible to be an originalist with respect to
whether organizations deserve constitutional protection, but not with respect to whether other
forms of life deserve constitutional protection.
345. H. SCHMERTZ, CORPORATIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (1978).
346. Id. at 16 ("The Supreme Court decision is also important in that it diminishes the
distinction that existed between individuals and corporations. The decision erases any doubt
that first amendment rights inure to corporations, which have, in the eyes of the law, certain of
the characteristics of 'natural persons.' ").
347. Id. Bellotti itself is the best illustration of the use of the corporate form to enhance
management's own power. The corporate political speech in Bellotti was deployed to defeat a
referendum on amending the Massachusetts constitution to allow a progressive income tax.
Undoubtedly, defeat of the referendum would benefit directly corporate managers, even
though the Court accepted the proposition that the referendum would have no direct effect on
the corporate plaintiffs. The referendum lost, despite the fact that it called for no new taxes; its
defeat is attributed to the expenditure of corporate funds. Telephone interview with Dan Sulli-
van, Massachusetts Department of Campaign Finance (Apr. 6, 1988).
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The Bill of Rights, applied to the individual, is an important safe-
guard against the tyranny of the majority. These same protections, how-
ever, when given to the corporation, can lead to a tyranny of the minority
in which the corporate form is manipulated to magnify managerial
power.
c. Personhood and Modem Constitutional Theory
Granting corporations Bill of Rights protections cannot be justified
under any of the schools of contemporary constitutional thought:
Originalism, Legal Process, Rights, Law and Economics, or Critical
Legal Studies.
A theory of original intent provides no basis for extending rights to
corporations because these entities are never mentioned in the Constitu-
tion. Neither does the so-called Legal Process school that suggests the
purpose of constitutional review, and the conference of rights, is to pro-
tect those who are traditionally underrepresented in the political pro-
cess.348 Legislatures have long worried about the overrepresentation of
corporations, and their managers or owners, in politics. 349 The modem
rights theory is also blind to organizational considerations; its principal
exponents never seriously consider corporate or other organizational
entitlements. 350
Even Law and Economics thinkers, who, of the modem theorists,
have the most developed theory of the firm, cannot justify corporate con-
stitutional rights. This school holds that a corporation "like other forms
of organizations, is simply a legal fiction which serves as a nexus for a set
of contractual relationships among individuals. '351 According to this
view, corporations should have no constitutional protections, because
without a concept of collective will, the corporation cannot be
personified.352
348. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsmusT 87 (1980) (arguing for a "partici-
pation-oriented, representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review," which leaves the se-
lection of substantive values to the political process); see also Sunstein, supra note 340, at 10.
On this theory corporations are only entitled to first amendment rights if such an entitlement
would improve the deliberative process.
349. See supra text accompanying notes 145-215.
350. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); D. MEIR-COHN, supra note
311, at 164-65.
351. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in
Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 913 (1982).
352. Recent writing in the Law and Economics tradition suggests that the fifth amend-
ment takings clause should be interpreted broadly to strike down much New Deal regulation.
R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985) (arguing that private common law should "go public" and that
the Constitution's takings clause invalidates most New Deal reforms: zoning, rent control,
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Finally, writings in the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) tradition seem-
ingly would reject the corporate appropriation of the Bill of Rights.
Although the prescriptive, programmatic elements of CLS scholarship
are less developed than those of other schools, much CLS writing is con-
cerned with challenging established power structures, including, if not
explicitly, the power of large corporations. Advocacy of Bill of Rights
guarantees for corporations would be antithetical to much of their
scholarship.353
d. The Zero-Sum Game
Too frequently the extension of corporate constitutional rights is a
zero-sum game that diminishes the rights and powers of real individuals.
Fourth amendment rights applied to the corporation diminish the indi-
vidual's right to live in an unpolluted world or to enjoy privacy. The
corporate exercise of first amendment rights frustrates the individual's
right to participate equally in democratic elections, to pay reasonable
utility rates, and to live in a toxin-free environment. 354 Equality of con-
stitutional rights plus an inequality of legislated and de facto powers
leads inexorably to the supremacy of artificial over real persons. And
now the ultimate irony: Corporate entities have the constitutional right,
says the Supreme Court, to patent living beings such as genetically engi-
neered cattle, pigs, chickens, and, perhaps someday, humanoids.355
The corporate drive for constitutional parity with "real" humans
comes at a time when legislatures are awarding these artificial persons
superhuman privileges. Besides perpetual life, corporations enjoy limited
liability for industrial accidents such as nuclear power disasters, and the
worker's compensation, transfer payments, and progressive taxation). Under this view, Loch-
ner was decided rightly because it invalidated regulation that Epstein regards as harmful.
But this writing has no particular view of the corporation or justification for corporate
constitutional rights. By suggesting that the "Ought" of the common law should become the
"Is" of constitutional law, this theory overlooks the importance of Modem Regulation and
Modem Property to the corporate community. To make a constitutional argument against
regulation, Epstein must develop some theory of the corporation that would allow it to assert
constitutional rights. He does not.
353. R. UNGER, POLITICS, A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY 395-570 (1987);
see also M. TUSHNET, Corporations and Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRES-
SIVE CRITIQUE 260 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
354. Corporations now employ automatic dialing machines for telephone solicitations.
These machines are capable of tying up individual phone lines, sometimes with life threatening
consequences in the event of emergency. The question of the corporations' first amendment
rights to engage in this type of speech has important consequences.
355. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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use of voluntary bankruptcy and other means to dodge financial obliga-
tions while remaining in business. 356
The legal system thus is creating unaccountable Frankensteins that
have superhuman powers but are nonetheless constitutionally shielded
from much actual and potential law enforcement as well as from ac-
countability to real persons such as workers, consumers, and taxpayers.
Reformers, in an earlier era, warned of the threat of big government,
and called for the creation of a new property, similar to the nineteenth
century Homestead Act,357 that would afford the individual a sanctuary
of freedom from government power.35 8 In the future individuals will re-
quire protection from corporations as well as government. As privatiza-
tion proceeds apace, corporations are increasingly assuming functions
traditionally reserved for states-running prisons, providing security,
collecting trash, handling mail and information, and even supplying edu-
cation. The actions of large modem corporations have a state-like im-
pact on the lives of individuals.
All this suggests that a sanctuary of freedom must be carved out for
the individual as against corporations. A new understanding of the cor-
poration and its relation to the Bill of Rights may be the starting point to
achieve that sanctuary.359
356. See, eg., Solomon, How Unique Are the Price-Anderson Limitations on Nuclear Acci-
dent Liability?, 3 RISK ANALYSiS 51 (1983). See generally H. HENN, LAWS OF CORPORA-
TIONS § 202 (3d ed. 1983); Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985); Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REv. 1, 40
(1986) (corporate liability does not ordinarily reach the assets of its shareholders); R. REICH &
J. DONAHUE, NEW DEALS 58-59 (1985) (how the bankruptcy laws allow firms to escape obli-
gations); Note, The Bankruptcy Law's Effect on Collective Bargaining Agreements, 81 COLUM.
L. REv. 391 (1981) (authored by Stephan E. Becker) (addressing the clash between bank-
ruptcy laws and labor laws); Klein, Hazardous Waste Liability and the Bankruptcy Code, 10
HARV. ENv. L. Rv. 533 (1986) (discussing corporate use of bankruptcy laws to escape haz-
ardous waste liability); Baird & Jackson, Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1199
(1984) (suggesting that toxic waste liability should not be a "claim" in bankruptcy proceed-
ings); Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases. A "Public law" Vision of the
Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 851 (1984) (arguing that traditional adjudication provides
ineffective compensation to mass tort victims and little incentive for industry to prevent inci-
dents); Note, Nuclear Power and the Price-Anderson Act: Promotion Over Public Protection, 30
STAN. L. Rv. 393 (1978) (authored by Daniel W. Meek) (government protection for the
nuclear power industry); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Con-
vention, 80 HARV. L. REv. 497 (1967) (protections for the airline industry).
357. 43 U.S.C. §§ 161 et. seq. (1862), 12 stat. 392 (repealed 1976).
358. See Reich, supra note 35, at 787.
359. The corporation's utilization of Bill of Rights protections is only one branch of the
study of constitutional theory and organizations. But this particularized problem demon-
strates the central importance of history, political economy, the study of institutions, and a
careful reading of the business press. See Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law
Rules, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1717, 1723 (1982) (criticizing narrow focus on the common law;
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C. A Constitutional Amendment
What is required is a constitutional presumption favoring the indi-
vidual over the corporation. To establish this presumption, a constitu-
tional amendment is needed that declares corporations are not persons
and that they are only entitled to statutory protection conferred by legis-
latures and referendums. Only then will the Constitution become the
exclusive preserve of those whom the Framers sought to protect: "real"
people.360
Popular consideration of the corporation's relation to the Bill of
Rights can help reconstitute American political life.361 Some sociologists
in the post-war era perceived the absorption of social, community, and
cultural life into the corporate structure, which in turn generates its own
hierarchy of status and power.362 And some political theorists suggest
that in the age of organizations-dominated by large private struc-
Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90
YALE L.J. 1717, 1754-55 (1981).
360. This is not to say that corporations should have no legal rights or only the legal rights
emanating from state enabling charters. Their charters, as Justice Rehnquist suggests, protect
the corporation's property rights. See supra notes 363, 289-92. Moreover, statutes passed spe-
cifically with corporations in mind will give them further protection.
361. The general problem of corporate personality and the Bill of Rights has yet to be
systematically considered by scholars. But three possible conceptions of the corporation, dis-
cussed in contemporary literature, offer possibilities.
One commentator suggests that corporations should be regarded, not as persons, but as
machines that can only derive rights from persons. This suggestion is meant to cover a wide
variety of legal situations. But for many Bill of Rights purposes, corporations must be consid-
ered "persons" because the plain meaning of the language so requires. See D. MEIR-COHN,
RIGHTS, PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 41-123 (1986).
As Rehnquist's dissent suggests, a modernized version of the artificial entity theory has
much to commend it in today's political economy. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 822; Central Hud-
son, 447 U.S. at 583; and supra notes 289-92. This theory may well be rediscovered as the
legacy of Jacksonian opposition to the grant theory fades. First, historically, the original con-
ception of the corporation in America is that it would serve a public purpose. Second, if
corporations were denied constitutional protections under an artificial entity theory, this
would serve a constitutional separation of powers function. To the extent the corporation acts
like a private state, it is unaccountable and in need of greater regulation, not protection.
Third, denying corporations intangible rights would uphold majoritarian will and elevate the
rights of individuals over corporations. Fourth, and finally, the artificial entity theory still
holds substantial descriptive power.
Another commentator suggests the Court adopt a realist view of the corporation as
merely a complex web of social relations-a set of competing interests-and mediate between
those interests. See Note, Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, 91 YALE L.J. 1641
(1982) (authored by George Ellard). But this begs the question of why the Court is the appro-
priate body to make these determinations. One reply is that the people, through a constitu-
tional amendment, should make that determination.
362. D. BELL, THE COMING OF PosT-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 287-89 (1973).
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tures-politics is sublimated to activities organized in non-political
institutions. 363
A national discussion of the constitutional status of corporations
would extricate political inquiry from this private institutional context.
A debate about individualism versus corporatism could be not only salu-
tary but far-reaching; it could inaugurate the search for shared values in
an age of value skepticism.
The language of such an amendment need not be complicated. An
example:
This Amendment enshrines the sanctity of the individual and estab-
lishes the presumption that individuals are entitled to a greater mea-
sure of constitutional protections than corporations.
For purposes of the foregoing amendments, corporations are not
considered "persons," nor are they entitled to the same Bill of Rights
protections as individuals. Such protections may only be conferred by
state legislatures or in popular referenda.
A debate over such an amendment would have the additional merit
of clarifying the constitutional status of corporations. As the foregoing
analysis suggests, corporations are accorded Bill of Rights protections for
conflicting, and sometimes unstated, reasons. Most importantly, the
amendment would allow the people to decide, rather than the Supreme
Court, an important question about the proper place of regulation in
American society.
Conclusion
The use, by corporations, of the Bill of Rights as a potent shield
against government regulation is a recent historical phenomenon. Cor-
porate Bill of Rights protections were asserted infrequently in the Pro-
gressive and New Deal eras; when they were, some were granted, some
were denied. But in recent years every Bill of Rights guarantee requested
by corporations has been granted. Measured both by the number of Bill
of Rights cases brought, 364 and by the discussion in the business litera-
ture, these rights are increasingly important to American corporations
and their managers.
363. S. WOLIN, PoLmIcs AND VISION 352-434 (1960).
364. It is virtually impossible to determine in how many cases corporations raised Bill of
Rights claims. These claims may have been asserted in many different types of actions. But
the Supreme Court has certainly heard, in recent years, many more Bill of Rights cases involv-
ing corporations than in the New Deal or Progressive era. See appendix I. Also, district courts
have decided more Bill of Rights cases in recent years. See, ag., Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce v. Austin, 643 F. Supp 397, 403 (W.D. Mich. 1986), anct cases cited therein.
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This newfound importance is related to the modem political econ-
omy in which new forms of regulation, and new forms of property, have
made the protection of intangible rights crucial to business organizations.
The Bill of Rights protections, taken together, now form a substantive
due process shield for corporations, reminiscent of the fourteenth amend-
ment shield extant in the Lochner era. The current judicial era is one of
corporate substantive due process.
Ironically, the rise in corporate Bill of Rights protections coincided
with a demise in coherent theory, for constitutional purposes, of the cor-
poration. This demise reflected several factors: the legacy of Legal Real-
ists and other theorists deeply critical of corporate theory, the increasing
dissonance between giant corporations and persons, the current crises in
the business theory of the firm, and concern on the part of the Supreme
Court about whether it legitimately can define the nature and purposes of
a corporation.
The lack of a consistent basis for according corporations constitu-
tional guarantees is all the more puzzling as the demand for corporate
protection increases. Awarding these safeguards to an entire class of
constitutional actors- corporations-is at least as extraordinary a step
as creating wholly new categories of constitutional rights (such as the
right to privacy).
The history of personhood theory suggests the need to clarify the
constitutional status of corporations. This Article questions the legiti-
macy of the corporation's claim to constitutional parity with "real" per-
sons and also suggests that the corporation's status should be determined
by constitutional amendment rather than by judicial fiat.
Undoubtedly, these reform proposals hint at the political prefer-
ences of the author. But it is perhaps worth suggesting that the legal
historian's biases should be apparent rather than hidden. Moreover,
these preferences did not wholly exist prior to undertaking an historical
inquiry, but were partially formed through research. And historical in-
quiry does more than shape political preferences: it can serve, as it did
during the era of Legal Realism, to suggest reforms and solutions.3 65
365. The history of corporate constitutionalism is also a useful lens through which to
refract questions of economic determinism. This history demonstrates a subtle interrelation-
ship between economic change and constitutional thought. As America's political economy
changed in the nineteenth century, so did corporate theory, reflecting the shift from a corpo-
rate charter system, to a general incorporation system. Corporations were considered less
creatures of the state, than natural entities, much like humans. See supra notes 8-23 and ac-
companying text.
But once the natural entity theory took hold, this left the state with few tools to regulate
corporate conduct that was increasingly vested in a managerial class, largely unaccountable to
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But any search for reform encounters America's persistent dilemma:
the contradiction between a yearning for an earlier era of individualism
and a completely antithetical desire for the amenities of a modem econ-
omy driven by large organizations. This dissonance is apparent in the
question of whether corporations should receive protections, ordinarily
reserved for individuals, under the Bill of Rights. The degree to which
corporations appropriate time-honored individual liberties will reveal
much about the resolution of this American dilemma during the Bicen-
tennial of the Bill of Rights.
shareholders. This led to a reemergence of the artificial entity theory in the Progressive and
New Deal eras as a tool to regulate corporations. Both theories of the corporation, artificial
and natural, eventually became inadequate to describe changes in the political economy.
Economic change did not always drive political theory, nor did political theory drive
economic change. The two interacted in subtle ways.
The history of corporate constitutionalism also offers lessons for gauging the social conse-
quences of legal rules. Legal history has focused primarily on the common law. This ap-
proach has provoked some critics to suggest that the common law simply has limited social
consequences, and is of limited use as a gauge for measuring social phenomenon. Whether this
is true or not remains to be seen, but on a spectrum that regards legislation as the most socially
distributive legal process, constitutional history is somewhere between legislation and the com-
mon law in importance.
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APPENDIX I: THE CORPORATION'S BILL OF RIGHTS.
First Amendment
1. Political Speech. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978) (right to spend money to influence referenda).
2. Commercial Speech. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Utilities Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (corporations right to commercial
speech protected.)
3. Negative Free Speech Right. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utili-
ties Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, reh. den., 475 U.S. 1133 (1986) (corporations







1. Freedom From Unreasonable Searches: Corporate Papers. Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (an overbroad subpoena for corporate docu-
ments constitutes an unreasonable search). But see United States v. Mor-
ton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) (an overbroad subpoena is not
considered an unreasonable search).
2. Freedom From Unreasonable Warrantless Regulatory Searches. Mar-
shall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). But see Colonnade Catering
Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1969) (exception for the liquor in-
dustry); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1977) (exception for fire-
arms industry); Donovan v. Dewey 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (exception for
mining industry).
Fifth Amendment
1. Double Jeopardy. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S.
564 (1977) (acquittal of corporation in accordance with the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure not appealable because of fifth amendment
protection against double jeopardy).
2. Takings Clause. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922).
3. No Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906) (subpoena for testimony of corporate officer upheld against claim
of corporate fifth amendment privilege).





Right to Jury Trial in Criminal Case. Armour Packing Co. v. United
States, 209 U.S. 56, 76-77 (1908) (a corporate defendant, convicted of
violating a federal criminal statute, was considered an "accused" for
sixth amendment purposes); see also United States v. R.L. Polk and Co.,
438 F.2d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 1971) ("the fundamental principle that cor-
porations enjoy the same rights as individuals to trial by jury").
Seventh Amendment
Right to Jury Trial in Civil Case. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970)
(Court implies that corporation has a right to jury trial in civil cases
because a shareholder in a derivative suit would have that right.); see also
In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980)








APPENDIX II: OTHER CORPORATE RIGHTS
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
A. Article I - Contracts Clause.
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518 (1819) (state revocation of corporate charter violates contracts clause
of article I, raising an impregnable barrier around corporations, and thus
rendering inviolable the "commercial institutions of the country"); see
also 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 1395 (1833).
B. Article III
1. Citizenship
Corporations Not Covered Citizens Under Article III. Bank of
United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809) (corporations
"as such" are not persons as term is used in Article III and Judiciary Act
of 1789).
2. Diversity Jurisdiction.
Corporations Are Citizens for Diversity Jurisdiction. Bank of
United States v. Deveaux 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809) (corporations are
"citizens" for purposes of Article III jurisdiction; they are citizens by
virtue of the group theory which holds that the members of the corpora-
tion, as real persons, qualify as citizens). But see Louisville, Cincinnati &
Charleston Railroad Co. v. Leston, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844) (Using
the person or natural entity theory, the Court held that, for purposes of
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) diversity, the corpo-
ration is considered a person and a citizen of the state of incorporation.);
Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853)
(all shareholders are presumed to be citizens of the state of incorpora-
tion.); see also 28 U.S.C. 1332 (c) (1982) ("[A] corporation shall be
deemed a citizen of any state by which it has been incorporated and of
the State where it has its principal place of business .....
C. Article IV
1. Privileges and Immunities.
Corporations Are Not Citizens or Persons for Purposes of the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause. Bank of America v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 519 (1839) (foreign corporations cannot claim rights of a person
under the privileges and immunities clause).
D. Fourteenth Amendment
1. Privileges and Immunities Clause.
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Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181 (1888) (corpora-
tions are not citizens for purposes of the fourteenth amendment privi-
leges and immunities clause).
2. Equal Protection Clause.
Santa Clara County v. Southern P.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (cor-
porations are persons for purposes of the equal protection clause).
3. Due Process Clause.
Minneapolis & S.L.R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889) (corpora-
tions are persons for purposes of the due process clause).
4. Liberty Clause.
Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243 (1906) (lib-
erty guaranteed by fourteenth amendment extends only to natural per-
sons and not to corporations). But see First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 778-79 (1978) (rejecting as "artificial mode of analysis" argu-
ment that corporations cannot claim fourteenth amendment protection
of liberty).
E. Other Constitutional Rights.
1. The Right to Travel.
Never Decided By a Court. See Comment, Keeping the Home Team
at Home, 74 CAL. L. R.Ev. 1329, 1354 (authored by Charles Gray) (argu-
ing that the constitutional right to travel as defined in United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966) should not apply to business corpora-
tions; in this case the Raiders football franchise efforts to leave Oakland).
But see Note, Eminent Domain Exercised - Stare Decisis or a Warning:
City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 4 PACE L. REv. 169 (1983) (au-
thored by Michael Schiano) (arguing the opposite position).
2. The Right to Privacy.
California Banker v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65 (1974) (corporations
do not enjoy a right of privacy equivalent to that of individuals under the
fourth and fourteenth amendments.) But see Belth v. Bennett, 740 P.2d
638, 640 (Mont. 1987) (corporations have a right to privacy under the
Montana constitution).
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